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Abstract
This thesis analyzes labor market issues in Indonesia. The first chapter analyzes
the insurance role of self-employment during the Asian Financial Crisis. Difference
in difference estimation is used to estimate the effect of having self-employed
business before the crisis on household consumption and labor supply during the
crisis. I find that households with self-employed business before the crisis could
increase labor supply by a much lesser amount to maintain the same level of
consumption compared with households without self-employed business before
the crisis. The second chapter looks at the effect of women’s work hours on
their intra-household bargaining power. I utilize direct information on household
decision-making from the Indonesian Family Life Survey to construct direct
measures of women’s intra-household bargaining power. I also use regional price
increase during the Asian Financial Crisis as an instrumental variable that positively
affects women’s work hours but does not affect women’s bargaining power directly.
I find evidence for a positive relationship between women’s work hours and their
intra-household bargaining power. The third chapter compares the Indonesian
Family Life Survey and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey and tries to reconcile
the inconsistencies between the two surveys in employment measures. After
documenting and testing potential causes of the inconsistencies, I find that the
inconsistencies are by large not reconcilable. The design of questions on working
status in the survey and the treatment of unpaid family work, however, does seem
to be a factor causing inconsistencies between the two surveys.
Keywords: Developing countries, risk and insurance, self-employment,
informal sector, financial crisis, intra-household decision making, women’s
bargaining power, data inconsistency, unpaid family work, survey design
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis attempts to add to our understanding of labor markets in developing
countries. It analyzes three issues in the context of Indonesia: the insurance role
of self-employment during aggregate economic shocks, the relationship between
women’s working status and their intra-household bargaining power, and the
comparability of labor force data.
Indonesia is relatively understudied in the development literature although it is
the world’s fourth most populous country. Being an archipelago with over 13,000
islands, Indonesia is diverse in geography, ethnicity, and culture. This diversity
makes the nation an ideal setting for economic research. Furthermore, Indonesia
has undergone various policy phases and economic fluctuations since the founding
of the nation in the 1940s. Inter-temporal variations in policy and the macro
economy are of interest from the perspective of both policy research and analysis
of microeconomic responses to changes in the economic environment.
The 1998 Asian financial crisis is a common thread through this thesis. Being
the hardest hit country by this crisis, Indonesia went through a period of turmoil
in terms of exchange rate, prices, and productivity. Each chapter makes use of this
event to shed light on the empirics of household behavior.
1
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The first chapter studies the insurance role of self-employment for households
coping with the Asian financial crisis in urban Indonesia. Using data from the
Indonesian Family Life Survey, it analyzes change in household labor supply
before and after the crisis, and reveals that one of the coping strategies households
used was to increase labor supply. The self-employed sector played a significant
safety net role during the crisis as workers laid-off from the wage sector and new
workers who entered the labor force during the crisis could find employment in the
self-employed sector. Furthermore, having prior self-employment before the crisis
may have had an insurance value for households; households with such activity
prior to the crisis increased their labor supply less than those who did not.
The second chapter investigates the relationship between women’s working
status and their bargaining power within the household. The fact that women’s
working status and bargaining power are simultaneously decided and the fact
that bargaining power is not observed have hampered research on this topic.
This chapter utilizes unique information on household decision-making from the
Indonesian Family Life Survey to construct indices of women’s intra-household
bargaining power. It also uses the Asian financial crisis as an exogenous event
that increased women’s work without directly affecting their bargaining power.
Exploring the fact that one major impact of the crisis was high inflation, that
inflation varied significantly across regions during the crisis, and that inflation
reduced real wages and thus affected household labor supply, this analysis uses
regional inflation as an instrument for the change in women’s work hours during
the crisis. It finds evidence of a positive relationship between women’s work hours
and the bargaining power indices.
The third chapter compares two widely used survey datasets from Indonesia:
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey
(Sakernas), and tries to reconcile the differences in measures of labor market
outcomes (the total employment rate, the wage employment rate, and the non-wage
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employment rate) between these two surveys.1 Inconsistency between these two
surveys in all of the above three measures, both in levels and in changes over
time, is significant. This chapter documents the key differences between the two
surveys that could cause these inconsistencies. It also tests whether differences
in sampling structure, age and education distribution, and questionnaire design
contribute to the inconsistencies. Differences in sampling structure and age and
education distributions do not seem to explain the inconsistencies. Accounting
for the difference in questionnaire design reconciles a small portion of the gaps,
especially in rural areas. This study concludes that the two surveys are not easily
reconcilable using information available. Questionnaire design is important for
measure of employment, especially for measure of family work in rural areas.
1Non-wage employment includes self-employed workers and unpaid family workers.
Chapter 2
Household Risk Coping Strategies:
The Role of Self-Employment during
the Asian Financial Crisis in
Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the role of self-employment as a way for households to
cope with economic shocks in developing countries. By looking at the episode
of the 1998 Asian financial crisis (AFC) in urban Indonesia, I provide evidence
that the self-employment sector played a safety net role in terms of absorbing
labor.1 Also, my findings indicate that having self-employment before the crisis
may have had insurance value for households during the crisis. Households with
prior self-employment experienced a smaller increase in labor supply compared to
households without prior self-employment.
1In this chapter individuals who report themselves as self-employed workers or unpaid family
workers are both defined to be employed in the self-employed sector.
4
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Being the hardest hit country by the Asian financial crisis (AFC), Indonesia
underwent a sharp depreciation of the local currency, an 80% inflation and a 14%
decrease in real GDP in 1998. During such crises or shocks, households typically
adopt coping mechanisms to mitigate the impact of the crisis on their standard of
living. As will be detailed in this chapter, data from the Indonesian Family Life
Survey (IFLS) and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey reveal that during the crisis
Indonesian households sold assets, increased the rate of household composition
change, and increased labor supply. Furthermore, the increased labor supply was
mainly in the self-employed sector. As a result, the increase in total employment
was associated with a shift of labor from the wage- to the self-employed sector.2
The fact that labor shifted from the wage employment sector into the
self-employment sector without a decrease in total employment suggests that the
self-employment sector may have played a safety net role during the crisis. The
self-employment sector appeared to have absorbed the labor laid off from the wage
sector. Also, it was able to absorb the additional labor that entered the labor
force during the crisis when households increased labor supply as a crisis-coping
strategy. In this chapter I pursue the safety net role of the self-employment sector
by asking the following question: Did self-employment act as a form of insurance
for households in urban Indonesia during the crisis, in the sense that a household
with self-employment before the crisis would fare better during the crisis than an
identical household without self-employment before the crisis?
As self-employment is strongly correlated with informal activities in developing
countries, the analysis in this chapter contributes another explanation for the
existence of a large informal sector in developing countries.3 Traditionally, the
2The increase of labor supply in the self-employment sector during recent economic crisis
episodes has been widely observed in developing countries, for example, Mexico during the 1982
crisis(de la Rocha (1988)), Mexico during the 1995 crisis (Martin (2000)), and Costa Rica during
the 1982 crisis (Gindling (1993)).
3I will show in the descriptive analysis that most of the non-farm self-employed businesses
in urban Indonesia are of small scale and under-regulated, and utilize less advanced technology
and unskilled labor. All these characteristics are associated with informal activities in developing
countries. Also, the definition of informal employment as self-employment is widely used in the
development literature (Fiess et al. (2010), Loayza and Rigolini (2011)) and by the International
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development literature contains two strands of thoughts on why the informal sector
exists when there is an earning gap between the formal and the informal sector.
The first strand originates from the dual sector model of Harris and Todaro (1970).
Their view is that the informal sector contains workers rationed out of the formal
sector due to formal sector entry barriers and rigidities such as a minimum wage.
Such factors lead to labor market segmentation, which causes informal workers to
earn less than identical workers in the formal sector.
A second, emerging strand of literature (Gindling (1991); Maloney (1999);
Maloney (2004)), more in the spirit of a Roy model, considers informal employment
as a voluntary choice based on people’s comparative advantage. Although workers
in the informal sector on average may earn less than workers in the formal sector,
those who work in the informal sector earn more in that sector than they would in
the formal sector.
This chapter adds a third rationale for informal employment, which is that
informal employment provides insurance against economic shocks in the formal
sector. If households anticipate that having informal employment will help them
fare better in future economic shocks, they may choose to engage in some informal
employment currently, even though they receive a lower return with informal
employment currently. If informal employment does, in fact, play an insurance role,
this would have policy implications. Policies aimed at modernizing the economy by
reducing the informal sector may need to be accompanied by measures that provide
households with better access to insurance, for example, unemployment insurance.4
Otherwise, reductions in informal activities may make households worse off by
increasing their consumption volatility.
The insurance role of self-employment will only arise if the return to
self-employment is not perfectly correlated with the economic shocks that the
households encounter. Traditionally the development literature viewed the
Labor Organization.
4Unemployment insurance does not exist in many developing countries including Indonesia.
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self-employment sector as a risky sector with big variation in profits or earnings
over time (Perry et al. (2007); Gunther and Launov (2012); Bennet et al. (2012)).
With respect to rural areas, much research has been done on the riskiness of crop
production and the various non-market strategies households use to insure against
this risk (Rosenzweig and Bingswanger (1993); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993);
Besley et al. (1993); Fafchamps et al. (1998)). With respect to urban areas, little
research exists that measures the riskiness of self-employment. It is commonly
believed, however, that self-employment is riskier than wage employment, as
self-employment is in the form of micro-entrepreneurship that may result in variable
profit or loss. Wage employment, in contrast, may generate more stable income
(Perry et al. (2007); Gunther and Launov (2012)). Nevertheless, self-employment
may have an insurance value if the other kinds of risk that the households face
are not perfectly correlated with the returns to self-employment. One such risk
is unemployment from wage jobs. Another such risk is inflation. Inflation may
be less correlated with changes in real earnings from self-employment, because
self-employment often involves production of in-kind services and goods, the value
of which is more insulated from inflation shocks. Also, self-employment does not
involve long-term employment contracts with fixed nominal pay, which can make
wages in the wage sector less flexible and unable to adjust with inflation. These
considerations are relevant to the AFC in Indonesia, which was accompanied by
surging inflation and a drop in formal sector productivity (Soesastro (1998), Evans
(1998)).
If entry into self-employment is costless, then households would not have an
incentive to hold prior self-employment as buffer against future shocks. They
can switch into self-employment after the shocks are realized without paying
a cost. Is entry into self-employment costless? In most developing countries,
self-employment is in small household businesses that employ only, or mainly,
family labor (Fiess et al. (2010); Loayza and Rigolini (2011)). In order for
households to enter self-employment, they need to start their own businesses, which
Chapter 2. Insurance Role of Self-Employment during Crisis 8
may require some initial investment in capital. As discussed in Balan et al. (1973)
and Fiess et al. (2010), although the initial starting capital is modest for these
businesses, the amount may be substantial relative to household resources and can
take some time to accumulate. As I will show using Indonesian data, the starting
capital for self-employed businesses in urban Indonesia is non-trivial relative to the
level of household consumption. Another cost of entry into self-employment may
be lower return in the initial period of operation due to lack of experience.
This chapter will add to the literature on risk and self-insurance in developing
countries by studying a risk-managing strategy used by urban households in
Indonesia: diversification between wage employment and self-employment.
Diversification of income generating activities has been one of the self-insurance or
risk management strategies discussed in the development literature. The strategies
that have been studied include diversification between farm and non-farm activities
(Reardon (1997), Townsend (1994), Dercon (2002)) and diversification in location
of land plots and types of crop grown (Morduch (1990), Dercon (1996)). The
literature on risk and self-insurance in developing countries mainly concentrates
on households in rural areas; income smoothing strategies of households in urban
areas are understudied. Similar to households in rural areas, households in urban
areas can face considerable risk at both the individual and aggregate levels. This
chapter concentrates on households in urban areas in Indonesia and studies their
income diversification strategies.
The main questions posed in the literature on income diversification strategies
include: 1. How big is the scope for income diversification? 2. To what
extent do households use these strategies? 3. To what extent do these strategies
smooth household’s income? 4. What are the constraints and costs of using
these strategies?(Dercon (2002)) In this chapter, when analyzing diversification
between wage employment and self-employment by urban households, I provide
some evidence on the first question by exploring household data on economic
shocks in urban Indonesia. I find that during the AFC households with
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mostly wage employment experienced more economic shocks than households
with mostly self-employment, while in a non-crisis period, households with
mostly self-employment experienced more economic shocks. Regarding the
second question, this chapter describes household labor allocation between wage
employment and self-employment in urban Indonesia. Around half of households
in urban Indonesia have self-employed businesses. I also provide some evidence on
the fourth question by examining the amount of starting capital for self-employed
businesses. I find this starting capital is substantial compared to household monthly
consumption. The main empirical task of this chapter is to provide evidence
on the third question: I conduct an empirical analysis to test the existence and
the magnitude of the insurance value of prior self-employment with respect to
household consumption and labor during the crisis.
To carry out such a test, ideally I would want to compare two households that
are identical except the fact that one household had self-employment before the
crisis and the other did not. Comparison of these two households during the crisis
would provide evidence of whether and by how much the household with prior
self-employment fared better than the household without prior self-employment. Of
course, it is impossible to observe two such households. Nevertheless, if I observe
all the household characteristics that determine whether the household would
have prior self-employment before the crisis, I can obtain a consistent estimate
of the insurance value of prior self-employment during the crisis by comparing
households with and without self-employment before the crisis. As shown in my
analytical model, however, the decision to have self-employment before the crisis
may depend on household unobserved characteristics that also affect household
consumption and labor during the crisis. Therefore, having self-employment before
the crisis is an endogenous decision.
To address this endogeneity problem, I utilize the panel data nature of the IFLS
and carry out difference in difference estimations. I use households that did not have
prior self-employment either in the pre-crisis period or in the during-crisis period
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as the control group. I use households that did not have prior self-employment
in the pre-crisis period but had prior self-employment in the during-crisis period
as treatment group. The difference in the changes in household consumption and
labor during the crisis between these two groups will provide a consistent estimate
of the treatment effect of prior self-employment. Using this approach, I find the
average effect of the crisis on household consumption and labor is a decrease in
consumption and an increase in household labor. Having prior self-employment
has no effect on household consumption, but has a negative effect on one measure
of household labor: the percentage of adult members who work. I conclude that the
evidence regarding the insurance value of prior self-employment is mixed.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes the Indonesian
context and the changes in the Indonesian economy during the AFC. Section 2.3
introduces the two datasets (the Indonesian Family Life Survey and the Indonesian
Labor Force Survey) used in this chapter and talks about various issues in using
these two datasets to analyze households’ and individuals’ responses to the AFC.
In section 2.4 I provide descriptive statistics regarding the magnitudes of various
coping mechanisms that urban households used to mitigate the impact of the crisis.
In section 2.5 I include some descriptive analysis on the frequency of economic
shocks encountered by urban households and on the nature of self-employed
businesses. I then examine differences between households that held prior
self-employment before the crisis and households that did not in terms of pre-crisis
characteristics as well as changes during the crisis. Section 2.6 introduces a
simple analytical model that captures households’ consumption and labor allocation
choice during the crisis and derives testable implications. Section 2.7 explains the
empirical strategy. Section 2.8 reports the results and provides some discussions.
Section 2.9 concludes.
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2.2 The Indonesian Context and the Asian Financial
Crisis
2.2.1 The Indonesian Context
Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world with a population of 238
million in 2010. Being an archipelago with 13000 islands, the country has around
300 ethnic groups and 742 different languages and dialects. Population density
varies significantly across regions, and 58% of the population lives on the island
of Java. Despite the growth of a number of urban centers, Indonesia remains a
largely rural country, with two-thirds of the population living in rural areas in 1997.
Jakarta, the capital and economic and financial center of the country, has been a
major destination for migrants.
Before the Asian financial crisis (AFC), Indonesia was undergoing a period
of rapid economic growth and structural change, transforming from a traditional
agricultural based economy into a modern economy based on industry and service.
From 1976 to 1997, non-oil and gas GDP grew on average by 7.5% per year
(Dhanani et al. (2009)).5 During the same period, agriculture’s share of non-oil/gas
GDP decreased from 37% to 16%, and agricultural employment’s share of total
employment decreased from 62% to 41% (Dhanani et al. (2009)). From 1986
to 1997, wage employment rose from a quarter to one-third of total employment
(Dhanani et al. (2009)). Human capital had also improved significantly: primary
school enrollment rose from 75% in 1970 to universal enrollment by 1995, and
secondary school enrollment rose from 13% to 55% over the same period (World
Bank Databank).
5Oil and gas sector has been an important sector of the Indonesian economy, especially during
the 1970s and 1980s when Indonesia was a significant oil-exporting country. Indonesia became an
oil-importing country recently due to its decreasing oil production and increasing domestic demand.
Although an important sector, employment in oil and gas is a small fraction of total employment in
Indonesia.
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Rice and fuel subsidies have been a feature of the Indonesian economy since
its independence in the 1940s. As shown in Figure 2.2, with the exception of a
brief period in 1974 and 1975, from the late 1960s until 1997 the price of rice
was maintained at a subsidized level. The subsidies were financed using the influx
of oil revenue and foreign investment (Beaton and Lontoh (2010);Timmer (2004)).
The government used subsidies primarily to support macroeconomic policies aimed
at maintaining social and political stability (Beaton and Lontoh (2010)). In this
regard, rice price stability was especially important because rice is the staple food
for most Indonesian households. As of 1997, the share of rice consumption in total
household consumption ranged from 5% to 20%, depending on the household’s
income level (calculated using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey). The
removal of rice and fuel subsidies during the AFC is one of the leading causes of
price surge during the AFC.
Figure 2.1: Map of Indonesia
Figure 2.2: Real Rice Price 1969 - 2007, Rp/Kg, Monthly Data
Source: Dawe (2008)
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2.2.2 The Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia and Its Impacts
The Asian financial crisis started in May, 1997, when the Thai baht came under
speculative attacks. Indonesia began to be affected in July 1997, when the local
currency, Rupiah, also came under attack due to a contagion effect. The Indonesian
government first tried to defend the Rupiah within a trading band and then allowed
the currency to float freely on August 14, 1997. A 30% depreciation followed in
the next two months (Figure 2.3). The sharp depreciation of the Rupiah made many
banks and corporations insolvent, because they had borrowed heavily in foreign
currency denominated short-term debts (Soesastro (1998)). In October, 1997, the
Indonesian government closed 16 insolvent banks.
The credit crunch had a significant impact on the modern sector, bringing
production to halt in many firms (Manning (2000)). Several studies reported
large-scale layoffs in construction and manufacturing (Hartono and Ehrmann
(2001); Soesastro (1998)). In January, 1998, after the announcement of the state
budget plan, the Rupiah collapsed. Under pressure from the IMF to cut government
expenditures and foreign debt, the Indonesian government removed subsidies on
rice and fuel in January, 1998. The removal of subsidies lead to a surge in food and
other prices (Figure 2.2 ; Figure 2.4). Inflation in 1998 was 80%, partly the result
of the removal of subsidies and partly due to the increase in the relative prices of
tradable goods including rice and other cash crops. The surge in the prices of basic
necessities lead to nation-wide protests and riots against the government, which
eventually lead to the resignation of Suharto in May, 1998 and the ending of 32
years of Suharto’s regime. Real GDP decreased by 14% in 1998, and GNI per
capita did not recover to the 1997 level until 2003 (Figure 2.5).
Strauss et al. (2004) explain that for Indonesian households, the major crisis
during the AFC was the surge in prices, which caused a sharp, rapid reduction in
households’ real income. Losses and firm closings in the modern sector also had
a significant impact on the household sector through layoffs and wage cuts. The
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result was a substantial decline in living standards. Frankenberg et al. (1999) found
that from 1997 to 1998 mean household per capita consumption decreased by 34%
in urban areas, and median household per capita consumption decreased by 5%. At
the same time, enrollment rates for urban children aged 13 to 19 years old fell from
67% to 62% (Poppele et al. (1999)).
Figure 2.3: Exchange Rate Fluctuation During Crisis
Source: Frankenberg et al. (2003)
Figure 2.4: Change of Price and Nominal Wage
Source:Frankenberg et al. (2003)
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Figure 2.5: GNI Trend
Source: tradingeconomics.com
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Indonesian Family Life Survey
The IFLS is a household level longitudinal survey conducted by RAND Corporation
in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2007. All rounds of the survey are publicly available
except the 1998 round. In the first wave conducted in the second half of 1993, over
30,000 individuals in 7,224 households were sampled. The sampling scheme was
stratified on provinces and rural-urban areas within provinces. Enumeration areas
(EAs) were randomly sampled within these strata, and households were randomly
sampled within the enumeration areas. The documentation for the IFLS states that
EAs in the urban areas and in smaller provinces were oversampled to facilitate
urban-rural and Java/non-Java comparisons. The sample covered 13 out of the 27
provinces in Indonesia, including all provinces on Java and provinces on Sumatra,
Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara (Figure 2.1). As a result, the
sample covered about 83% of the Indonesian population.
In each of the succeeding rounds, the survey team tried to re-contact all of the
households interviewed in 1993 (“original households”). Members who moved out
of their original households were also tracked and their new households were added
to the sample (“split-off” households).6 The resulting sample size and the recontact
rate for each round is listed in Table 2.1. Attrition for original households was 7%
from 1993 to 1997 and 3% from 1997 to 2000. If we only want to compare changes
between 1997 and 2000 for the original households, then attrition is rather low.
The IFLS collected rich information on many aspects of household and
individual life, including household consumption, business and assets, and
individual education, working status and work history.
In this chapter, I treat the IFLS2 as the survey round before the crisis and the
IFLS3 as the survey round during the crisis, and derive the changes during the
6A more detailed description of the IFLS re-contact procedure is provided in Appendix A.
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Table 2.1: Sample Size and Attrition of the IFLS 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2000
Household Type
Original 1997 Splits 1998 Splits 2000 Splits
1993 households 7224
1997 households 6742 878
1993-1997 recontact rate 93%
1997 HHs to be tracked in 1998 1911 264
1993 HHs to be tracked in 1998 2063
1998 households 1990 344
1993-1998 recontact rate 96%
1997 households that are also in 1998 1893 241
1997-1998 recontact rate 99% 91%
2000 households 6758 2646
1993-2000 recontact rate 94%
1997 households that are also in 2000 6564 751
1997-2000 recontact rates 97% 86%
1998 households that are also in 2000 1935 220 279
1998-2000 recontact rates 97% 91% 81%
crisis by comparing the IFLS3 with the IFLS2. As noted already, in Indonesia the
AFC started in July, 1997. The IFLS2 was conducted mainly between June and
November of 1997. Therefore, when the IFLS2 field work took place, the crisis had
already begun to unfold. The currency collapse and the hyperinflation, however,
both occurred in January, 1998, which was after the IFLS2 fieldwork. I, therefore,
have some confidence in treating the IFLS2 as representing the pre-crisis situation.
To analyze the impact of the crisis, ideally one should use the IFLS2+, which
was administered in 1998 at the deepest point of the crisis. This round, however, is
not publicly available. Therefore, I can only use the IFLS3, which was conducted
in 2000, to represent the situation during the crisis. By 2000, the economy would
have recovered to some extent from the deepest of the crisis, but as shown in Figure
2.5, per capita GNI did not recover to the 1997 level until 2003. As a result, it
should be possible to capture part of the effects of the AFC using the IFLS3. One
should keep in mind that the changes observed by comparing the IFLS2 and the
IFLS3 may understate the full impact of the crisis on Indonesian households.
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2.3.2 The Indonesian Labor Force Survey
The Indonesian Labor Force Survey is a household level repeated cross section
survey. The Indonesian Bureau of Statistics has been conducting it since 1976.
This chapter uses the period from 1986 to 2011.7 The survey design stratifies on
urban-rural status and randomly samples enumeration areas within urban and rural
areas. Then segment groups are randomly sampled within enumeration areas, and
all households within segment groups are interviewed. The sample of the Labor
Force Survey each year is much bigger than that of the IFLS, ranging from 155,000
to 950,000 individuals and covering all provinces of Indonesia.8 Therefore, the
Labor Force Survey should be more representative of the population distribution
across regions and across urban-rural status than the IFLS. Its questionnaire is much
shorter than the IFLS, only asking for information about education and work for
household members older than 15 years.
The advantage of using the Labor Force Survey to analyze the effects of the AFC
is that data are available annually. As a result, one can obtain the long-run trend in
labor market outcomes and observe the deviation from the trend during the AFC.
Another advantage is that the Labor Force Survey in 1997 was conducted in August
only, while the field work for the IFLS2 extended from June until November.
Therefore, the 1997 round of Labor Force Survey can be treated as pre-crisis with
more confidence than the IFLS2. Also, the Labor Force Survey’s 1997 round can be
compared with the 1998 round, so that one can observe the changes in labor market
outcomes between those two years. One can also see whether the crisis impact
continued to deepen or whether outcomes had begun to recover in 1999 and 2000.
In these respects, the Labor Force Survey should complement the observations
one can make from comparing labor market outcomes between the IFLS2 and the
IFLS3.
7From 1986 to 1993, the survey was conducted quarterly. Starting in 1994, the survey was
conducted annually.
8In 1995, the Labor Force Survey was administered as part of the Inter-Census Population
Survey, resulting in a bigger sample size and different sampling frame.
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The main advantage of the IFLS is that it contains information on household
consumption, which is a key variable in my analysis. Therefore, this chapter mainly
uses the IFLS in the empirical analysis. In addition, the panel data nature of the
IFLS allows me to control for household fixed effects and thus deal with the problem
that self-employment is an endogenous decision.
2.4 Descriptive Statistics on Different Coping
Mechanisms
2.4.1 Impact of Crisis on Consumption
Table 2.2: Change in Household Per Capita Consumption in Urban Indonesia
Mean of Real Per Capita Consumption 1997 135699
Median of Real Per Capia Consumption 1997 75940
Mean of Change in Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -27185
Median of Change in Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -1372
Mean of Change in Ln of Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -0.0434
Median of Change in Ln of Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -0.0211
Change of Mean Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -19.91%
Change of Median Real Per Capita Consumption 1997-2000 -5.95%
Change of Mean Real Per Capita Consumption 1993-1997 67.73%
Change of Median Real Per Capita Consumption 1993-1997 35.49%
Data source: IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3, original panel households
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, Frankenberg et al. (1999) find that household
per capita consumption decreased by 34% in mean and 5% in median comparing
the IFLS2 and the IFLS2+ (1997 and 1998). I compute the change of household
per capita consumption between the IFLS2 and the IFLS3 (1997 and 2000). Table
2.2 shows that from 1997 to 2000 the change in mean of household real per capita
consumption is -19.91%, and the change in median of household real per capita
consumption is -5.95%. This change is similar to what Frankenberg et al. (1999)
have found using the IFLS2+. Table 2.2 also shows that before the crisis average
household consumption was increasing fast, and the crisis has reversed this trend.
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Figure 2.6: Mean of Change in Ln of Real Household Per Capita Consumption
from 1997 to 2000 in Urban Indonesia by Real Household Per Capita
Consumption in 1993 (with 95% C.I. bars)
Source: IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3
The fact that mean of household per capita consumption decreased more than
median indicates that the crisis hit richer households more. Figure 2.6 confirms
that this might be the case. One can see that the richer households in 1993 in
terms of household per capita consumption had a bigger percentage decrease in
per capita consumption from 1997 to 2000.9 For the richest group of households,
mean percentage decrease in household per capita consumption was more than ten
percentage points.
One can see that the impact of the crisis on consumption was quite large. To
mitigate the effect of the crisis, households could use various coping strategies, such
as increasing labor supply, spending savings, selling assets or sending members to
live or work in areas less hit by the crisis. In this section, I will show the magnitudes
of each of these mechanisms.
9I use 1993 consumption to categorize households into richer and poorer groups because by 1997
household consumption may have already been affected by the crisis.
Chapter 2. Insurance Role of Self-Employment during Crisis 21
2.4.2 Increase in Labor Supply and Shift from Wage
Employment to Self-employment
One coping strategy households could use during the crisis was to increase labor
supply in order to generate additional income. Using around 4400 urban panel
respondents who were tracked in the IFLS1, the IFLS2 and the IFLS3, in Table 2.3 I
show the change in percentages of individuals who are employed in the wage sector,
in the self-employed sector, and not working. From 1993 to 1997, the distribution of
individuals among different employment status did not change. From 1997 to 2000,
however, wage employment decreased by 3.6 percentage points, self-employment
increased by 7.7 percentage points, and total employment increased by 4 percentage
points. In other words, total employment increased significantly, and at the same
time, there was a shift from wage employment into self-employment.
Table 2.3: Percentage of Urban Individuals with Different Employment Status
1993 1997 2000
Wage employment 34.83 33.8 30.21
[33.44, 36.24] [32.41, 35.21] [28.87, 31.59]
Self-employment 30.34 30.7 38.42
[29.01, 31.71] [29.35, 32.08] [36.99, 39.87]
Not working 34.83 35.51 31.37
[33.44, 36.24] [34.1, 36.93] [30.02, 32.76]
Data source: IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3, panel respondents, numbers in brackets are 95% confidence
intervals. All measures calculated using only the primary job of individuals.
To look at the change in labor supply at the household level, I compute the
percentage of adult members (age greater or equal to 15 years) who work, who are
employed in the wage sector and who are employed in the self-employed sector
for each household. The sample I use are original panel households that had urban
residence in 1997 and that were recontacted in 2000. Table 2.4 shows the mean
of these measures. Again, the percentages show little change between 1993 and
1997, but from 1997 to 2000 the share of adult members who work on average
increased by 5 percentage points for urban households. The increase was due to
greater self-employment.
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Table 2.4: Share of Adult Members of Urban Households who Work, who Are
Employed in Wage Sector, and who Are Employed in Self-Employed Sector,
Mean across Households
1993 1997 2000
Share working 59.48 58.43 63.64
[58.29, 60.67] [57.22, 59.65] [62.44, 64.84]
Share wage employment 34.99 34.73 33.76
[33.71, 36.26] [33.47, 35.99] [32.50, 35.02]
Share self-employment 24.49 23.7 29.88
[23.25, 25.74] [22.47, 24.93] [28.55, 31.21]
Data source: IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3, panel respondents, numbers in brackets are 95% confidence
intervals. Adult members are older than 15. All measures calculated using only the primary job of
individuals.
Since self-employment is mostly in small household businesses, we should see
an increase in the number of household businesses during the crisis. This is indeed
the case, as demonstrated in Table 2.5. The change in percentage of households with
either farm or non-farm business was small from 1993 and 1997. Between 1997 and
2000, however, there was a surge (17 percentage points) in the percentage of urban
households with non-farm businesses. This increase adds more confidence to the
claim that self-employment increased significantly during the crisis. The expansion
of self-employment was accompanied by the creation of household businesses.
Table 2.5: Percentage of Urban Households with Farm and Nonfarm Businesses
1993 1997 2000
% with farm 11.63 9.92 13.52
% with non-farm 38.4 37.86 54.56
Data source: IFLS1 IFLS2 IFLS3, panel original households
To confirm the stylized fact that total employment increased during the
crisis with a shift from wage employment sector into self-employment sector,
I use the Labor Force Survey to construct the trend of wage employment vs.
self-employment at the individual level for the period from 1986 to 2011.10
1995 was taken out as it was part of the Inter-Census Population Survey with
10wage employment is percent of adults employed in the wage sector, self-employment is percent
of adults employed in the self-employed sector.
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a different sampling frame. The trend is shown in two separate graphs because
in 2001 the definition of working had changed in the Labor Force Survey,
resulting in non-comparability of the data before and after 2000.11 As shown
in Figure 2.7, before 1997, there was a trend of increasing wage employment
and stable self-employment. In 1998 this trend was reversed, and we see a two
percentage points drop in wage employment and 1.5 percentage point increase in
self-employment. As a result, from 1997 to 1998 total employment decreased by
0.5 percentage point and labor shifted from the wage employment sector to the
self-employment sector. We can also see that from 1998 to 2000 wage employment
did not drop further, and self-employment increased by another 1.0 percentage
point. Therefore, the pattern of a shift from wage employment to self-employment
during the crisis is also observed in the Labor Force Survey.
Figure 2.7: Percentage of Urban Adults Employed in the Wage Sector
vs. Percentage of Urban Adults Employed in the Self-Employed
Sector, 1986-2000
Data: Indonesian Labor Force Survey 1986-2000. Adults are older than 15. Self-employed sector
includes self-employed and family workers. All measures calculated using only the primary job of
individuals.
The magnitude of the decrease in wage employment is similar between
11According to Dhanani et al. (2009), it took the survey team several years to adjust to the change
in definitions of various labor market outcomes, and there was considerable noise in the Labor Force
Survey data between 2000 and 2003.
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of Urban Adults Employed in the Wage Sector
vs. Percentage of Urban Adults Employed in the Self-Employed
Sector, 2001-2011
Data: Indonesian Labor Force Survey 2001-2011. Adults are older than 15. Self-employed sector
includes self-employed and family workers. All measures calculated using only the primary job of
individuals.
Figure 2.9: Pump Price for Diesel Fuel (US dollar per Liter)
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Figure 2.10: August to August Inflation from 1987 to 2011
Source: Indonesia Statistics Bureau
the Labor Force Survey and the IFLS, while the magnitude of the increase in
self-employment is much bigger according to the IFLS than according to the Labor
Force Survey. A potential reason for this discrepancy is that the IFLS has one more
follow up question than the Labor Force Survey when trying to elicit information on
employment status. More specifically, in the IFLS respondents were asked whether
they worked in a family business in the previous week as the last follow-up question
to decide whether the respondent was working. This question was not asked in the
Labor Force Survey. Therefore, the IFLS should pick up more accurately than the
Labor Force Survey the increase in self-employment during the crisis.
One interesting observation from Figure 2.8 is that another episode of increased
self-employment occurred from 2005 to 2008. Interestingly, this period coincides
with another episode of rice and fuel price surge following an import ban on
rice and the removal of subsidies on fuel (Figures 2.2, 2.9). Inflation doubled in
2006 and 2008 compared with 2005 (Figure 2.10). Thus, it appears that rising
prices are associated with increases in self-employment, implying that increases
in self-employment seemed to be a coping strategy that urban households used to
combat inflation.
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2.4.3 Change in Savings and Other Assets
Using the IFLS, Table 2.6 looks at the change in ownership and value of assets in
different categories for urban households from 1997 to 2000.
Table 2.6: Change in Ownership and Value of Assets for Urban
Households 1997-2000
Asset type Change of ownership Know value Change in value
Sold all New owner Kept some Never own
House 6.03 6.55 72.23 15.20 86.46 -1186650
[310932]
Building* 8.37 9.03 7.68 74.91 94.31 -149796
[96123]
Land 16.06 10.51 8.55 64.89 93.63 -429843
[88814]
Vehicles 16.06 13.03 41.39 29.53 95.62 39197
[46623]
Appliances 5.66 5.86 82.59 5.90 92.28 98013
[12246]
Savings 13.51 17.13 19.06 50.31 87.84 57472
[18316]
Receivables 8.24 9.03 3.00 79.74 96.55 10269
[5849]
Jewelry 16.07 17.28 46.34 20.31 88.22 9796
[8051]
Furniture 1.00 3.00 95.55 0.45 87.94 61606
[11794]
IFLS2 and IFLS3 panel households. *Building not occupied by the household. Numbers in
brackets are standard deviations. Change in asset value is change in real value adjusted for
inflation. Inflation data from Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.
One can see that in terms of change in ownership of assets, fewer households
own land and vehicles in 2000 than in 1997. Selling land and vehicles may have
been one of the coping strategies used by urban households. In terms of change in
value, the mean change in asset value was negative only for the categories houses,
buildings, and land. We do not know whether the drop in value for these groups is
caused by a decrease in quantity or a reduction in price. For liquid assets such as
savings, receivables and jewelry, Table 2.6 shows no decrease either in ownership
or in value. There are two potential explanations why we do not observe a drop in
liquid assets between 1997 and 2000. The first is that there was, in fact, no drop.
The second is that there was a decrease at the depth of the crisis (1998), but by 2000
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households had re-invested in these assets while recovering from the crisis. As a
result, we do not observe a change. We can still observe a decrease in the ownership
of non-liquid assets such as land and vehicles by 2000 perhaps because they take
longer to restock. As shown in Frankenberg et al. (2003), using the IFLS2 and the
IFLS2+, they found that the percentage of urban households that owned jewelry
decreased from 64% to 50% between 1997 and 1998. They argue that jewelry was
a major type of household asset in Indonesia, and that selling jewelry was one of the
coping strategies used during the crisis. If we compare 1997 and 2000, however, we
do not see a decrease in ownership in jewelry for urban households. This suggests
that selling assets may have played a bigger role during the crisis than one can
observe by comparing the IFLS2 and the IFLS3.
2.4.4 Change in Household Composition
Another coping mechanism households could use is to send members to live or
work in areas less hit by the crisis. For example, it is suggested in Manning (2000)
that during the AFC urban households in Indonesia with ties to rural areas sent
members to live/work in rural areas. Because agriculture was more resilient to the
crisis, there were more employment opportunities in rural areas than in urban areas.
To investigate whether such changes in household composition were an
important mechanism that urban households in Indonesia used during the crisis,
I compare the annual hazard rate of a household having at least one member
moving in/out due to various reasons between the period 1993-1997 and the period
1997-2000. For example, as shown in Table 2.7, from 1993 to 1997, on average
each year 2.61% of urban households had at least one member die.
Table 2.7 shows that the hazard rates during the crisis period were not higher
than during the pre-crisis period for all reasons except for the reason “needing
place”. Also, the aggregate hazard rate of having member move in or move out
is about 2.5 percentage points higher for the crisis period. This finding suggests
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Table 2.7: Annual Hazard Rate (%) of Having at Least One Member
Moving by Moving Reasons, Urban Households
Reason Move In Move Out
1993-1997 1997-2000 1993-1997 1997-2000
Death 2.61 2.99
Birth 6.65 5.45
Follow spouse/parent 1.13 2.81 2.52 4.18
Work 0.91 1.48 4.04 4.30
Marriage 1.98 1.91 3.69 3.49
School 0.60 0.95 1.79 2.08
Need place 1.03 2.08 0.73 2.04
Other 2.00 1.95 2.01 2.31
Total* 7.09 9.42 12.59 15.05
Data source: IFLS1, IFLS2 and IFLS3. * Total includes all reasons except death and birth. Annual
hazard rates are calculated as annual growth rates that produce the observed changes during the
1993-1997 and the 1997-2000 intervals.
more movement in household composition during the crisis than before the crisis.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics on the Insurance Function
of Self-Employment
From the last section, one can see that shift of labor from wage employment sector
to self-employment sector appears to have been a mechanism Indonesian urban
households used to cope with the AFC. It seems that self-employed sector was
more resilient to the crisis than the wage sector, and that it served as a safety net. In
this section, I take a first look at whether self-employment functioned as a form of
insurance.
As explained in the introduction, for self-employment to function as insurance
against shocks in the wage sector, the return to self-employment should not be
perfectly correlated with the return to wage employment. In this section, I use
the IFLS data to describe the nature of self-employed businesses. Then I show
that the frequency of economic shocks differs between households that only had
self-employment and households that only had wage employment. Then I compare
characteristics between households that had self-employment before the crisis and
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households that did not have self-employment before the crisis. I also compare
changes in characteristics during the crisis between these two groups of households,
to see if one group fared better during the crisis than the other group.
2.5.1 Nature of Self-Employed Businesses and Amount of
Starting Capital
In each round of the IFLS, a module on household farm and non-farm businesses
was administered. The IFLS4 had the richest information on household business,
because in this round questions on the number of paid and unpaid employees and
the amount of starting capital were added. Therefore, I use the IFLS4 to describe
the nature of urban self-employed non-farm businesses.12
From Table 2.8, one can see that 95% of urban non-farm businesses in Indonesia
have fewer than five workers, and 40% are operated by only one person. Only 16%
have paid employees. 24% of these businesses are operated inside home. Most of
these businesses do not have a permit. All these characteristics indicate that the
household businesses are mostly informal activities.
One important observation to note is that urban non-farm businesses require
a substantial amount of starting capital. I divide the amount of each business’s
starting capital by monthly per capita consumption of the same household to obtain
a relative value of starting capital. Median starting capital is 1.26 times household
monthly per capita consumption, and mean starting capital is 8.57 times household
monthly per capita consumption. This evidence supports the argument that entry
into self-employed sector is not free. Therefore, households have an incentive to
12In this chapter self-employment is defined to be equivalent to household business, and
self-employed workers work in household businesses while reporting themselves to be either
self-employed or family workers. I concentrate on non-farm businesses in this chapter for the
following reasons. First, farm businesses are different from non-farm businesses in nature, so
grouping the two may not make sense. Second, only a small percentage (about 10%) of urban
households have farm businesses, and this group of households are significantly poorer than the
rest of urban households. Conversely, households with non-farm businesses are not significantly
different from households without non-farm businesses in terms of consumption and wealth.
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Table 2.8: Main Characteristics of Urban Self-Employed Non-Farm
Businesses in Indonesia
Location of Business Outside home 52%
Partially outside home 23%
At home 24%
Whether Have Permit With permit 11%
Without permit 89%
Industry Restaurants and food sales 29%
Non-food sales 30.5%
Tailor and hairdressing 12%
Other 28.5%
Number of Workers 1 40%
2-5 55%
> 5 5%
Number of Paid Employees 0 84%
>0 16%
Starting Capital Median 1.26*
Mean 8.57*
*In terms of household monthly per capita consumption
Calculated using the IFLS4
establish self-employed businesses before the realization of shocks.
With respect to the line of business, 30% are in restaurants and food sales,
and another 30% are in non-food sales. Tailor and hairdressing accounts for
12%. Will these kinds of businesses be more resilient during economic downturns?
One can imagine that these small retail and service businesses mostly provide
inexpensive products and services related to daily needs, the demand for which
would not decrease so much during economic downturns. The formal sector, in
contrast, provides more luxury goods and services that consumers can substitute
away from during economic downturns, and therefore the formal sector can be
more pro-cyclical. Also, small scale businesses would tend to use fewer imported
inputs than formal sector businesses, and as a result they would be less affected
by exchange rate swings that accompany financial crises in developing countries.
Lastly, self-employed businesses borrow little in the formal financial sector, and
would not be affected by fluctuations in the formal financial sector during financial
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crises.
2.5.2 Frequency of Economic Shocks for Households with and
without Self-Employment
In the IFLS2 (1997) and the IFLS3 (2000) households were asked whether they had
experienced various kinds of economic shocks in the last five years. The types of
shocks include: 1. death of a householder or other family member, 2. sickness of
a householder that necessitated hospitalization or continuous medical treatment, 3.
crop loss, 4. household/business loss due to fire, earthquake, or other disasters, 5.
unemployment of a householder or a business failure, 6. decrease of household
income due to decrease in production or low price of products. I concentrate
on the last two kinds of shocks, which are relevant to this analysis. For the
original panel urban households, I calculate the percentage of households that had
a particular kind of shock in either 1994 or 1995 based on what type of households
they were in 1993. I distinguish among three types of households: households
that only had wage employment, households that had only self-employment, and
households that had both wage employment and self-employment.13 Similarly,
I calculate the percentage of households that had a particular kind of shock in
either 1998 or 1999 based on what type of households they were in 1997. Since
1994-1995 was a non-crisis period and 1998-1999 was a crisis period, I can
compare these two periods to see whether the frequency of shocks for different
kinds of households changed between the two periods. In this way I provide very
preliminary evidence on whether shocks to wage-employment and self-employment
are perfectly correlated over time.
Unfortunately, the fifth category of shock in the survey question does not allow
me to distinguish shocks that occur due to unemployment and ones that occur due
to the failure of a business. I can, however, distinguish between shocks experienced
13Only primary job of household members are considered. The households that have both
self-employment and wage employment are households that have members working in the
self-employed sector and also members who work in the wage sector.
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by households with only wage employment and shocks experienced by households
with only self-employment. For the households with only wage employment,
most shocks in this category should be associated with unemployment; for the
households with only self-employment, most shocks in this category should be
associated with the failure of a business. It is possible that households with only
wage employment faced a lower risk of unemployment than an average household,
and that households with only self-employment faced a lower risk of business
failure than an average household. If we assume that there was no selection
of employment status based on risk in the two sectors, however, we can get
an approximation of how often unemployment and failure of business happened
for urban households by looking at households with only wage employment and
households with only self-employment separately.
Table 2.9: Percent of Households that Had an Economic Shock by
Period and Household Employment Status
Wage Emp. Only Self-Emp. Only Wage & Self-Emp.
Lost a job or failed a business
Period 1994 and 1995 1.51 2.82 2.19
[1.02, 2.25] [1.85, 4.29] [1.34, 3.57]
Period 1998 and 1999 5.17 1.7 4.38
[4.14, 6.43] [0.95, 3.02] [3.12, 6.11]
Decrease of household income*
Period 1994 and 1995 0.44 1.88 1.39
[0.21, 0.91] [1.12, 3.15] [0.75, 2.58]
Period 1998 and 1999 0.78 3.83 2.67
[0.44, 1.39] [2.61, 5.59] [1.72, 4.11]
1. Data Source: IFLS2 and IFLS3
2. Employment status is the status a year before the period
3.* Decrease of household income due to decrease in production or low price of products.
4.The numbers in brackets are 90% confidence intervals
Table 2.9 shows that compared to the preceding non-crisis period (1994-1995),
the risk of unemployment increased significantly in the crisis period (1998-1999),
from 1.51% to 5.17%. The risk of business failure decreased, although the decrease
was not statistically significant. Risk of a decrease in household income, however,
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increased more for households with only self-employment than households with
only wage employment during the crisis. This table provides evidence that for
serious risks such as unemployment and failure of business, the risk in wage and
self-employed sectors were not perfectly correlated if we compare the crisis period
with the pre-crisis period.
2.5.3 Characteristics of Households with and without
Self-Employment
In this section, I will first compare characteristics of urban households with and
without self-employment before the crisis. The characteristics I compare are age
and education composition, ownership and value of non-business assets, per capita
consumption, and share of adults who work. The households with farms (about 10%
of urban households in 1997) in urban areas are excluded from this analysis, as I
found these households were significantly poorer than the rest of the households.
Also, my analysis examines the role of self-employment (household business) in
urban areas, and farming may be qualitatively different from non-farm businesses
in urban areas.
Table 2.10 gives a comparison of household characteristics for the two groups
of households. Prior to the crisis, households with and without self-employment
were different in terms of household size, age composition, education composition,
ownership of assets, and labor allocation. More specifically, households with
self-employment on average were larger, had more members in the 15-24 age group,
had lower education, had less savings, and worked much more. With respect to per
capita consumption, ownership of other assets and total asset value, however, in
1997 these two groups looked the same.
It should be noted that around 25% of the households in both groups did not
know the value of their assets. Also, many households did not report full working
hours information, and the percentage of households without hours information
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Table 2.10: Mean Characteristics of Urban Households with and
without Self-Employment in 1997
Type of Characteristics No Self-Emp. With Self-Emp.
Num. of Obs. 1185 995
Household Size 4.27 4.85
Age Composition
% of members under 15 25.08 24.20
% of members 15-24 16.81 19.14
% of members 25-34 17.46 13.97
% of members 35-44 13.83 15.10
% of members 45-54 8.97 10.11
% of members 55-64 9.13 10.36
% of members 65+ 7.36 5.84
Education Composition
% of households not reporting 0.42 1.11
all member’s education
% of members with no school 9.79 10.98
% of members with elementary school 33.89 41.24
% of members with jr. secondary school 16.81 16.95
% of members with sr. secondary school 29.33 25.27
% of members with post-sec school 10.18 5.57
Asset Ownership
% own building 16.54 15.08
% own land 21.77 25.53
% own vehicles 57.38 56.58
% own savings 34.68 29.65
% own receivables 8.27 13.37
% own jewelry 62.87 61.81
Asset Value
% of households not reporting 23.46 25.23
values of all assets
Real value of assets 3414935 3095478
Per Capita Consumption
Mean 142744 131254
Median 80150 73486
Labor Allocation
% of adult members who work 48.89 67.49
% of adult members with wage employment 48.89 20.51
% of adult members with self-employment 0.00 46.98
% of households without full hours information 21.10 9.38
Total hours worked per week 73.47 95.06
Hours worked per week per adult 26.23 29.46
Total weeks worked per year 69.00 92.18
1. Data source: IFLS2
2. Sample include panel original households with employment information
for all members older and equal to 15 in both 1997 and 2000
3. Numbers in bold are different at 90% significance level
4. Hours worked per week is hours worked in a normal week
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Table 2.11: Change in Mean Characteristics of Urban Households between 1997
and 2000 for Households with and without Self-Employment in 1997
Type of Characteristics No Self-Emp. With Self-Emp.
Num of Obs. 1185 995
Household Size 0.0565 -0.2362
Age Composition
% of members under 15 -1.86 -3.48
% of members 15-24 0.83 0.91
% of members 25-34 -2.58 -2.15
% of members 35-44 1.99 -0.32
% of members 45-54 1.15 2.67
% of members 55-64 0.10 0.70
% of members 65+ 1.09 2.37
Education Composition
% of households not reporting 2.03 3.42
change in members’ education
% of members with no school -1.76 -1.26
% of members with elementary school -1.95 -2.40
% of members with Jr. secondary school -0.42 0.97
% of members with Sr. secondary school 2.57 1.33
% of members with post-sec school 1.56 1.36
Asset Ownership
% own building -0.76 -0.90
% own land 3.21 7.44
% own vehicles 2.87 5.33
% own savings -2.62 -2.71
% own receivables -1.01 -1.01
% own jewelry -1.27 -1.71
Asset Value
% of households not reporting 28.86 30.65
change in asset value
Real Value of assets -9943279 -8559010
Per Capita Consumption
% of households not reporting 1.18 2.01
change in per capita consumption
Real Per capita consumption (mean) -27863 -25765
Real Per capita consumption (median) -1997 -1862
Ln of real per capita consumption -0.0509 -0.0513
Labor Allocation
% of adult members who work 8.83 1.03
% of adult members with formal employment -5.40 4.16
% of adult members with self-employment 14.23 -3.13
% of households without full information 25.44 14.17
on change in hours
Total hours worked per week 17.56 15.74
Hours worked per week per adult 3.56 3.51
Total weeks worked per year 11.46 5.50
1. Data source: IFLS2
2. Sample include panel original households with employment information
for all members older and equal to 15 in both 1997 and 2000
3. Numbers in bold are different at 90% significance level
4. Hours worked per week is hours worked in a normal week
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is significantly higher for households without self-employment than households
with self-employment. This is puzzling, as intuitively one would imagine that
workers with wage work would be more likely to report hours. An explanation
can be found by looking at the occupations of the wage workers who do not report
hours in 1997. Most of these workers are transport equipment workers, construction
workers, shop assistants, or maids. These occupations tend to have more frequent
turnover and tend to be without regular work hours. Therefore, the households
without self-employment in 1997 and also without full hours information were the
households with more wage workers in these unstable (in terms of hours and job
security) occupations.
Table 2.11 shows the mean change in the same characteristics for these two
groups of households during the crisis. One can see a difference between these
two groups in terms of change in household size, change in age composition,
and change in the percentage of adult members who work. The households
with self-employment in 1997 had a decrease in household size, while the
households without self-employment in 1997 had an increase in household size.
The households with self-employment in 1997 had a decrease in the percentage of
members in the 35-44 age group, while the households without self-employment in
1997 had an increase in the percentage of members in the 35-44 age group. Both
groups of households had an increase in the percentage of adult members who work,
but the households without self-employment in 1997 had a much bigger increase.
With respect to hours worked, one can see an increase in weeks worked per year
but not in hours worked per week; moreover, households without self-employment
in 1997 had a larger increase in weeks worked per year.
The fact that the larger increase in the percentage of adult members who work
in households without self-employment in 1997 is not reflected in hours worked per
week may be due to two reasons. First, measurement error in hours is substantial.
Second, the households who report hours are a selected group for which there is
less increase in household work. As discussed above, the households who did not
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report hours and who were also in the group without self-employment in 1997 tend
to have more workers who hold more insecure jobs with more volatile hours. These
households may also be poorer and with more frequent change in labor allocation
compared to the rest of households without self-employment. As a result, this
sub-group of households would be likely to increase their labor supply more during
a crisis.
2.6 Model
The goal of the empirical analysis in this chapter is to test the existence
and magnitude of the insurance value of prior self-employment during the
Asian financial crisis. In this section I outline a model that illustrates why
households would have an incentive to diversify between wage employment
and self-employment to minimize consumption risk. The model also provides
predictions that can be tested using the IFLS data. As discussed in the introduction,
for households to have an incentive to diversify between wage employment
and self-employment, the returns to wage employment and to self-employment
need to be not perfectly correlated. Also I will assume that there is an entry
cost into self-employment, so that households would have an incentive to hold
self-employment in anticipation of future shocks.
The standard household labor supply model usually only has two agents,
husband and wife. In the IFLS data, however, households are usually larger than
a nuclear household and contain more than two members who are at working age.
Therefore, in my model there are Nt + Mt members in the household in period t,
Mt members younger than 15 (not of working age), and Nt members older than 15
(of working age). Different households do not have to have the same size and age
composition in each period.
I assume there are T decision periods, and that the household maximizes its
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expected utility over these periods, so that its utility is given by
E
t=T∑
t=1
βtU(ct, L1t , L
2
t , ..., L
Nt
t ) . (2.1)
ct is household per capita consumption for period t, and Lit is leisure for individual
i in period t. β is household discount rate. I assume that the utility function is time
separable and additively separable between consumption and leisure. Households
are risk averse to consumption variation so that
U(ct, L1t , L
2
t , ..., L
Nt
t ) =
1
1 − γ (ct)
1−γ + Π(L1t , L
2
t , ..., L
Nt
t ) . (2.2)
Therefore, in this formation households have an incentive to smooth consumption
over time.
The household faces a budget constraint, a time constraint, and a borrowing
constraint in each period:
Budget constraint: ct(Nt+Mt)+at−1 =
Nt∑
i=1
wi,Ft F
i
t+
Nt∑
i=1
wi,IFt IF
i
t+at−(1−IBust−1 )IBust EBus ,
(2.3)
Labor constraint: F it = 0, 1 IF
i
t = 0, 1 L
i
t = 0, 1 L
i
t+F
i
t+IF
i
t = 1 i = 1, 2, ...,Nt ,
(2.4)
Borrowing constraint: at ≥ 0 , (2.5)
Non-negativity of consumption: ct > 0 . (2.6)
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at−1 is the amount of asset at the beginning of period t or end of period t − 1.
The household is subject to a borrowing constraint so that the asset level cannot
be negative. In each period, each working age individual i chooses between three
discreet labor choices: not working (Lit=1), working in the wage sector (F
i
t=1), or
working in the self-employed sector (IF it=1). The household chooses how much
to consume, ct, in each period. If the household does not have self-employment
at the beginning of the period (IBust−1 = 0) and the household chooses to start
a self-employed business in period t, which means having at least one member
working in the self-employed sector (IBust =1), then the household needs to pay a
start-up cost for the business, EBus. The choices that households make in period t,
ct, F it , IF
i
t , leaves the household with an asset level of at and a self-employment
status IBust at the end of the period t and beginning of period t + 1.
The start-up cost Ebus includes two kinds of cost that a household may incur
if they want to start a new self-employed business. The first kind is a lump-sum
amount of starting capital for the new business. As I have shown in section 2.5,
this amount is substantial for urban Indonesian households. The second kind of
start-up cost is lower profit in the initial periods of business operation. In this
model I assume that each household only has one self-employed business, and the
start-up cost is not related to how many people are employed in the business. The
assumption that each household only has one household business is not far from the
reality in Indonesia. The IFLS data shows that the majority of households that own a
household business only have one business. The assumption that business start-up
cost is not related to the number of workers in the business may be arguable. I
will use this assumption, however, as a start point to bring in the start-up cost of
self-employed businesses into a standard household labor supply model.
As mentioned before, for households to have an incentive to use
self-employment as insurance against shocks to returns to wage employment,
returns to wage- and self-employment should not be perfectly correlated. Therefore,
I assume that returns to wage- and self-employment not only depend on individual
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characteristics such as education and experience, but also depend on aggregate
shocks to wage- and self-employed sectors, which are not perfectly correlated. Then
wi, jt = ψ
j
tW
j(agei, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j) i = 1, 2, ...,Nt j = F, IF , (2.7)
where wi, jt is return in sector j for individual i in period t. j can be wage sector (F)
or self-employed sector(IF). ψ jt is the aggregate shock to returns in sector j. agei is
i’s age at the beginning of the period, which is a proxy for i’s work experience.
edui is i’s education level. Xi, j represents a vector of unobserved individual
characteristics that affect his/her return in sector j. For example, individuals with
greater entrepreneurship skills will have a higher return in the self-employed sector.
Z j represents a vector of unobserved household characteristics that would affect the
individual’s return in sector j, and V j is a vector of unobserved local labor market
characteristics that determine the demand for labor in sector j.
For simplicity, I assume that the shocks to wage employment and the shocks
to self-employment are independent, and shocks are also independently distributed
over time. Then
ψFt , ψ
IF
t ∼ N(µ,Σ), µ = (1, 1), Σ =

σ2F 0
0 σ2IF
 . (2.8)
Another issue the model has to deal with in order to make it applicable to the
IFLS data is modeling the change in household composition. As shown in section
2.4 and 2.5, the panel households in the IFLS data are not intact overtime. Each
year, around 10% of households would have at least one new member (including
birth), and around 15% of households would lose at least one member (including
death). As a result, in order to apply this model to the data, I need to propose a
way to model household composition change. It is shown in section 2.4 that the
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movement in household composition is not significantly higher during the Asian
Financial Crisis than before the crisis. Since I am mainly interested in changes
during the crisis, I will not model household composition decisions including
fertility and migration. Instead I will treat the change in household composition
as an exogenous shock embodied in Φt. When Φt is realized, the household may
have a new set of members with new age, education, and ability composition
compared with the last period. I assume that Φt is independent from ψFt and ψ
IF
t
and independent over time. Based on all the assumptions made above, the Bellman
equation for the household is
V(st) = Max
ct ,L1t ,L
2
t ,..,L
Nt
t
(
u(ct, L1t , L
2
t , ..., L
Nt
t ) + β
∫
V(st+1) f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1)
)
, (2.9)
where the state vector is
st = (at−1, IBust−1 , ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,Φt) ,
and the transition of the state vector from st−1 to st is shown by the following
equations:
IBust =

1 if
∑Nt
i=1 IF
i
t ≥ 1
0 if
∑Nt
i=1 IF
i
t = 0
(2.10a)
i = 1, 2, ...,Nt ,
at = at−1 − ct(Nt + Mt) +
Nt∑
i=1
wi,Ft F
i
t +
Nt∑
i=1
wi,IFt IF
i
t − (1 − IBust−1 )IBust EBus . (2.10b)
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If any member of the household works in the self-employed sector in period t,
the household will have a household business at the end of period t (IBust = 1).
at is updated from the budget constraint. Note that in each period, the members
(is) may change because of household composition change, resulting in changes
in age, education and ability composition. The timing of the model works as
follows: at the end of period t − 1, the household get an endowment of state
variables at−1, IBust−1 from the choices in period t − 1. Then at the beginning of
period t, the shocks to wage- and self-employment returns, ψF and ψIF , and the
shock to household composition, Φt, are realized. Then the household makes
labor and consumption choices in period t based on their expectations of shocks
to wage- and self-employment returns and of shock to household composition in
the future. These choices will leave the household with a new set of state variables
at the end of period t. The value function depends on f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1) instead of
on f ((ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1)/(ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,Φt)) because I assume that shocks are independent
over time.
From Equation 2.4, Equation 2.10 and Equation 2.9 we can derive that
ct =Fc(at−1, IBust−1 ,Nt,Mt, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,Nt , j=F,IF , ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,
f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1), Ebus) , (2.11)
and
Lit = F
L(at−1, IBust−1 ,Nt,Mt, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,Nt , j=F,IF , ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,
f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1), EBus) , (2.12)
and
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IBust = F
Bus(at−1, IBust−1 ,Nt,Mt, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,Nt , j=F,IF , ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,
f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1), EBus) . (2.13)
The shock to household composition for period t, Φt, is reflected in the formation
that the set of working age household members, i=1,2,...,Nt, and under working age
members, i=Nt+1,...,Mt, is updated by Φt from t − 1 to t. So outcomes in period t
depend on household composition in period t instead of that in period t − 1.
If we sum all the (1 − Lit)s in equation 2.12 and divide it by Nt, we will get the
percentage of adult members who work. Then we can derive
workt = Fwork(at−1, IBust−1 ,Nt,Mt, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,Nt , j=F,IF , ψ
F
t , ψ
IF
t ,
f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1), EBus) , (2.14)
where workt = 1 − (∑i=Nti=1 Lit)/Nt .
Per capita consumption(ct), the percentage of adult members who work(workt), and
whether the household has self-employment in period t(IBust ) depend on a set of
variables. These variables include the household’s wealth and self-employment
status at the beginning of the period, the change in household composition, and the
shocks to returns to wage- and self-employment. They also include unobserved
characteristics at the individual, household, and regional level, the household’s
expectation about future shocks, and the self-employment entry cost.
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2.7 Empirical Strategy
The main relationship I am interested in in this chapter is the relationship between
ct/workt and IBust−1 when t is the crisis period. In other words, I want to find out
whether consumption and labor during the crisis for the household depended on
whether the household had self-employment before the crisis, and how much. Since
I only observe household’s choices in 1993, 1997 and 2000, I will treat 1997 as the
period before the crisis and 2000 as the period during the crisis.14 Assuming that
households only make decisions at the time points 1993, 1997, and 2000, then
according to Equation 2.11 and 2.14, I have the following relationships:
c2000 = Fc(a1997, IBus1997,N2000,M2000, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N2000, j=F,IF , ψ
F
2000, ψ
IF
2000,
f (ψF2000+ , ψ
IF
2000+ ,Φ2000+), EBus) , (2.15)
and
work2000 = Fwork(a1997, IBus1997,N2000,M2000, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N2000, j=F,IF ,
ψF2000, ψ
IF
2000, f (ψ
F
2000+ , ψ
IF
2000+ ,Φ2000+), EBus) . (2.16)
i includes every working age individual who was in the household in 2000.
f (ψF2000+ , ψ
IF
2000+ ,Φ2000+) represents the household’s expectation about uncertainty in
next decision period.
If I can observe all independent variables in Equation 2.15 and 2.16,
I can consistently estimate the relationship between c2000/work2000 and IBus1997.
Only a subset of the independent variables, however, are observable. These
14Section 2.4 has a more extensive discussion on why I treat 1997 as pre-crisis and 2000 as during
the crisis.
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are a1997, IBus1997, agei, and edu
i. The rest of the variables, which are
Xi, j,Zi, j,V i, j, ψF2000, ψ
IF
2000, f (ψ
F
2000+ , ψ
IF
2000+ ,Φt+1), and EBus, are unobservable. If I
Bus
1997
and the unobserved variables are not correlated, I can still get consistent estimate
of the relationship between c2000/work2000 and IBus1997. I
Bus
1997, however, is endogenous,
because according to Equation 2.13,
IBus1997 = F
Bus(a1993, IBus1993,N1997,M1997, (age
i, edui, Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N1997, j=F,IF ,
f (ψF2000, ψ
IF
2000,Φ2000), EBus) . (2.17)
i includes every working age individual who was in the household in 1997,
and f (ψF2000, ψ
IF
2000,Φ2000) is the household’s expectation about shocks in 2000.
Therefore IBus1997 is correlated with unobserved variables X
i, j,Z j,V j, which are also
correlated with c2000 and work2000 as shown in equation 2.15 and 2.16. I need to
find a way to deal with the endogeneity of IBus1997. Since 1997 is a pre-crisis period, I
assume there is no aggregate shock to the returns in wage and self-employment in
this period, so that ψF1997 and ψ
IF
1997 do not appear in equation 2.17.
Because households have different sizes, I need to propose an approach to
approximate for age and education composition. I use the number of adult members
by education level to approximate for education composition, and I use the number
of members by age group to approximate for age composition. At the same time,
I use number of working age members who are female to control for household
gender composition. I use province indicator variables to approximate for Z j,
regional characteristics that affect labor demand for wage- and self-employed
workers. Therefore, the regressions I estimate are the following:
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c2000 =αc0 + α
c
1a1997 + α
c
2I
Bus
1997 +
6∑
i=1
βciNumagegroupi,2000
+
4∑
i=1
γciNumedugroupi,2000 +
12∑
i=1
ζci Iprovincei,2000 + θ
c
2000 + τ
c
2000 + κ
c
2000 + ε
c
2000 ,
(2.18)
and
work2000 =αw0 + α
w
1 a1997 + α
w
2 I
Bus
1997 +
6∑
i=1
βwi Numagegroupi,2000
+
4∑
i=1
γwi Numedugroupi,2000 +
12∑
i=1
ζwi Iprovincei,2000 + θ
w
2000 + τ
w
2000 + κ
w
2000 + ε
w
2000 .
(2.19)
θc2000 and θ
w
2000 represent a function of unobserved individual, household, and
regional variables in equation 2.15 and 2.16, so that
θc2000 = F
θc((Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N2000, j=F,IF , EBus) , (2.20)
and
θw2000 = F
θw((Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N2000, j=F,IF , EBus) . (2.21)
τc2000 and τ
w
2000 represent the effect of the crisis, ψ
F
2000 and ψ
IF
2000, on household
consumption and labor. κc2000 and κ
w
2000 are the effects of households’ expectation of
shocks in future periods, f (ψF2000+ , ψ
IF
2000+ , φ2000+), on current household consumption
and labor. εc and εw represent measurement errors in c2000 and work2000, and I
assume both of them are independently distributed over time with mean zero and
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independent from all variables in the rest of equations 2.18 and 2.19. The OLS
estimates of these equations are presented in Appendix B.
To deal with the endogeneity problem, I use difference in difference estimations.
I use the households that have no self-employment either in 1993 or in 1997
as the control group, and use households that have no self-employment in 1993
but have self-employment in 1997 as the treatment group.15 Then the difference
between these two groups in the change of household consumption and labor from
1997 to 2000 will yield a consistent estimate of the treatment effect of having
self-employment in 1997 on outcomes in 2000. Here is how the difference in
difference method works: Similarly to 2.18 and 2.19, for both the control and the
treatment groups, we have
c1997 =αc0 + α
c
1a1993 +
6∑
i=1
βciNumagegroupi,1997
+
4∑
i=1
γciNumedugroupi,1997 +
12∑
i=1
ζci Iprovincei,1997 + θ
c
1997 + κ
c
1997 + ε
c
1997 , (2.22)
and
work1997 =αw0 + α
w
1 a1993 +
6∑
i=1
βwi Numagegroupi,1997
+
4∑
i=1
γwi Numedugroupi,1997 +
12∑
i=1
ζwi Iprovincei,1997 + θ
w
1997 + κ
w
1997 + ε
w
1997 ,
(2.23)
where
15Households with farm business in the urban area are excluded due to different nature of farm
and non-farm businesses
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θc1997 = F
θc((Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N1997, j=F,IF , EBus) , (2.24)
θw1997 = F
θw((Xi, j,Z j,V j)i=1,2,...,N1997, j=F,IF , EBus) . (2.25)
κc1997 and κ
w
1997 represent the effect of household expectation of shocks in next period,
f (ψF2000, ψ
IF
2000, φ2000), on household consumption and labor. Because all household
in these two groups had no self-employment in 1993, IBus1993 does not appear in these
two equations. If we take the difference between equation 2.18 and 2.22, and
similarly take the difference between equation 2.19 and 2.23, we will have
∆c97−00 =αc1∆a93−97 + α
c
2I
Bus
1997 +
6∑
i=1
βci∆Numagegroupi,97−00
+
4∑
i=1
γci ∆Numedugroupi,97−00 +
12∑
i=1
ζci ∆Iprovincei,97−00
+ ∆θc97−00 + τ
c
2000 + ∆κ
c
97−00 + ∆ε
c
97−00 , (2.26)
and
∆work97−00 =αw1 ∆a93−97 + α
w
2 I
Bus
1997 +
6∑
i=1
βwi ∆Numagegroupi,97−00
+
4∑
i=1
γwi ∆Numedugroupi,97−00 +
12∑
i=1
ζwi ∆Iprovincei,97−00
+ ∆θw97−00 + τ
w
2000 + ∆κ
w
97−00 + ∆ε
w
97−00 . (2.27)
The coefficient I am interested in are αc2 and α
w
2 . In order to get a consistent
estimate of these effects, IBus1997 needs to be independent from ∆θ
c
97−00, ∆θ
w
97−00, ∆κ
c
97−00
Chapter 2. Insurance Role of Self-Employment during Crisis 49
and ∆κw97−00. If we assume that ((X
i, j)i=1,2,...,Nt , Z
j, V j have not changed between 1997
and 2000, then ∆θc97−00 and ∆θ
w
97−00 will difference out the household fixed effect.
If we assume that household’s expectation about future shocks is the same in every
period, then the effect of f (ψFt+1, ψ
IF
t+1,Φt+1) is also cancelled in ∆κ
c
97−00 and ∆κ
w
97−00.
Then equation 2.26 and 2.27 become
∆c97−00 =αc1∆a93−97 + α
c
2I
Bus
1997
+
6∑
i=1
βci∆Numagegroupi,97−00 +
4∑
i=1
γci ∆Numedugroupi,97−00
+
12∑
i=1
ζci ∆Iprovincei,97−00 + τ
c
2000 + ∆ε
c
97−00 , (2.28)
and
∆work97−00 =αw1 ∆a93−97 + α
w
2 I
Bus
1997
+
6∑
i=1
βwi ∆Numagegroupi,97−00 +
4∑
i=1
γwi ∆Numedugroupi,97−00
+
12∑
i=1
ζwi ∆Iprovincei,97−00 + τ
w
2000 + ∆ε
w
97−00 . (2.29)
τc2000 and τ
w
2000 are constants and represent the average effect of the crisis on
household consumption and labor. Ordinary least square regressions of equation
2.28 and 2.29 will give me a consistent estimate of αc2 and α
w
2 .
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2.8 Results and Discussion
2.8.1 Results
Table 2.12 and Table 2.13 report the difference in difference estimation results.
Table 2.12 shows the results for specifications that use household consumption and
the percent of adult members who work as the dependent variable. In addition, I
also use various measures of hours worked by household members as the dependent
variable. Since around 20% of households do not have full information on hours
worked for every working member, I present results for all households (Table 2.12)
and again only for households with full information on hours (Table 2.13).
As shown in Table 2.12 and 2.13, the average effect of the crisis on household
real per capita consumption is not significantly different from zero. The average
effect of the crisis on household work is an increase in the percentage of adult
members who work by 5-7 percentage points. Also, the hours worked per adult
member per week increased by 4 hours. Total hours worked per week and total
weeks worked per year also rose from 1997 to 2000.
From Table 2.12 one can see that having prior self-employment has a negative
coefficient on per capita household consumption, but the coefficient is not
significant. This indicates that prior self-employment has no significant effect
on household per capita consumption during the crisis. Prior self-employment,
however, does seem to affect percentage of adult members who work: the relevant
coefficients are negative and significant. Having prior self-employment decreases
the percentage of adult members who work in the last week by around 9.5
percentage points, and decreases the percentage of adult members who work
in the last year by 5.7 percentage points. The magnitude of the effect on the
percentage of members who work during last year is smaller. This difference
may be caused by the fact that whether an individual worked last year is derived
from a question in the household roster. Whether an individual worked last
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week, conversely, is derived from a separate module that aims at eliciting work
information, especially information about self-employment and family work, from
more in-depth interviews with each household member. Therefore, the share of
adult members who worked last week should be a better measure of household
work, and should pick up the increase in self-employed work more accurately.
From Table 2.13, one can see that when the sample is restricted to households
who have hours information, the effect of prior self-employment on household
consumption is still not significant. The effect of prior self-employment on the
percentage of adult members who worked last week becomes smaller, while
remaining significant. The effect of prior self-employment on various measures
of hours worked by the household are all negative, although only significant for
hours worked per week.
From these two tables, we can see that the effect of prior self-employment
on percent of adult members who work is much stronger in the full sample than
the sample with hours information. This is confirming the hypothesis that the
households that do not have prior self-employment and report hours may have had a
smaller increase in work than the households that do not have prior self-employment
and do not report hours. As mentioned in the descriptive analysis, households
that do not have prior self-employment and do not report hours are more likely
to have workers in occupations with less job security and more volatile hours.
Therefore, they may also be the ones who needed to increase labor supply more
to cope with the impact of the crisis compared to households that do not have prior
self-employment and do report hours.
The fact that we see an effect of prior self-employment on household work
during the crisis but not on consumption may be because work takes more time
to adjust than consumption. It could be the case that prior self-employment
had a positive effect on household consumption at the deepest point of the crisis
(1998, 1999). By 2000, we may no longer observe this effect as households were
already recovering from the crisis. Whether an individual works or not and the
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sector in which an individual works, however, may take longer to adjust to the
pre-crisis levels. As a result, the estimates can pick up the insurance value of prior
self-employment on work better than on consumption. By the same logic, since it
is easier to adjust labor supply along the intensive margin than along the extensive
margin, we may observe a more significant effect of prior self-employment on the
percentage of members who work than on hours.
2.8.2 Discussion
The result that having self-employment in 1997 decreases household work in
2000 shown in Table 2.12 and 2.13 may reflect a secular trend of modernization
of households in Indonesia. As shown in Table 2.10, households without
self-employment are smaller, more educated and work less, all of which suggest that
the households without self-employment are more modernized than the households
with self-employment. If there is a secular trend of modernization so that
households with self-employment are becoming more like the households without
self-employment, then households with self-employment will work less over time,
which would give the results shown in Table 2.12 and 2.13.
This argument is unlikely to apply to my difference in difference analysis,
because neither the control group nor the treatment group had self-employment in
1993. In other words, all households were already “modern households” in 1993.
The fact that the treatment group experienced a smaller increase in labor supply
during the crisis because they established self-employed businesses in 1997 gives
some credibility to the insurance story.
Another possible confounding factor is that many households changed
composition between 1993 and 2000. Therefore, the difference in difference
approach may not entirely control for household fixed effects. To check whether
this is an important problem, I estimated equation 2.28 and 2.29 for households
that did not have any change in adult members (although they might have had some
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change in the 0-14 age group or in the 65+ age group) between 1993 and 2000. For
these households, which I refer to as “intact” households, the working age members
were the same in 1993, 1997 and 2000. Table 2.14 and 2.15 present the results for
this restricted sample.
We can see that if we do not exclude households without hours information,
the results are similar between Table 2.12 and 2.14. The negative effect of prior
self-employment on the percent of adults who work is even bigger for the intact
households than for all households. When we only look at intact households
with hours information, however, the effect of prior self-employment on the
percentage of adult members who work is no longer significant. The effect of
prior self-employment on hours is not significant, either. This again indicates
that households who report hours may be a selected group in terms of change
in household work. In general the results for the intact households are not very
different from the results for all households.
2.9 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter has analyzed various mechanisms that households used to cope with
the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in urban Indonesia, and found that one important
mechanism was to increase labor supply in the self-employed sector. I proposed that
self-employment plays an insurance role against wage sector shocks and tested the
existence and magnitude of this insurance role for urban Indonesian households
during the AFC. I found that the treatment effect of prior self-employment on
household consumption during the crisis is not significant, but the treatment
effect of prior self-employment on the percentage of adult members who work
is significant. Having prior self-employment decreases the percentage of adult
members who work during the crisis by around 9 percentage points.
Does this mean that households with prior self-employment were better off
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during the crisis? We can see in the descriptive analysis and the results from
difference in difference estimations that all households, no matter with prior
self-employment or not, increased the percentage of adult members who work
during the crisis. This means that the household members who were previously
not working started to work during the crisis. The fact that households with prior
self-employment experienced a smaller increase in the percentage members who
work is some indication that prior self-employment did increase household welfare
during the crisis.
This chapter has only tested the insurance role of prior self-employment in terms
of consumption and labor supply during the crisis. Other household outcomes could
have been affected by the crisis, such as children’s school enrollment and household
members’ health. Therefore, one interesting extension of the analysis in this chapter
would be to test whether prior self-employment has a positive effect on these other
variables during the crisis. Also, I could potentially use other measures of prior
self-employment, such as the size of the self-employed business or the amount of
business capital, to test the insurance value of prior self-employment. This approach
may pick up the insurance value of self-employment better than a simple dummy
variable.
This chapter has analyzed the insurance role of prior self-employment for
households during aggregate economic downturns. It would also be interesting
to look at the insurance role of self-employment during non-crisis times. To
answer this question, ideally one would need longitudinal household level data
on household labor allocation and household consumption for a long period
of time with frequent observations. Then it would be possible to analyze
whether diversification between self-employment and wage employment has helped
households smooth consumption over time.
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Chapter 3
Do Working Women Have More
Intra-Household Bargaining Power?
- A Natural Experiment Approach
Using Direct Measures of
Intra-Household Bargaining Power
3.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to answer the question: What determines women’s
intra-household bargaining power? This is an important question because higher
intra-household bargaining power improves women’s status and welfare. In
developing countries, where women usually have lower status than men, improving
the status and welfare of women is one of the fundamental goals of development.1
In addition, higher bargaining power of women within the household may result
1The 1995 Beijing Women’s conference set achieving gender equality as one of the fundamental
goals of development.
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in more desirable household outcomes. Literature on household decision making
reveals that potential determinants of women’s bargaining power, such as women’s
income share wages, positively affect household investment in children’s education
and health, household saving rates, and household repayment of loans (de Aghion
and Morduch (2004), Duflo (2003), Case and Ardington (2006), Qian (2008)).
The theoretical and empirical literature on household decision making proposes
various factors that may affect women’s intra-household bargaining power.
According to standard intra-household bargaining theory (McElroy and Horney
(1981), Manser and Brown (1980), Lundberg and Pollak (1993)), women’s
intra-household bargaining power depends on women’s welfare in the event that
bargaining breaks down. This welfare depends on women’s wage rates, and other
resources women control when bargaining breaks down, such as non-labor income
and assets. Therefore, economic factors, such as wages, non-labor income, and
assets, are potential determinants of women’s intra-household bargaining power.
Besides these economic factors, other studies on intra-household decision making,
such as Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) and Bertocchi et al. (2012), propose
that cultural factors may also affect women’s intra-household bargaining power,
as cultural factors are correlated with traditions that may govern the way household
decisions are made. Bertocchi et al. (2012) proposes that religion may relate to
women’s bargaining power within the household, and Frankenberg and Thomas
(2001) proposes that ethnicity may also affect this power.
This chapter concentrates on current working status (work hours) as a potential
determinant of women’s bargaining power while controlling for other potential
determinants, such as wages, non-labor income, assets, and ethnicity. This is an
intriguing factor because both sociology and economics literature have proposed
that working women have more intra-household bargaining power (Kantor (2003),
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Calderon et al. (2011), Anderson and Eswaran
(2009), etc.), but little empirical work has tested this hypothesis. In addition,
standard household bargaining theory predicts that current earnings, or how much a
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woman works, should not matter for her intra-household bargaining power once her
wage rate is controlled for; however, it is intuitive to think that when women work
and earn an income, they will have more say in how to use their earned income.
Conversely, if a woman must depend on her husband’s income for all spending,
she will have less autonomy in spending according to her preferences. Therefore,
it is worthwhile to examine whether empirical testing of the effect of work hours
on women’s intra-household bargaining power lends more credibility to standard
bargaining theory or to intuition.
To test the effect of women’s work hours on their intra-household bargaining
power, I utilized rich information on household decision making from the
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) to construct direct measures of women’s
intra-household bargaining power. In the IFLS, both husband and wife are asked to
list the household members who participate in 17 categories of household decision
making, including those regarding consumption, saving, and time allocation. The
answers to these questions gave us a unique insight into how household decisions
are made. Although who makes a decision about a particular category is not
perfectly correlated with whose preferences influence the decision, I assume that
the intensity of participation in household decision making is positively correlated
with an individual’s bargaining power. Based on this assumption, I constructed two
indices to measure women’s intra-household bargaining power. One is equal to the
percentage of categories for which the wife is the sole decision maker. The other
is the average of the wife’s decision weight across categories, where the decision
weight is equal to one divided by the number of people who participate in decision
making in that particular category if the wife is one of the decision makers, and
zero otherwise. I used these indices as direct measures of women’s intra-household
bargaining power in the empirical analysis.
To estimate the effect of women’s work hours while controlling for their wages,
it was necessary to address the issue that many women do not work and do not report
wages. I addressed this issue by using Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman
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(1979)) to correct for the possible selection of women into working based on
unobserved characteristics that also affect their bargaining power. The exclusion
restriction was the number of pre-school children in the household. The argument
for this exclusion restriction is that young children will strongly affect women’s
labor force participation but may not have much effect on their intra-household
bargaining power.
It was also necessary to address the empirical issue that women’s bargaining
power and work hours may be simultaneously decided. That is, while the causal
effect of work hours on women’s bargaining power may be positive, the causal
effect of women’s bargaining power on their work hours may be negative if
women’s higher bargaining power buys them more leisure time. If women in
particular cultural or institutional contexts are restricted from working, then the
higher bargaining power of women may increase their work hours. No matter what
the direction of causal effect of bargaining power on women’s work hours, the OLS
estimate of the effect of hours on bargaining power will be biased if there is any
effect of bargaining power on hours. To address this issue, I used instrumental
variable estimation.
IFLS data span the Asian financial crisis, a time when Indonesia experienced
high inflation. The sharp rise in prices caused a significant drop in households’
real income. One way households coped with the decrease in real income was
to increase women’s work. According to IFLS data, women’s employment rate
jumped by more than 10 percentage points from 1997 to 2000. The crisis, however,
did not affect all regions equally. In regions with higher inflation, we would
expect larger increases in women’s work. The inflation shock during the crisis
can therefore be viewed as an exogenous event that affected women’s work without
directly affecting women’s intra-household bargaining power. Therefore, I used
regional inflation during the crisis as an instrument for the change in women’s
work hours during the crisis, so as to estimate the causal effect of the change
in work hours on the change in women’s bargaining power as measured by my
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decision-making indices.
In addition to women’s work hours and wages, I controlled for a rich set of
individual and household characteristics available in the IFLS data. I controlled for
work hours and wage of the husband. I also controlled for ethnicity, age, education,
non-labor income, and business and non-business assets of both the wife and the
husband. Furthermore, I controlled for the number of adults older than 15 and the
number of adults older than 65 in the household, as well as urban/rural status and
province.
I find that according to the OLS estimations with control for women’s wages
and the selection of women into working, the effect of work hours was positive
and significant on one bargaining power index and positive but not significant on
the other. The magnitude of the effect is small. When I used instrumental variable
estimation to analyze the effect of change in women’s work hours on the change in
their bargaining power indices, the effect is positive and significant for one index
and positive but not significant for the other. The magnitude of the effect is much
larger compared with the OLS estimates. In general, there seems to be evidence
that more work increases women’s intra-household bargaining power.
This chapter contributes to the literature on intra-household decision making
in three ways. First, this chapter provides a more direct test of the determinants
of women’s intra-household bargaining power than do most empirical studies in
the literature. Due to the lack of direct measures of bargaining power, most
empirical studies in the literature do not directly test what determines women’s
intra-household bargaining power. Instead, they look at the effect of potential
determinants of women’s bargaining power (such as women’s wages or non-labor
income) on household outcomes, such as children’s education and health. The
studies treat a positive correlation between these potential determinants and
household outcomes as evidence that household members go through a bargaining
process to decide on household allocations and that economic factors, such as
wages and non-labor income, do affect women’s bargaining power (Duflo (2003),
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Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Lundberg et al. (1997), Qian (2008)). This chapter,
with direct measures of household intra-household bargaining power, provides a
direct test of what determines women’s intra-household bargaining power.
Second, this chapter adds to our understanding of intra-household decision
making by describing the decision making patterns in the IFLS data. Whereas
standard household bargaining models (McElroy and Horney (1981), Manser and
Brown (1980), Lundberg and Pollak (1993)) usually treat bargaining power as
one-dimensional in the sense that a household member will have equal decision
power for all aspects of household decisions, this analysis reveals that household
members have different levels of decision making power in different decision
categories. While wives are typically in charge of decision categories such as food
expenditures, husbands have more decision power in categories such as expenditure
on children’s education. This analysis also reveals that the decision making in
some decision categories is delegated to one of the household members, whereas in
other decision categories, decisions tend to be made jointly by multiple household
members. These insights indicate that household decision making is a complicated
process and simple household decision models may not capture many important
aspects of this process.
Third, although working status is an interesting determinant of women’s
intra-household bargaining power, little empirical work has tested this potential
determinant because working status and women’s bargaining power are
simultaneously determined. Empirical literature has concentrated on more
exogenous determinants of women’s bargaining power, such as non-labor income
and wages (Duflo (2003), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Lundberg et al. (1997),
Qian (2008)). This chapter is able to concentrate on working status as a potential
determinant of women’s bargaining power using instrumental variable estimation.
The inflation shock during the Asian financial crisis serves as a unique exogenous
event that increased women’s work hours without directly affecting their bargaining
power.
Chapter 3. Do Working Women Have More Bargaining Power? 71
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the IFLS, describes the information contained in the household decision making
module in the IFLS, and shows how I constructed the bargaining power indices.
Section 3.3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 shows descriptive statistics.
Section 3.5 presents the results, and Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
3.2 The Indonesian Family Life Survey, Questions
on Intra-Household Decision Making, and
Construction of Bargaining Power Indices
3.2.1 Indonesian Family Life Survey
The IFLS is a household level longitudinal survey conducted by RAND Corporation
in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2007. All rounds of the survey are publicly available
except the 1998 round. In the first wave conducted in the second half of 1993, over
30,000 individuals in 7,224 households were sampled. The sampling scheme was
stratified on provinces and rural-urban areas within provinces. Enumeration areas
(EAs) were randomly sampled within these strata, and households were randomly
sampled within the enumeration areas. The documentation for the IFLS states that
EAs in the urban areas and in smaller provinces were oversampled to facilitate
urban-rural and Java/non-Java comparisons. The sample covered 13 out of the 27
provinces in Indonesia, including all provinces on Java and provinces on Sumatra,
Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara (Figure 2.1). As a result, the
sample covered about 83% of the Indonesian population.
In each of the succeeding rounds, the survey team tried to re-contact all of the
households interviewed in 1993 (“original households”). Members who moved out
of their original households were also tracked and their new households were added
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to the sample (“split-off” households).2 The resulting sample size and the recontact
rate for each round is listed in Table 2.1. Attrition for original households was 7%
from 1993 to 1997 and 3% from 1997 to 2000. If we only want to compare changes
between 1997 and 2000 for the original households, then attrition is rather low.
The IFLS collected rich information on many aspects of household and
individual life, including household consumption, business and assets, and
individual education, working status and work history.
3.2.2 Module on Household Decision Making
A unique feature of the IFLS is that it contains a module on intra-household
decision-making. This module was added to the survey in 1997. As shown in the
questionnaire in Appendix D, this module included questions about 17 categories of
household decision-making. For each decision category, the respondent is asked to
list all the household members who participate in making the decision. Therefore,
multiple decision makers for a particular category are allowed. In most households
the module was administered to both the husband and wife. Thus, for most couples
one can observe whether the husband and the wife agree in their answers.
The categories of decision-making and the distribution of women’s participation
levels within these categories are summarized in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. In Table
3.1, columns (1) and (3) show the percentage of couples in which the wife reports
that she is the sole decision maker in 1997 and 2000, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) show the percentage of couples in which both the husband and the wife report
that the wife is the sole decision maker in 1997 and 2000, respectively. Table 3.2
provides similar information, but in this case reports the percentage of households
in which the wife is either the sole decision maker or a joint decision maker with
other household members. The sample size for each category is equal to the number
of couples in which both the husband and wife gave responses for that decision
2A more detailed description of the IFLS re-contact procedure is provided in Appendix A.
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category.
Table 3.1: Percentage of Couples in which Wife is the Sole Decision Maker
1997 2000
Reported by Reported by
Category Obs. Wife Both Wife Both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditure on Food 4892 71.03 58.32 69.60 54.09
Expenditure on Routine Purchase 4892 69.73 57.44 67.35 52.70
Expenditure on Durables 4260 6.88 1.81 7.37 1.67
Expenditure on Husband’s Clothes 4869 29.97 14.09 28.57 14.73
Expenditure on Wife’s Clothes 4875 51.92 34.24 59.94 40.72
Expenditure on Children’s Clothes 4287 33.05 19.27 33.78 18.33
Expenditure on Children’s Education 3861 13.75 4.92 12.90 4.58
Expenditure on Children’s Health 4278 17.06 6.08 16.62 5.52
Whether the Husband/Wife Works 4831 7.53 0.79 6.25 1.06
Time Husband Spends Socializing 4887 8.76 0.88 9.74 0.82
Time Wife Spends Socializing 4887 42.42 26.40 42.60 25.66
Gift to Parties/Weddings 4849 24.31 10.46 20.71 7.26
Transfer to Husband’s Family 3164 8.60 2.15 9.92 2.18
Transfer to Wife’s Family 3369 11.87 3.47 11.64 3.38
Contribution to Arisan* 1799 41.19 23.01 41.25 20.23
Monthly Savings 763 24.90 10.75 26.87 9.70
Whether Use Contraception 2301 18.56 8.60 36.29 21.38
* Arisan is a form of rotating savings and credit association
* Calculated from couples that both report an answer to the category
The tables reveal several interesting patterns. First, the level of women’s
participation in decision-making is not evenly distributed across categories. In
some categories, such as expenditure on food and routine purchases, women on
average have high levels of participation. In other categories, such as expenditure
on durables, whether the husband/wife works, and transfers to wife’s and husband’s
family, women have lower levels of participation.
Second, not being the sole decision maker does not necessarily mean that the
wife is not involved in the decision. For example, although only around 7% of
women report that they are the sole decision makers for expenditures on durables,
about 73% of women report that they are a joint decision maker in this category.
For some categories, decisions tend to be made by either the husband or the wife
alone, while in some other categories, decisions tend to be made by the husband
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Table 3.2: Percentage of Couples in which Wife is a Sole or Joint Decision Maker
1997 2000
Reported by Reported by
Category Obs. Wife Both Wife Both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditure on Food 4892 89.47 83.85 91.74 84.69
Expenditure on Routine Purchase 4892 89.00 83.26 90.96 84.30
Expenditure on Durables 4260 76.92 65.02 80.47 68.36
Expenditure on Husband’s Clothes 4869 70.63 53.05 70.24 51.86
Expenditure on Wife’s Clothes 4875 86.48 78.91 91.61 85.44
Expenditure on Children’s Clothes 4287 84.63 77.16 83.86 75.11
Expenditure on Children’s Education 3861 86.25 76.07 85.42 75.21
Expenditure on Children’s Health 4278 90.74 82.70 90.74 82.16
Whether the Husband/Wife Works 4831 75.66 60.73 71.08 55.68
Time Husband Spends Socializing 4887 54.10 34.75 53.71 30.71
Time Wife Spends Socializing 4887 90.94 84.71 89.97 82.71
Gift to Parties/Weddings 4849 93.01 86.64 92.47 83.93
Transfer to Husband’s Family 3164 90.30 80.94 90.49 80.12
Transfer to Wife’s Family 3369 92.46 86.41 91.75 84.86
Contribution to Arisan 1799 93.50 85.38 93.33 81.55
Monthly Savings 763 87.29 76.80 85.58 69.99
Whether Use Contraception 2301 94.31 90.09 94.48 89.61
* Arisan is a form of rotating savings and credit association
* Calculated from couples that both report an answer to the category
and the wife jointly.
Third, there is a significant amount of disagreement between husbands and
wives about who makes decisions. This is shown by the fact that the percentages
reported by both the husband and wife are uniformly lower than the percentages
just reported by the wife. We can see that not everyone answers all questions.
For some categories, the number of couples that report answers is relatively small.
One explanation for variation in response rates is that some couples do not engage
in some activities, and, as a result, cannot report who makes decision in those
categories. For example, if a couple does not have a child, they would not report
who makes decisions about children’s clothes, education and health. Similarly, if
a couple does not save, they would not report who makes decisions about monthly
savings.
If we compare the distribution in 1997 with the distribution in 2000, we can see
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that for most categories the distribution of decision making is stable between the
two years.
Some changes do occur. For example, the percentage of couples where the wife
is the sole decision maker about the wife’s clothing expenditures and contraception
use increases between 1997 and 2000. The percentage of couples in which the
wife is a sole decision maker about expenditures on food, expenditures on routine
purchases, and gifts to parties and weddings decreases slightly. With respect to the
percentage of couples in which the wife is either the sole or a joint decision maker,
one can see small increases for expenditures on durables and expenditures on wife’s
clothes. There are also small decreases for whether the husband/wife works, the
time the husband spends socializing, contributions to Arisan, and monthly savings.
3.2.3 The Construction of Intra-Household Bargaining Power
Indices
As shown in section 3.2.2, the decision-making module in IFLS contains
information about who participates in making various decisions. This information
is related to, but not equivalent to, information regarding who has decision-making
power. I must, therefore, make some assumptions about the relationship between
participation in decision-making and bargaining power. First, I will assume that if a
member participates in decision-making in a category, he/she has more bargaining
power in this category than members who do not participate. Second, I will
assume that if a person is the sole decision maker in a category, then he/she has
more bargaining power in that category than joint decision makers. Under these
assumptions, I construct indices from the decision-making module to measure
women’s influence on decision-making or their intra-household bargaining power.
The 17 categories may not have equal importance in terms of household
decision-making. One can argue that decisions such as expenditure on durables and
children’s education are more important than decisions such as routine purchase.
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Claiming certain decision are more important and assigning more weight to them
when constructing indices, however, can be subjective. Also, there is no empirical
or theoretical evidence to support such claims. Therefore, as a start, I assume that
all decision categories are equally important and give them the same weight when
constructing indices in this chapter.
Based on the above assumptions, one can use the information in the IFLS
decision-making module to construct different possible indices of bargaining power.
Here I consider the following possibilities:
1. Index 1: The percentage of categories in which the wife reports that she is
the sole decision maker
2. Index 2: The percentage of categories in which both the husband and the
wife report that the wife is the sole decision maker
3. Index 3: The percentage of categories in which the wife reports that she is
either the sole or a joint decision maker
4. Index 4: The percentage of categories in which both the husband and the
wife report that the wife is a sole or joint decision maker
5. Index 5: Using only the wife’s report, the average of the wife’s decision
weight across categories. The decision weight is one divided by the number of
people who participate in the decision in that category when the wife participates,
and zero otherwise.
6. Index 6: Using both the husband’s and wife’s report, the average of the wife’s
decision weight across categories. Here the decision weight is one divided by the
average of the number of decision makers reported by the husband and the number
of decision makers reported by the wife if both the husband and the wife agree that
the wife is a sole or joint decision-maker, and zero otherwise.
As discussed above, not all couples report answers for every category. Also, in
some couples only the wife or only the husband has given a response for one or
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more categories. Consequently, the categories used in the calculation of the indices
will affect the sample size. Indeed, when all categories are used, the sample size
is fairly small. In view of sample size considerations, I calculate the bargaining
power indices in three different ways, in each case using a different selection
of decision-making categories. In all cases, I exclude the category whether the
husband/wife works, because I am interested in the effect of working status on
women’s bargaining power. Including working decision may cause endogeneity
issues. Specifically, I use the following three decision sets:
1. 16 decision categories: All decision categories (sample size=1120)
2. 11 decision categories: Decision categories A-H, K, N, O, i.e., all categories
except those with relatively many missing answers, which are transfers to the
husband’s family, transfers to the wife’s family, contributions to Arisan, monthly
savings, use of contraception (sample size=5926)
3. 7 Categories: Decision categories A, B, C, D, K, N, O, i.e., all categories
except those with many missing answers and those related to children (sample
size=7565)
Table 3.3 shows values of the six indices, each calculated using the three
decision sets. Several interesting observations emerge. First, wives on average
have sole decision power in only a few categories, but they participate in most of
the categories. Second, the indices are quite different when based on only what
the wife reports versus what both the husband and the wife report in agreement.
In general, wives tend to report that they have more decision-making power
than both the husband and wife. Third, the more categories in the decision
set, the lower is the percentage of categories in which the wife is the sole
decision-maker. This pattern is not observed for percentage of categories in which
wife is the sole or joint decision-maker, also not observed for the average of decision
weights. Another interesting observation is that the average of decision weights is
consistently at around 50% for index 6 across all decision sets. This observation is
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suggesting that maybe wives and husbands in Indonesia have equal decision power
in intra-household decision-making.
Table 3.3: Summary of Bargaining Power Indices, 2000 (%)
Decision Set 1 Decision Set 2 Decision Set 3
16 Categories 11 Categories 7 Categories
1. Perc. of Categories Sole Reported by Wife 29.31 33.46 41.04
3. Perc. of Categories Some Reported by Wife 88.60 83.84 82.28
5. Average of Weights Reported by Wife 58.57 58.15 61.45
Obs. 1987 6713 8085
2. Perc. of Categories Sole Reported by Both 16.41 20.44 26.28
4. Perc. of Categories Some Reported by Both 80.31 73.38 70.95
6. Average of Weights Reported by Both 51.01 49.39 51.64
Obs. 1120 5946 7565
For the empirical analysis in this chapter, I will mainly use two indices based on
11 (Decision Set 2) and 7 categories of decision-making (Decision Set 3). The two
indices are the percent of categories in which both the husband and wife agree that
the wife has sole power (Index 2), and the average decision weight across categories
based on both the husband’s and the wife’s reports (Index 6).
My choice of decision sets is based on considerations of sample size. Decision
Set 3 yields the largest sample size, but excludes decisions regarding children.
Decision Set 2 has a smaller sample size, but it includes decisions regarding
children. The relationship between women’s bargaining power and children’s
outcomes is a topic of interest in the literature, which contains studies finding that
households in which women have more control over money tend to spend more on
children. With respect to the indices, I choose to use indices based on both the
husband’s and the wife’s reports, because this gives a more conservative measure
of women’s bargaining power than indices only based on the wife’s reports. We
can see from Table 3.3, for example, that the indices based only on the wife’s
reports indicate that the wife has more bargaining power than indices based on
both the husband’s and wife’s reports. Finally, I choose as one of the indices the
average decision weight, because this index takes into account how many people
participate in making decision in each category, and so reflects not just whether
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the wife participates but also how many others participate in the decision. As
the other index, I choose the percent of categories in which the wife is the sole
decision maker, to obtain a measure of a different aspect of decision-making power.
The percent of categories in which the wife has sole power measures dominance,
and the average decision weight measures participation. Therefore, using both
of these indices should provide us with more insight into the effects of potential
determinants on women’s decision-making power.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Equation of Interest
I want to estimate the effect of women’s work hours on women’s intra-household
bargaining power. According to standard theoretical models of intra-household
bargaining, women’s wage is an important determinant of their intra-household
bargaining power. As discussed in the introduction, other potential determinants
of women’s intra-household bargaining power include: husband’s working status
and wage, husband’s and wife’s non-labor income and assets, cultural factors such
as religion and ethnicity, household demographic structure, and marriage market
factors such as the sex ratio in the local marriage market, divorce laws, etc.
If we treat women’s bargaining power at time t as a latent continuous
unobserved variable, Power∗t , it will be determined according to
Power∗t = α0 + α1Hour
∗
t + α2Waget + α3H + α4Xt + α5W + α6Zt . (3.1)
Hour∗t is the wife’s true work hours. Waget is wife’s hourly wage. H is the vector
of time-invariant observed individual and household characteristics that determine
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women’s bargaining power. In my analysis H include husband and wife’s ethnicity,
age (deterministic instead of time invariant), and education. Xt is the vector of other
observed individual and household characteristics that are time-variant. Xt in my
analysis include husband’s work hours, hourly wage (I set husband’s hourly wage to
zero if the husband does not work), and an indicator variable indicating whether the
husband is working. Xt also include husband’s non-labor income, business assets
and non-business assets, wife’s non-labor income, business assets and non-business
assets, as well as number of adults (older than 15) in the household, number of
members older than 65 in the household, and province and urban/rural status.
W is a vector of unobserved individual and household characteristics that are
time-invariant, such as the wife’s and husband’s personality. Zt is a vector of
unobserved characteristics that are time-variant, such as local marriage market sex
ratio, divorce laws, etc.
I will assume that each of the indices is a noisy measure of the wife’s true
bargaining power, therefore for each index, Indexlt,
Indexlt = α
l
0 + α
l
1Hour
∗
t + α2Waget + α
l
3H + α
l
4Xt + α
l
5W + α
l
6Zt + 
l
t , (3.2)
where  lt is the measurement error of Index
l
t when measuring the true bargaining
power.
Since there is also measurement error measuring women’s working hours,
Equation 3.2 becomes
Indexlt = α
l
0 + α
l
1Hourt + α2Waget + α
l
3H + α
l
4Xt + α
l
5W + α
l
6Zt + 
l
t − α1υt ,
(3.3)
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where υt is the measurement error of Hourt when measuring Hour∗t .
Assuming that current working hours is not correlated with the unobserved
variables, W and Zt, and the measurement error  lt , I can directly estimate the effect
of working hours on Indexlt using OLS regression.
3.3.2 Correcting for Selection of Women into Working
Since about half of women in my sample do not work, I do not observe an hourly
wage for these women. Therefore, for about half of couples I cannot estimate
Equation 3.3 directly. If women’s work hours does not depend on unobserved
characteristics that also affect their bargaining power conditional on H and Xt, then
estimation of Equation 3.3 only using couples in which women work still provides
consistent estimate of α1 and α2. Whether women work, however, may depend
on unobserved characteristics such as their innate ability that may also affect their
bargaining power.
To correct for this selection problem, I use Heckman two-step procedure. First
I estimate women’s labor force participation decision according to
Ut = γ0 + γ1S t + γ2Vt + γ3Q + ut , (3.4)
and
Workt =
 1 if Ut > 00 otherwise . (3.5)
S t are observed characteristics that determine the utility of the wife if she works.
These variables include wife’s age, wife’s education, total non-labor income of
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the household, total assets of the household, number of pre-school children (0
to 6 years old) in the household, number of children between 7 and 15 in the
household, number of members older than 65 in the household, number of work-age
members (15 to 65) in the household, education composition of work age members
in the household, and province and urban/rural status. Vt is vector of unobserved
time-variant characteristics that affects women’s participation decision, and Q is
vector of unobserved time-invariant characteristics that affect women’s participation
decision. The exclusion restriction is number of pre-school children and number of
children between 7 and 15. Number of children, especially number of pre-school
children will strongly influence women’s labor force participation decision, but may
not have much effect on women’s intra-household bargaining power. Assuming ut
is normally distributed, I can estimate Equation 3.4 and 3.5 using probit model.
Then I compute an Inverse Mills Ratio from estimates of Equation 3.4 and 3.5
and include this as an independent variable in Equation 3.3. The results from these
estimations are presented in Section 3.5.
3.3.3 The Simultaneous Equation Problem
Estimating the effect of women’s work hours on their bargaining power may be
subject to a simultaneous equation problem. As suggested above, I am interested
in the effect of Hour∗t on women’s bargaining power Power
∗
t in Equation 3.1. In
other words, the coefficient I am interested in is α1. Women’s bargaining power,
however, may also affect their working status. This is because everything else held
constant, higher bargaining power for women in the household may buy women
more leisure if we treat leisure as a normal good. In contrast, if women are restricted
to do market work in Indonesia, then higher bargaining power in the household for
women may allow them to work more instead of working less. Regardless of the
direction in which bargaining power influences women’s working status, we will
have the following equation for the determination of women’s working hours:
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Hourt = β0 + β1Power∗t + β2S t + β4Vt + β5Q + υt , (3.6)
where S t is a vector of time-variant observed individual and household
characteristics that determine the wife’s working status. These variables include
wife’s age, education, and non-labor income. They also include the age and
education composition of members in the household, total non-labor income of the
household, total assets of the household, and the region in which the households
reside. Vt is a vector of time-variant unobserved characteristics that determine
the wife’s working status such as local labor demand, social network, etc. Q is
a vector of unobserved time-invariant variables that affect women’s working status
such as ability and preference for market work instead of housework, etc.. υt is the
measurement error of Hourt when measuring the true hours that women work.
Since we do not observe the true Power∗t and instead use Indext to measure
Power∗t , equation 3.6 becomes
Hourt = β0 + β1Indext + β2S t + β4Vt + β5Q + υt − β1t , (3.7)
where υt is the measurement error when using Hourt to measure true hours Hour∗t ,
and t is the measurement error when using Indext to measure true bargaining power
Power∗t . As a result we can see that Hourt is correlated with t, and OLS estimation
of Equation 3.3 may not yield a consistent estimate of α1.
3.3.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
To deal with the simultaneous equation problem, I use instrumental variable
estimation. In 1998 the Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia. One of the significant
Chapter 3. Do Working Women Have More Bargaining Power? 84
impacts of the crisis was high inflation. National inflation from 1997 to 1998 was
close to 80%. This sharp rise in the price level resulted in a sharp decrease in
household’s real income and wealth in a short period of time.
The IFLS data reveal that one of the coping strategies households used to
combat the drop in real income due to inflation was to increase women’s work.
Total employment of women in the IFLS sample increased from 52% to 65% from
1997 to 2000.
One feature of the Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia was that the crisis did
not hit all regions equally. In terms of 1997-1998 inflation, provincial variation
was substantial, ranging from 60% in Central Java to 90% in South Sumatra. The
variation in regional inflation makes it a possible instrument, as it is correlated with
the change in women’s work during the crisis but was unlikely to have affected
women’s intra-household bargaining power directly.
Since the impact of inflation was on the change in women’s work, not the level
(which also differed among regions), the instrumented relationship is for change
over time. Taking the first differences of Equation 3.3 and 3.7, I obtain
∆Indexlt = α
l
1∆Hourt + α
l
3∆Xt + α
l
5∆Zt + ∆
l
t − α1∆υt , (3.8)
and
∆Hourt = β1∆Indext + β2∆S t + β4∆Vt + ∆υt − β1∆t . (3.9)
We can see that ∆Hourt is still correlated with ∆t in Equation 3.8. If there
is any common variables in ∆Zt and ∆Vt, estimation of Equation 3.8 will also be
subject to omitted variable problem. Therefore I am going to use provincial level
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inflation from 1997 to 1998 from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics to instrument
for ∆Hourt. As the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia by the beginning of 1998 and
1998 was the deepest point of the crisis, 1997 to 1998 inflation should accurately
capture the effect of the crisis on inflation.
To use regional inflation as an instrument, I need to use households that
have not migrated across provinces between 1997 and 2000. Since less than 5%
of households migrated across provinces between 1997 and 2000 in IFLS, this
restriction should not create a significant problem on the accuracy of my estimates.
In the instrumental variable estimation, I do not control for change in the
wife’s and the husband’s hourly wage. This is because controlling for change
in wife’s hourly wage will exclude women who did not work in either 1997 or
2000 and significantly decrease sample size. The group of women who went from
not-working to working or from working to not-working from 1997 to 2000 is the
most interesting group in this analysis, because they had the most dramatic change
in their working status. To include these women, I cannot control for change in
hourly wage since they do not report a wage in 1997 or 2000. Assuming that the
change in women’s wage is not correlated with regional inflation from 1997 to 1998,
I can still get a consistent estimate of the effect of change in women’s work hours
on the change in their bargaining power indices using the instrument.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
3.4.1 Women’s Employment and Inflation across Provinces
during the Crisis
Table 3.4 shows the levels of and changes in women’s employment rates (percent of
women who work) before and after the crisis by province, as well as the 1997-1998
inflation by province. Most provinces experienced a substantial increase in
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women’s employment, but the magnitude of the increase varies considerably across
provinces. The scale of the 1997-1998 inflation also varies across provinces. From
the table, one can see evidence of a positive correlation between the 1997-1998
inflation and the change in women’s employment rate.
Table 3.4: Women’s Employment Rate and Inflation
Women’s Employment Rate
Province 1997 2000 ∆ 97-00 ∆ in Perc. 97-00 1997-1998 Inflation
North Sumatra 52.45 69.23 16.78 31.99 0.7524
West Sumatra 52.23 65.63 13.4 25.66 0.8163
South Sumatra 44.04 66.51 22.47 51.02 0.9104
Lampung 51.74 77.11 25.37 49.03 0.7226
Jakarta 37.61 48.32 10.71 28.48 0.7263
West Java 31.92 50.36 18.44 57.77 0.6916
Central Java 70.33 74.18 3.85 5.47 0.6116
Yogyakarta 75 83.33 8.33 11.11 0.7487
East Java 49.61 67.89 18.28 36.85 0.7388
Bali 71.71 66.78 -4.93 -6.87 0.6069
West Nusa Tenggara 68.71 67.69 -1.02 -1.48 0.6899
South Kalimantan 63.08 67.76 4.68 7.42 0.6795
South Sulawesi 22.31 43.8 21.49 96.32 0.7396
Notes: Employment rate, calculated from IFLS data, is the percent of women who work. Inflation
data is from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.
3.4.2 Summary Statistics
In the econometric analysis, I will be using the two indices of bargaining power
that are based on 7 categories and 11 categories of decision-making, as discussed
in section 3.2.3. Independent variables used in the analysis include husband’s and
wife’s work hours and hourly wage, as well as other characteristics of the couple,
such as ethnicity, age, education, non-labor income, non-business assets, and
business assets. I also include the household size, the household’s age composition,
and the region of residence. Since for 90% of the couples, wife and husband
have the same ethnicity, I only include wife’s ethnicity in the regressions. I
include a binary variable, however, indicating whether the wife and the husband
have different ethnicity. In Indonesia, ethnicity and region are highly correlated.
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Therefore, I am not able to include all provinces as separate independent variables.
For large, regionally spread ethnic groups, I include the interaction of ethnic groups
and provinces for these ethnic groups. Table 3.5 and 3.6 give summary statistics of
the key variables. The sample includes couples for whom I am able to construct the
two indices and for whom I have full information on all characteristics used in the
OLS regression (Equation 3.3). A complete table of summary statistics is presented
in Appendix E.
Table 3.5: Summary of Characteristics of Couples in 2000 Who Respond to 7
Categories of Decision Making
Sample All Couples With Working Wife
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Obs. 4349 2264
Index 1 Percent Sole 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.23
Index 2 Average Decision Weight 0.54 0.17 0.55 0.17
Work Hours per Week Wife 23.95 29.51 46.01 25.64
Work Hours per Week Husband 48.58 24.69 49.39 25.01
Age Wife 37.32 11.67 39.00 10.20
Age Husband 42.64 12.93 44.26 11.85
Years of Sch. Wife 6.41 4.33 6.32 4.61
Years of Sch. Husband 7.31 4.51 7.08 4.67
Hourly Wage Wife* 1900 5566 1900 5566
Hourly Wage Husband* 2543 12201 2023 3276
Husband Not Working 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Non-labor income Wife* 99365 647332 104522 525493
Non-labor income Husband* 292948 1656376 222186 1528711
Non-business asset Wife* 10883691 31159719 11326320 28780893
Non-business asset Husband* 14137155 36093618 13952889 31907547
Business Asset Wife* 2162454 13621599 2881753 14817303
Business Asset Husband* 7935037 41739273 8150524 35295912
Number of Adults in HH 3.22 1.39 3.18 1.33
Number over 65 in HH 0.17 0.43 0.16 0.42
Urban 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50
*In Rupiah, the exchange rate in 2000 was about 9000 Rupiah/US$
Note: Statistics are for 2000, calculated using the IFLS 2000 data. Due to the large
number of ethnic groups and provinces, I do not report their summary statistics here. They
can be found in Appendix E. Samples are couples who respond to 7 categories of decision
making, and who have complete information on all characteristics.
One can see from Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 that wives on average have about 0.85
fewer years of school than husbands and are about 5 years younger than husbands.
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Wives also have lower wages, lower non-labor income, less non-business assets, and
less business assets than husbands. Both work hours and wages have large standard
deviations, indicating significant variation for both husbands and wives. In about
6% of couples, the husbands do not work. Comparing all couples and couples in
which wives work, one can see that the average characteristics are similar between
these two samples. Also, the average characteristics are similar between the sample
that responds to only 7 categories of decision-making (Table 3.5) and the sample
that responds to 11 categories of decision-making (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6: Summary of Characteristics of Couples in 2000 who
Respond to 11 Categories of Decision Making and Who Also Live in
Households with Children Between 0 and 15
Sample All Couples With Working Wife
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Obs. 2857 1530
Index 1 Percent Sole 0.29 0.23 0.29 0.23
Index 2 Average Decision Weight 0.54 0.17 0.55 0.16
Work Hours per Week Wife 24.78 29.75 46.28 25.65
Work Hours per Week Husband 50.31 23.89 50.86 24.51
Age Wife 36.1176 9.50 37.57 8.73
Age Husband 41.37 10.80 42.72 10.30
Years of Sch. Wife 6.55 4.25 6.52 4.52
Years of Sch. Husband 7.42 4.51 7.19 4.64
Hourly Wage Wife* 1911 4794 1911 4794
Hourly Wage Husband* 2687 12649 2077 3117
Husband Not Working 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Non-labor income Wife* 85375 497928 114314 597843
Non-labor income Husband* 219352 1447964 160070 1395234
Non-business asset Wife* 10954890 27882225 11553372 30546909
Non-business asset Husband* 13977216 32672394 13614831 29705121
Business Asset Wife* 1999688 10505754 2588335 12268476
Business Asset Husband* 8322005 46508751 8524550 38081772
Number of Adults in HH 3.19 1.38 3.19 1.34
Number over 65 in HH 0.15 0.40 0.14 0.40
Urban 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.50
*In Rupiah, the exchange rate in 2000 was about 9000 Rupiah/US$
Note: Statistics are for 2000, calculated using the IFLS 2000 data. Due to the large
number of ethnic groups and provinces, I do not report their summary statistics here. They
can be found in Appendix E. Sample are couples who respond to 11 categories of decision
making, who have complete information on all characteristics, and who reside in
households with children younger than 15.
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Table 3.7 gives summary statistics for the first differenced estimations. The
sample includes couples for whom I am able to compute an index in both 1997 and
2000, and who also have full information on all the independent variables for both
1997 and 2000. One can see that the sample size has decreased significantly. To
compute the change in non-labor income and assets, I use province-specific monthly
inflation indices from the Indonesian Statistics Bureau. I also match the months of
the index to the months in which the household was interviewed in 1997 and 2000.
Table 3.7: Change in Couple’s Characteristics 1997-2000
7 Decision Categories 11 Decision Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Obs. 3209 1689
Index 1 (percent sole) -0.02 0.29 -0.02 0.24
Index 2 (average decision weight) -0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.19
Work Hours per Week Wife 6.29 29.63 7.73 30.09
Work Hours per Week Husband 1.63 28.52 1.64 28.22
Non-business Asset Wife 1632769 20126979 1624748 16452648
Non-business Asset Husband -267224 30874311 358471 17342433
Business Asset Wife 125410 13229028 -145532 15093117
Business Asset Husband 979440 26982675 1475595 30202857
Non-labor income Wife -164459 1873456 -228785 2504944
Non-labor income Husband -61504 1220520 -108516 1483727
Number of adults 0.06 1.23 0.16 1.22
Number older than 65 0.05 0.37 0.01 0.31
Notes: Samples are couples who respond to 7 or 11 categories of decision making in both
1997 and 2000, and who have complete information on all characteristics in the table in
both 1997 and 2000. The sample under 11 decision categories are also couples who reside
in households with children under age 15 in both 1997 and 2000. Changes in non-labor
income and assets are computed using province-specific monthly inflation indices from the
Indonesian Statistics Bureau. I match the months of the index to the months in which the
household was interviewed in 1997 and in 2000.
Table 3.7 presents summary statistics for two samples. The first sample contains
couples in which both husband and wife responded to 7 categories of decision
making in both 1997 and 2000, and for whom I observe the characteristics listed
in Table 3.7 in both 1997 and 2000. The second sample contains couples in which
both husband and wife responded to 11 categories of decision making in both 1997
and 2000, and for whom I observe the characteristics listed in Table 3.7 in both 1997
and 2000. In addition, these couples live in households with children younger than
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15 in both years. One can see that the changes in characteristics are not significantly
different between these two samples. The averages of both indices did not change
between 1997 and 2000. Wives increased their average work time per week by 6-7
hours, and husbands increased their average work time per week by about 1.6 hours.
We do not see a significant decrease in either the wife’s or the husband’s assets. We
do see a drop in the wife’s and the husband’s non-labor income.
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Effect of Women’s Work Hours on Women’s Bargaining
Power Indices
Estimation results of Equation 3.2 are presented in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. Table
3.8 shows the results for the bargaining power index that is based on 7 decision
categories. Table 3.9 displays the results for the index that is based on 11 decision
categories, and for the restricted sample that only includes couples who reside in
households with children aged 15 and younger. The coefficients in the columns
labeled “Basic OLS” are estimated without controlling for women’s wages and
without correcting for the selection of women into working. The coefficients in
the columns labeled “With Selection” are estimated with controls for women’s
wages and correction for the selection of women into working. The results from
the selection equation are presented in Appendix F.
The main coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the wife’s work hours.
In both Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 the estimated coefficient on wife’s work hours
is positive in all specifications and for both bargaining power indices. It is also
statistically significant, except when I control for wages and selection and at the
same time when the dependent variable is the sole power index.
The magnitude of the coefficients on wife’s work hours differs a bit between
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Tables 3.8 and Table 3.9. The estimates in Table 3.8 when the dependent variable is
sole power index are .00036 and .0002. This means that one more hour of work per
week by the wife increases the percent of categories in which wife has sole decision
power by .02 to .036 percentage points. When the dependent variable is the average
decision weight, one more hour of work per week by the wife increases her average
decision weight by .032 to 0.44 percentage points, depending on the specification.
Also of interest is the coefficient on the wife’s wage, which is positive in
all specifications and significant if the dependent variable is the average decision
weight. One more US dollar per hour increases her average decision weight by 1.2
(Table 3.8) or 1.7 (Table 3.9) percentage points.
Therefore, according to OLS regressions, the effect of women’s work hours and
women’s wage on their bargaining power indices is small in magnitude. A 40-hour
increase in women’s work hours per week will only increase both indices by about
.12 percentage points. Since women’s average hourly wage is about .21 US$, a
doubling of the average wage will only increase her average decision weight by
about .24 percentage points.
The regressions in Table 3.8 were estimated over couples who reside in
households with and without children younger than 16, and for a bargaining power
index that does not include decision categories specifically related to spending on
children. In contrast, the regressions in Table 3.9 include only couples who reside
in households with children in this age range and for a bargaining power index
that includes decision categories related to spending on children. Comparing the
coefficients for wife’s work hours and wages in the two tables, one can see that the
estimates are quite similar. This suggests that the impacts of wife’s work time and
wages on bargaining power are not significantly different for couples who live in
households with children and who live in households without children.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Wife’s Hours on Wife’s Bargaining Index in 2000, 7 Decision
Categories
Percent Sole Average Weight
Basic OLS With Selection Basic OLS With Selection
Work hours per week wife .00036*** .0002 .00044*** .00032**
(3.14) (1.11) (5.02) (2.31)
Hourly wage wife .0045 .01205**
(in US dollars) (0.58) (2.05)
Work hours per week husband .00036** .00043** .00023* .00015
(2.29) (2.00) (1.91) (0.92)
Hourly wage husband .00114 -.00697 .00056 -.00619
(in US dollars) (0.47) (-0.48) (0.30) (-0.56)
Husband not working .00449 .0397* .00782 .0336*
(0.27) (1.66) (0.61) (1.86)
Urban .01466* .00821 .00909 .00818
(1.96) (0.74) (1.58) (0.98)
Age wife .00021 .00144 .0004 .00042
(0.31) (1.38) (0.77) (0.53)
Age husband .00061 -.00038 .00022 -6.1e-05
(0.98) (-0.46) (0.46) (-0.10)
Years of school wife -.00111 -.00249 .00029 -.00107
(-0.95) (-1.51) (0.33) (-0.86)
Years of school husband -.00218** -.00223 .00044 .00067
(-2.04) (-1.47) (0.53) (0.58)
Non-labor income wife .06902 .12963 .06009* .12224**
(in 1000 US dollars) (1.50) (1.64) (1.69) (2.04)
Non-labor income husband .03503* .01554 -.00359 -.02999
(in 1000 US dollars) (1.79) (0.49) (-0.24) (-1.25)
Non-business asset wife .00057 .00173 .00303*** .0031**
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.42) (0.94) (2.88) (2.22)
Non-business asset husband .00183 .00283* -.00055 .00034
(in 1000 US dollars) (1.60) (1.80) (-0.62) (0.29)
Business asset wife -.00538** -.00417 -.00143 -.00106
(in 1000 US dollars) (-2.26) (-1.39) (-0.78) (-0.46)
Business asset husband -.0001 .0003 -.00053 -.00082
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.14) (0.23) (-0.92) (-0.84)
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Number of adults -.00646*** -.0044 -.00895*** -.00693**
(-2.58) (-1.19) (-4.64) (-2.48)
Number older than 65 -.0207** -.02211* -.01361** -.00246
(-2.49) (-1.76) (-2.12) (-0.26)
Inverse Mills Ratio .02512 -.01245
(0.83) (-0.54)
Constant .08642*** .06314 .46677*** .48235***
(3.71) (1.29) (25.98) (12.97)
Observations 4349 2264 4349 2264
R2 0.119 0.050
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. This sample are couples who both
report answers to all of 7 categories of decision making. Work hours is work hours per week.
Exchange rate of 9000 Rupiah/US dollar used, it is the average exchange rate in 2000. Coefficients
of ethnicity variables not reported here. Ethnicity does matter for all regressions in this table.
Adults are members older than 15.
Table 3.9: Effect of Wife’s Hours on Wife’s Bargaining Index in 2000,
11 Decision Categories, Households with Children 0-15
Percent Sole Average Weight
Basic OLS With Selection Basic OLS With Selection
Work hours per week wife .0003** .00033 .00046*** .00048***
(2.16) (1.52) (4.30) (2.91)
Hourly wage wife .00994 .01684**
(in US dollars) (0.89) (2.02)
Work hours per week husband .0003 .00051* .00016 .00015
(1.55) (1.96) (1.09) (0.79)
Husband not working -.00927 .03591 .0085 .04191*
(-0.40) (1.16) (0.48) (1.82)
Hourly wage husband .00414 .00631 .00188 .00799
(in US dollars) (1.42) (0.32) (0.85) (0.55)
Age wife .00027 .00251* 9.3e-05 .0008
(0.31) (1.77) (0.14) (0.76)
Age husband 2.6e-05 -.0015 .00017 -.00053
(0.03) (-1.41) (0.29) (-0.67)
Years of school wife -.0012 -.00281 .00082 -.00055
(-0.83) (-1.36) (0.75) (-0.36)
Years of school husband -.00112 -.0006 .00019 .00025
(-0.85) (-0.33) (0.19) (0.19)
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Non-labor income wife .1617** .13575 .13071** .1234**
(in 1000 US dollars) (2.17) (1.63) (2.30) (1.99)
Non-labor income husband .05213* .069 -.00152 -.00851
(in 1000 US dollars) (1.84) (1.56) (-0.07) (-0.26)
Non-business asset wife .00074 -.00092 .00276** .00171
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.42) (-0.40) (2.07) (1.00)
Non-business asset husband .0009 .0018 -.00085 -.00021
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.63) (0.86) (-0.79) (-0.13)
Business asset wife -.00854** -.00722* -.00338 -.00315
(in 1000 US dollars) (-2.37) (-1.66) (-1.23) (-0.97)
Business asset husband -.00056 -.00048 -.00062 -.0015
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.68) (-0.32) (-0.99) (-1.36)
Number of adults -.00805** -.0077 -.00793*** -.00772**
(-2.45) (-1.63) (-3.16) (-2.21)
Number older than 65 -.00616 -.01037 -.00922 -.00073
(-0.57) (-0.68) (-1.11) (-0.07)
Urban .00466 -.01004 .00319 -.0016
(0.50) (-0.70) (0.45) (-0.15)
Inverse Mills Ratio .04519 .00156
(1.21) (0.06)
Constant .10372*** .04386 .47683*** .47253***
(3.43) (0.70) (20.70) (10.22)
Observations 2857 1530 2857 1530
R2 0.115 0.050
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. This sample are the couples who both
report answers to all of 11 categories of decision making, and who also reside in households with
children between 0-15 years. Work hours is work hours per week. Exchange rate of 9000
Rupiah/US dollar used, it is the average exchange rate in 2000. Coefficients of ethnicity variables
not reported here. Ethnicity does matter for all regressions in this table. Adults are members older
than 15.
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3.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates: Effect of Change in
Women’s Work Hours on Change in Women’s Bargaining
Indices
Table 3.10 and 3.11 show the results of the instrumental variable regressions that
use provincial inflation during the Asian financial crisis as an instrument. Here
changes in the bargaining power indices are regressed on changes in wife’s hours
and other variables. For the bargaining power indices constructed using 7 decision
categories (Table 3.10), the effect of wife’s work hours on the percent of categories
in which the wife has sole power is positive and significant. The magnitude of this
effect has become much larger than the OLS estimate in the last section. One more
hour of wife’s work per week increases the percent of categories in which the wife
has sole power by 1.5 percentage points. The IV estimate of the effect of change in
work hours on change in average decision weight is positive and almost significant
at 10% significance level. The magnitude of this effect has increased significantly
compared with the OLS estimate in the last section as well. One more work hour
per week by the wife increases her average decision weight across 7 categories
by .5 percentage points. If I use 11 categories including decisions on children’s
expenditure to construct the indices, the effect of the change in wife’s work hours
on the change in her bargaining indices is no longer significant. The coefficients,
however, remain positive and are of similar magnitude compared with estimates
using 7 categories of decision-making.
The fact that the coefficients on women’s work hours become much larger in
the IV estimation suggests reverse causality. In other words, if a wife’s bargaining
power increases, she can reduce her work hours. When reverse causality exists,
estimates that do not correct for endogeneity may be downward biased.
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Table 3.10: Effect of Change in Wife’s Work Hours on Change in
Wife’s Bargaining Index, 7 Decision Categories
Percent Sole Power Average Decision Weight
OLS IV OLS IV
Work hours per week wife 1.9e-05 .01531** .00015 .00471
(0.11) (2.55) (1.15) (1.62)
Work hours per week husband -.00018 -.00205** -.00015 -.00071*
(-0.99) (-2.54) (-1.11) (-1.83)
Non-business asset wife -.00096 -.00515 .00232 .00108
(in 1000 US Dollars) (-0.37) (-1.02) (1.17) (0.44)
Non-business asset husband -.00095 .00251 -.00246* -.00142
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.57) (0.74) (-1.90) (-0.87)
Business asset wife -.00594 -.01332* -.00063 -.00283
(in 1000 US dollars) (-1.53) (-1.71) (-0.21) (-0.75)
Business asset husband .0021 .00892** -3.1e-05 .002
(in 1000 US dollars) (1.14) (2.05) (-0.02) (0.95)
Non-labor income wife -.00145 -.02471 .02096 .01402
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.06) (-0.53) (1.11) (0.62)
Non-labor income husband -.00221 .01477 .00631 .01137
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.06) (0.21) (0.21) (0.33)
Number of adults -.00622 -.00462 -.00375 -.00327
(-1.51) (-0.60) (-1.18) (-0.88)
Number over 65 -.00031 -.01673 .00272 -.00218
(-0.02) (-0.63) (0.26) (-0.17)
Constant -.0184*** -.11093*** -.01134*** -.03892**
(-3.50) (-2.95) (-2.81) (-2.15)
Observations 3209 3209 3209 3209
R2 0.002 0.003
P-value of partial R-square test 0.0026 0.0026
P-value of Wu-Hausman test 0.0000 0.0655
t-statistic in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Sample are couples who report answers
to all 7 categories in both 1997 and 2000. All the variables are in change between 1997 and 2000.
Inflation data from Indonesian Bureau of Statistics used. Work hours is work hours per week.
Exchange rate of 9000 Rupiah/US dollar used, it is the average exchange rate in 2000. Adults are
members older than 15. Partial R-square test tests for the relevance of the instrument.
Wu-Hausman test tests for the endogeneity of instrumented variable.
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Table 3.11: Effect of Change in Wife’s Work Hours on Change in
Wife’s Bargaining Index , 11 Decision Categories, Households with
Children 0-15 in 1997 and 2000
Percent Sole Power Average Decision Weight
OLS IV OLS IV
Work hours per week wife -.00011 .01029 .00016 .00398
(-0.59) (1.44) (1.00) (0.98)
Work hours per week husband -4.8e-05 -.00092 -.00013 -.00045
(-0.24) (-1.34) (-0.82) (-1.17)
Non-business asset wife .00194 -.00839 .00294 -.00085
(in 1000 US Dollars) (0.53) (-0.90) (1.00) (-0.16)
Non-business asset husband .00114 .00591 -.00371 -.00195
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.37) (0.98) (-1.50) (-0.57)
Business asset wife -.00377 -.01736 -.00088 -.00587
(in 1000 US dollars) (-0.88) (-1.48) (-0.25) (-0.88)
Business asset husband .00152 .00729 -.00072 .00139
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.80) (1.44) (-0.47) (0.49)
Non-labor income wife .00527 -.00601 .0256 .02146
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.25) (-0.17) (1.51) (1.06)
Non-labor income husband .00318 .00246 -.00674 -.007
(in 1000 US dollars) (0.09) (0.04) (-0.23) (-0.20)
Number of adults -.0033 .00363 .00362 .00617
(-0.69) (0.39) (0.94) (1.18)
Number over 65 .011 -.05525 -.02613* -.05046
(0.58) (-1.00) (-1.70) (-1.61)
Constant -.01618*** -.09532* -.01122** -.04029
(-2.67) (-1.73) (-2.30) (-1.29)
Observations 1689 1689 1689 1689
R2 0.002 0.006
P-value of partial R-square test 0.0682 0.0682
P-value of Wu-Hausman test 0.0158 0.2712
t-statistic in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Sample are couples who report answers
to all 11 categories in both 1997 and 2000, and who also reside in households with children
between 0 and 15 in both 1997 and 2000. All the variables are in change between 1997 and 2000.
Inflation data from Indonesian Bureau of Statistics used. Work hours is work hours per week.
Exchange rate of 9000 Rupiah/US dollar used, it is the average exchange rate in 2000. Adults are
members older than 15. Partial R-square test tests for the relevance of the instrument.
Wu-Hausman test tests for the endogeneity of instrumented variable.
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3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter has looked at the effect of women’s work hours on their
intra-household bargaining power. Bargaining power is measured by indices
constructed from direct information on household decision-making in the IFLS.
To address the problem that women’s work hours and bargaining power may
be simultaneously determined, I use regional inflation shock during the Asian
Financial Crisis as an instrument for women’s work hours. I found that the effect
of women’s work hours on their bargaining power indices is in general significant
and positive in both the OLS and IV estimations. The IV estimates of the effect
of women’s work hours on their bargaining indices are much larger than the OLS
estimates.
Whether I am able to obtain the true relationship between women’s work
hours and their bargaining power depends on how well I can measure women’s
intra-household bargaining power. As discussed before, the information on
household decision-making in IFLS only tells us who participates in making various
kinds of decisions. This information is not equivalent to whose preference is more
reflected in the decisions. We can imagine a scenario in which the husband makes
all decisions, but the husband takes the wife’s preferences fully into consideration
when making the decisions. In this case, the wife has high bargaining power
although she does not participate in decision-making. Therefore, in this chapter
I make the assumption that when the wife reports that she participates in making a
decision, her preference will more likely be reflected in that decision.
The IFLS survey data contain information on 17 decision categories, and not
all respondents responded to all those categories. As a result, I cannot include all
the 17 decision categories in my analysis. Even if I could, using the 17 categories
does not exhaust all the household decisions a family makes. In the 17 categories,
there are also more routine decisions such as expenditure on daily food and more
rare decisions such as large purchases. It is not entirely clear whether each of the
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decisions should have equal weight when I want to measure the wife’s bargaining
power. For this chapter, I assume that each decision is equally important and give
them equal weight when constructing my indices.
The accuracy of the results in this chapter will also depend on the validity of
the instrument and whether there is indeed a simultaneous equation problem. Since
inflation was about 70-80% in the first half of 1998 during the Asian financial crisis,
and since inflation varied regionally during the crisis as shown in the descriptive
analysis, using regional inflation as an instrument for the change in women’s work
hours seems to be a valid approach. The difficulty with using this instrument lies
in the fact that inflation data are only available at the provincial level, and in the
fact that I observe the change in women work hours two years after the depth of the
crisis.
Since the analysis covers only 13 provinces, the instrumental variable has only
13 data points. The limited data points of the instrumental variable will result in
large standard errors in the IV estimates. Also, 1998 was the nadir of the crisis, and
I only observe post-crisis changes in 2000. Therefore, it is possible that the change
in women’s work hours between 1997 and 2000 is no longer driven by the inflation
shock during the crisis. Nevertheless, provincial inflation is highly and positively
correlated with the change in women’s hours, as shown in the results section. This
correlation gives me some confidence in the instrumental variable.
If there were no reverse causality, that is, if bargaining power did not affect
women’s work hours decisions, then OLS estimation would be appropriate and OLS
results would be preferred. The test of endogeneity in the instrumental variable
estimation indicates that change in women’s work hours is endogenous when the
dependent variable is percent of categories in which wife has sole power, but not
endogenous when the dependent variable is the average decision weight. Therefore,
there is no clear evidence whether work hours is endogenous. The fact that the
instrumental variable estimate is much larger than the OLS estimate, in contrast,
indicates that there may be downward bias if we ignore the endogeneity issue.
Chapter 3. Do Working Women Have More Bargaining Power? 100
The large difference between the OLS estimate and the IV estimate means that
there should be strong negative effect of wife’s intra-household bargaining power
on their work hours. It is not entirely clear whether this is true in the Indonesian
context. In a poor household, where all members have to work long hours in order
to make ends meet, it is possible that higher bargaining power of women increases
their leisure time. Conversely, it is also possible that women, maybe in more
traditional households with means to support non-working wife, are prohibited from
working outside the house. Then higher bargaining power of women will increase
their work hours.
It is hard to interpret the coefficient for work hours, since hours is not in
monetary terms. My specification assumes that one more hour of work increases
women’s bargaining power by the same amount no matter how much the women’s
hourly wage is. It is not hard to imagine one more hour of work will increase
women’s bargaining power more when the hourly wage is 50 US$ than when the
hourly wage is 1 US$. Including interaction terms between hours and wage may
be one way to solve this problem. The problem of missing wage for non-working
women, again, will complicate this approach.
The effect of work hours on bargaining power may not only pick up the effect
through higher current income; there may be some non-monetary value associated
with working that increases women’s intra-household bargaining power. Higher
social status, for example, may be a consequence of higher labor force participation,
and may affect women’s intra-household bargaining power.
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Chapter 4
Understanding Inconsistencies
between the IFLS and the Sakernas
in Measures of Labor Market
Outcomes
4.1 Introduction
This chapter compares two widely used surveys from Indonesia, the Indonesian
Family Life Survey (IFLS) and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (Sakernas),
and strives to reconcile their differences in employment measures. I document
substantial inconsistencies between these two surveys in measuring both
employment levels and changes over time. I also document the differences between
the two surveys that may cause the inconsistencies, before reconciling them by
exploring the differences between the two surveys in terms of sampling structure,
distribution of basic characteristics, and questionnaire design.
The IFLS, conducted by the RAND Corporation, is a major Indonesian
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longitudinal household survey, while the Sakernas is the official labor force survey
conducted by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. Both surveys elicit information
on individuals’ employment status, hours worked, and wages. Substantial
inconsistency, however, exists between these two surveys in terms of employment
measures (total employment, wage employment, and non-wage employment).1 In
particular, the IFLS shows a much larger increase in total employment during the
1998 Asian financial crisis and this gap between the two surveys persists long after
the crisis.
Comprehending the underlying reasons for the inconsistency between these two
surveys is important because the Sakernas is used as the official survey to monitor
the overall situation of and changes in the Indonesian labor market. The fact
that another major survey in Indonesia reports significantly different employment
levels and trends calls for further investigation. Documenting and examining the
differences between the two surveys pertaining to the measurement of employment
will also be an asset for researchers who are interested in using either survey to
conduct labor-related research in Indonesia.
Previous studies on the Indonesian labor market have noted the inconsistency
between the two surveys. In particular, when studying the impact of the Asian
financial crisis on the labor market in Indonesia, Smith et al. (2002) use both
the IFLS and the Sakernas, and find that the IFLS shows a greater increase
in total employment during the crisis, especially for women. They postulate
that the inconsistency is due to better measurement of family work in the IFLS
and the fact that much of the increase in employment during the crisis was in
family work. They do not, however, test this hypothesis. Other studies on the
inconsistency between labor surveys have also noted that different treatment of
“off-the-books” workers such as self-employed and family workers is a potential
cause of inconsistency. For example, Abraham et al. (2009) have noted that while
1Total employment in this chapter is defined as the percentage of adults (those over 15) who are
working. Wage employment is defined as percentage of adults who are wage workers. Non-wage
employment is defined as the percentage of adults who are self-employed or family workers.
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household data would cover more off-the-books workers such as self-employed
and family workers, establishment data would cover more “marginal” workers
such as part-time workers who do not consider working to be their main activity.
Furthermore, in Bowler and Morisi (2006) which compares the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the Current Employment Statistics Survey (CES) in US in terms
of employment measures, the authors note that different coverage of off-the-books
workers, such as undocumented residents, may be one reason for the difference
in employment measures. None of these papers, again, have tested directly
whether different coverage of off-the-books workers actually causes differences
in employment measures. Given that the employment questions in the IFLS and
the Sakernas are the same except that IFLS has one additional follow-up question
on whether the individual worked in a family business in the previous week, this
chapter is able to test directly whether further probing about family work causes
employment measurement differences.
Accounting for differences in treatment of family work, however, may explain
only a small percentage of the gaps in employment measures found between
the Sakernas and the IFLS; there may be many other factors. For example,
when explaining the large swings in employment measures over time within the
Sakernas, Korns (1987) notes that other factors, including change in sample size
and design, change in concept of working, change in employment questions, change
in personnel and training, change in questionnaire length and focus, and change
in interviewer instruction manual can cause changes in employment measures
when there is no real change in the labor market. Bowler and Morisi (2006)
have also noted that potential factors causing differences in employment measures
between the CPS and the CES include differences in definition of employment,
geographic coverage, and response error. None of these studies, however, document
systematically the differences over time within a single survey or between surveys,
and Korns (1987) does not test whether the potential factors proposed actually do
contribute to the swings in employment measures over time in the Sakernas. In this
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chapter, I first document systematically the differences between the IFLS and the
Sakernas that could cause the inconsistency in employment measures. Starting from
the factors proposed in Korns (1987) and Bowler and Morisi (2006), I document
differences between the IFLS and the Sakernas in sample size and sampling
structure, in the concept of working, in employment questions, in personnel and
training, and in questionnaire length. In addition I add tracking and interviewing
procedure of the IFLS and field work length and timing as additional factors that
could contribute to the inconsistency between the two surveys.
I then test whether some of these factors do explain the inconsistencies. I
test whether the difference in sampling structure, in particular the difference in
geographic coverage due to stratification, explains some of the gaps between the
two surveys. I also compare distributions of basic characteristics, namely education
and age, within geographic regions to see if differential sampling procedures in the
two surveys have caused differential coverage of population in terms of education
and age. I also conduct an Oaxaca decomposition to test how much of the gap in
employment measures between the two surveys is caused by difference in education
and age distribution.
I find that although the IFLS and the Sakernas have substantial differences
in distribution by geography, age and education, accounting for difference in
geographic coverage and differences in education and age distribution does little
to explain the gaps under study. Dropping the question on family work in the IFLS
and using same questions to define working, in contrast, does help with explaining
the gap in total employment between the two surveys, especially in the rural areas.
These results confirm findings in other studies that try to reconcile inconsistencies
between labor surveys (Bowler and Morisi (2006), Bollinger and Hirsch (2013),
Abraham et al. (2009)), i.e. that inconsistencies between labor surveys cannot
be fully explained based on information available. The findings in this chapter
also confirm the hypothesis that different treatment of family workers can cause
significant differences in measures of employment. In developing countries where
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there is usually a large informal sector with a substantial number of family workers,
designing surveys to pay appropriate attention to obtain accurate coverage of
self-employed and family workers is vitally important.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the two surveys
and documents discrepancies between them in employment measures. Section 4.3
documents differences between the two surveys’ structures that may cause these
differences. Section 4.4 tests the extent to which some of the potential factors do in
fact explain the discrepancies. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 IFLS, Sakernas, and Discrepancy between
the Two Surveys in Labor Market Outcome
Measures
4.2.1 IFLS
The IFLS is a household level longitudinal survey conducted by the RAND
Corporation in 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2007. All rounds of the survey
are publicly available except the 1998 round. In the first wave conducted in
the second half of 1993, over 30,000 individuals in 7,224 households were
sampled. The sampling scheme was stratified on provinces and rural-urban
areas within provinces. Enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly sampled within
these strata, and households were randomly sampled within the enumeration
areas. The documentation for the IFLS states that EAs in the urban areas and
in smaller provinces were oversampled to facilitate urban-rural and Java/non-Java
comparisons. The sample covered 13 out of the 27 provinces in Indonesia, including
all provinces on Java and provinces on Sumatra, Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and
Nusa Tenggara. As a result, the sample covered about 83% of the Indonesian
population.
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In each of the succeeding rounds, the survey team tried to re-contact all of the
households interviewed in 1993 (“original households”). Members who moved out
of their original households were also tracked and their new households were added
to the sample (“split-off” households).2 The resulting sample size and attrition at
the individual level for each round is listed in Appendix G. Attrition for original
households from 1993 to 1997 was 7% and from 1997 to 2000 was 3%. The
re-contact and interview procedures described in Appendix A make clear that each
IFLS survey round may not merit the description of a repeated random cross section
survey.
The IFLS collected rich information at both household and individual levels
on consumption, employment, health, education, etc. At the household level,
modules about consumption, household business, and assets were administered in
each round. At the individual level, modules about education history, work history
and health were administered in each round.
4.2.2 Sakernas
The Sakernas(Indonesian Labor Force Survey) is a household level repeated
cross-section survey conducted by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics since 1976.
This chapter examines the rounds from 1993 to 2007, since this is the period that is
also covered by the IFLS. From 1986 to 1993, the survey was conducted quarterly.
Since 1994, it was conducted in August every year.
The sample of the Sakernas is much bigger than that of the IFLS ranging from
155,000 individuals to 950,000 individuals depending on the survey year. Also, the
Sakernas sample covers all provinces of Indonesia.3 Therefore, the Sakernas should
be more representative of the Indonesian population. In 1995, the Sakernas was
administered as part of the Inter-Census Population Survey, resulting in a bigger
sample size and different sampling frame compared with other years. The Sakernas
2A more detailed description of the IFLS re-contact procedure is provided in Appendix A.
3Sample size of Sakernas each year is presented in Appendix H
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questionnaire is much shorter than the IFLS. It only elicits information on education
and work from household members who are older than ten years.
4.2.3 Discrepancy in Labor Market Outcome Trends
This section compares the trends in labor market outcomes constructed using the
IFLS and the Sakernas when I treat both the IFLS and the Sakernas samples as
random cross-section samples. For both surveys, I only use the 13 provinces that
are included in the IFLS. The results for this set of comparisons are summarized in
Figures 4.1,4.2, and 4.3. The labor market outcomes shown are percent of adults
(older or equal to 15) who work, percent of adults who are employed in the wage
sector, and percent of adults who are employed in the non-wage sector. I compare
the trends in these outcomes for four groups of people: males in urban areas,
females in urban areas, males in rural areas, and females in rural areas. Figures
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 reveal significant inconsistencies in the trends of labor market
outcomes between the IFLS and the Sakernas.
Percentage of Adults Who Work
For the percentage of urban adult males who work, we can see that the IFLS and the
Sakernas start at similar levels in 1993. Both the IFLS and the Sakernas trends are
flat between 1993 and 1997. Then the Sakernas level shows little change between
1997 and 2000, while the IFLS level shows a large increase between 1997 and 2000.
The increase shown in the IFLS level between 1997 and 2000 persists to 2007 with a
slight increase between 2000 and 2007. Conversely, the Sakernas displays a pattern
of a slight decline between 2000 and 2007, which brings the gap between the IFLS
and the Sakernas further to about eight percentage points in 2007.
For the percentage of urban adult females who work, the IFLS starts at a higher
level (about five percentage points higher) than the Sakernas in 1993. Then the IFLS
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Figure 4.1: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Work by
Urban/Rural Male/Female
shows no change between 1993 and 1997, while the Sakernas shows a substantial
increase between 1996 and 1997 which brings the Sakernas level closer to the IFLS
level. From 1997 to 2000, the IFLS shows a 7-8 percentage points’ increase while
the Sakernas displays little change except for a small decrease between 1999 and
2000. The IFLS exhibits little change between 2000 and 2007. The Sakernas shows
a decline and then an increase between 2000 and 2007 which renders the 2007
Sakernas level very close to the 2000 Sakernas level. The ending gap between the
IFLS and the Sakernas (IFLS being higher) is about eleven percentage points.
For the percentage of rural adult males who work, the Sakernas starts at a higher
level (about four percentage points higher) than the IFLS in 1993. Then both the
Sakernas and the IFLS show little change between 1993 and 1997, and the gap
between the Sakernas and the IFLS is maintained in 1997. From 1997 to 2000, the
IFLS displays a significant five percentage points’ increase, and the Sakernas shows
a small decrease. These changes bring the IFLS level about one percentage point
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higher than that of the Sakernas in 2000. Then there is little change in the IFLS
level between 2000 and 2007, while Sakernas shows a decline between 2000 and
2007. As a result, the IFLS level ends up to be about four percentage points higher
than that of the Sakernas in 2007.
For the percentage of rural adult females who work, the Sakernas starts at a
slightly higher (about two percentage points higher) level than the IFLS in 1993.
The IFLS shows a significant decrease (about five percentage points) between 1993
and 1997, while the Sakernas exhibits little change between 1993 and 1997. From
1997 to 2000, the IFLS shows a significant increase (about ten percentage points),
and the Sakernas displays little change, resulting in the same level between the
IFLS and the Sakernas in 2000. From 2000 to 2007, there is little change in the
IFLS level, while the Sakernas level decreases until 2006 and picks up from 2006
to 2007. The ending gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas (IFLS being higher) is
about seven percentage points.
Percentage of Adults Employed in the Wage Sector
In terms of percentage of urban male adults employed in the wage sector, we can
see that the IFLS trend is significantly higher than the Sakernas trend for the whole
1993-2007 period. The IFLS trend is almost flat between 1993 and 2000 with
a four percentage points’ increase between 2000 and 2007. The Sakernas trend
swings around for the 1993-2007 period. There is a small increase between 1993
and 1997 and a significant drop between 1997 and 1998 that persists until 2000. In
2001, the Sakernas shows a substantial increase (around eight percentage points)
followed by a decreasing trend between 2002 and 2007 which brings the Sakernas
level in 2007 back to its 2000 level. As a result, the starting gap between IFLS and
Sakernas in 1993 is about eight percentage points. Then the gap narrows to seven
percentage points in 1997, widens to ten percentage points in 2000, and widens
further to fourteen percentage points in 2007.
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The IFLS trend of the percentage of urban adult females who are employed
in the wage sector is also significantly higher than that of the Sakernas for the
whole 1993-2007 period. The IFLS shows little change between 1993 and 1997,
a small increase (about two percentage points) between 1997 and 2000, and a
further increase (about another two percentage points) between 2000 and 2007. The
Sakernas shows little change between 1993 and 2007 except a small increase (about
three percentage points) between 2000 and 2001 and a gradual decline between
2001 and 2007. Therefore, the gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas is about
three percentage points in both 1993 and 1997. Then the gap is widened to around
seven percentage points in 2000, and further widened to around nine percentage
points in 2007.
The rural IFLS trend for the percentage of adult males employed in the wage
sector is also higher than the Sakernas trend for the whole 1993-2007 period. The
IFLS shows a small increase from 1993 to 1997 (about one to two percentage
points), a further increase of around four percentage points between 1997 and 2000,
and no change between 2000 and 2007. Sakernas shows a jump of about three
percentage points between 1993 and 1994 and a small decrease between 1994 and
1997. Then the Sakernas level decreases consecutively between 1997 and 2000, and
the gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas is widened between 1997 and 2000. The
Sakernas displays a small increase (about two percentage points) between 2000 and
2001 and little change between 2000 and 2007 except a small dip in 2003. As a
result, the 2007 Sakernas level is about two percentage points higher than the 2000
level. The gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas is about four percentage points
in both 1993 and 1997, and it widens to about eleven percentage points in 2000.
The ending gap is about nine percentage points in 2007.
For adult females in rural areas, the IFLS trend is slightly higher than the
Sakernas trend for the whole 1993-2007 period. IFLS shows no change between
1993 and 1997, a small increase (about two percentage points) between 1997 and
2000, and a further small increase (about one percentage point) between 2000 and
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2007. The Sakernas trend is flat between 1993 and 2007 with a small dip (about
two percentage points) in 2003. As a result, the gap between the IFLS and the
Sakernas is about two percentage points in 1993 and 1997. Then it widens to about
four percentage points in 2000, and further widens to about 5.5 percentage points
in 2007.
Figure 4.2: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Wage Work by
Urban/Rural Male/Female
Percentage of Adults Employed in the Non-Wage Sector
In urban areas, the percentage of male adults employed in the non-wage sector
according to the Sakernas is higher than that according to the IFLS for all years
between 1993 and 2007. The IFLS shows a small decrease (about two percentage
points) between 1993 and 1997, an increase of around four percentage points
between 1997 and 2000, and a slight decrease (about one percentage point) between
2000 and 2007. The Sakernas shows a small increase between 1993 and 1997 and
further increase (about two percentage points) between 1997 and 2000. After a
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dip in 2001, the Sakernas trend stays at the same level in 2002 until it picks up in
2007 with a 2-3 percentage point increase. As a result, the starting gap between
the Sakernas and the IFLS (Sakernas being higher) is about six percentage points
in 1993, and the gap widens to eight percentage points in 1997. Then it narrows to
about five percentage points in 2000, and ends at around six percentage points in
2007.
For the percentage of urban adult females employed in the non-wage sector,
we can see that the IFLS trend and the Sakernas trend almost over-lap between
1993 and 1997. Then the IFLS shows a significant five percentage points’ increase
between 1997 and 2000, while the Sakernas displays a small increase between 1997
and 1999 and a three percentage points decrease between 1999 and 2000. Then
Sakernas shows a further drop between 2000 and 2001 of about six percentage
points and another drop between 2002 and 2003. The Sakernas trend starts to pick
up and reaches a little more than its 2000 level in 2007. Conversely, the IFLS
exhibits a slight decrease (about one percentage point) between 2000 and 2007. As
a result, we see almost no gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas levels in 1993,
1997, and 2007 and a small gap of about three percentage points in 2000.
In rural areas, for adult males we can see that the Sakernas trend is much higher
than the IFLS trend for the whole 1993-2007 period. The IFLS trend is mostly flat
between 1993 and 2007 with a small dip in 1997. The Sakernas, in contrast, shows a
gradual decrease between 1993 and 1997, a progressive increase between 1997 and
2000, and a slow decline between 2000 and 2007 (about seven percentage points in
7 years). As a result, the starting gap between the Sakernas and the IFLS is about
nine percentage points, and the gap stays at the same level in 1997 and 2000. The
ending gap is about five percentage points.
For rural adult females, the Sakernas also starts at a much higher (about five
percentage points higher) level in 1993 compared with the IFLS. Then this gap
widens to about eight percentage points in 1997 after the IFLS level declines
by about three percentage points. Then a significant increase in the IFLS level
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between 1997 and 2000 (about nine percentage points) narrows the gap to about
two percentage points, while Sakernas only shows a small increase of about two
percentage points between 1997 and 2000. There is a slight decrease in the IFLS
level of about 1-2 percentage points between 2000 and 2007. The Sakernas shows
a dramatic decline between 2000 and 2006 and a substantial increase (about seven
percentage points) between 2006 and 2007. As a result, the ending gap between the
IFLS and the Sakernas (IFLS being higher) is about two percentage points.
Figure 4.3: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Non-Wage Work
by Urban/Rural Male/Female
General Patterns
For males, the gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas in the percentage working
is relatively small compared with the gap in the percentage employed in the wage
sector and the gap in the percentage employed in the non-wage sector. It appears
that the IFLS tends to put more workers in the wage sector and the Sakernas tends
to put more workers in the non-wage sector. When we add together the percentages
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in these two sectors, the gap between the two surveys is not so large. This pattern
is less evident for females but still observable in both urban and rural areas.
Also, we can see that the Sakernas trends of percent working for all groups
are flatter than the IFLS trends. The IFLS trends of percent working for all four
groups share a common increase between 1997 and 2000, and this increase persists
to 2007. Therefore, for all four groups the gap between the IFLS and the Sakernas
is much wider in 2007 compared with 1993 (in the case of rural males, the gap flips
sign between 1993 and 2007).
4.3 Potential Factors Causing Discrepancy
Several potential factors could cause these discrepancies in employment measures
between the IFLS and the Sakernas. These factors include: 1). difference in
sampling structure, 2). panel data nature of the IFLS and its interviewing and
tracking rules, 3). difference in definition of working and questionnaire design, 4).
non-randomness in selecting enumeration areas and households, 5). personnel and
training of interviewers, and 6). questionnaire length and time of year in which
fieldwork is conducted. I will talk about each of these factors in detail in this
section.
4.3.1 Difference in Sampling Structure
The IFLS documentation states that in the initial year of the IFLS (1993), the sample
was stratified on province and urban/rural areas. As a result, the IFLS strata are
urban or rural areas of various provinces. In 1993, the IFLS oversampled smaller
provinces and urban areas to facilitate comparison among provinces and between
urban and rural areas. Within each stratum, enumeration areas are randomly
selected, and within each enumeration area, households are randomly selected.
Chapter 4. Reconciling Inconsistencies between IFLS and Sakernas 118
The 1996 manual of Sakernas (Ind (1996)) does not state formally but implies
that the 1996 Sakernas sample was stratified on urban/rural areas. Then, within
each stratum, enumeration areas were randomly selected. Within each enumeration
area, a segment group (a block of households) was chosen and every household in
the segment group was interviewed. Although it is not stated, I will show that the
Sakernas also seems to oversample smaller provinces. This pattern indicates that
the Sakernas was stratified on provinces.
The sampling structures of both surveys indicates that the Sakernas and the
IFLS may not be representative samples at the national level without using proper
sampling weights. Also, the Sakernas and the IFLS may not be directly comparable
due to differences in regional distribution. I will explore the impact of using
sampling weights in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 IFLS’s Tracking and Interviewing Rules
While the Sakernas is a standard cross section household survey in which all adult
members of all households are asked the same questions each year, the IFLS is a
panel survey with very specific tracking and interviewing rules.
As described in Appendix A, the IFLS tries to follow the 1993 households and
members of the 1993 households that have moved out of their original households
since 1993. The new households that original respondents have moved into (the
split-off households) are incorporated into the IFLS sample each year. The IFLS
does not, however, track all members that have moved out of the original 1993
households, and only certain members according to the rules listed in Appendix A
are tracked. Moreover, the tracking rules change from year to year. I will show
later that due to the addition of new household members in the original and split-off
households each year, the IFLS sample grows in size and does not display a pattern
of aging between survey years. This feature may make the IFLS sample of later
survey years more similar to a cross-section sample instead of a panel sample at the
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individual level. Nonetheless, the particular tracking rules of the IFLS suggest that
one should be cautious when treating the IFLS sample as a random cross-section
sample each survey year. In Section 4.4 I will compare the distribution of basic
characteristics of each IFLS survey year to the Census distribution to gain a sense
of biases in the IFLS samples.
The IFLS questionnaire contains a particular module called the adult
information module that includes detailed questions on individuals’ current working
information and employment histories. This module contains questions that are
similar to the Sakernas employment questions, which ask for working information
in the last week. In each of the IFLS survey years, however, only a portion of adults
in the IFLS sample answer this module. As described in Appendix A, in 1993,
only the household head and spouse, an individual aged 50 and above (randomly
selected) and his/her spouse, and an individual aged between 15 and 49 (randomly
selected) and his/her spouse were administered the adult information module. This
rule systematically oversamples older household members as the household head
is usually older than the average age in the IFLS sample. In all later rounds of
the IFLS, every adult member of the 1993 original households are administered the
adult information module. In split-off households, only the tracked respondents,
their spouses, and their children are administered the adult information module.
Therefore, we can see that among the adults that are included each year of the IFLS
sample, there is a selection of who gets to answer the employment questions.
In 1993, fortunately, for the younger adult individuals that are not administered
the adult information module, the household head answers, in the household
economy module, whether each of them worked in the last year and their
employment sector (wage or non-wage) in the last year. Since about 40% of
adults in 1993 are not covered by the adult information module but covered in the
household economy module, I combine the information from these two modules
to form the employment measures in 1993 in this chapter. Therefore, in 1993, for
about 40% of 1993 adults the reference period is last year, and they did not answer
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the employment questions themselves. There is only one single question deciding
whether they worked last year: “Did [...] work to earn income/wages/salary during
the past 12 months?” This is an important caveat when interpreting the results later.
In later rounds of the IFLS, the household head is no longer asked about working
information of each member in the household economy module.
In Section 4.4 I compare the distribution of basic characteristics of all adults in
the IFLS with the distribution of adults for whom I have the employment measures
in the IFLS (adults who answered adult information module or who were covered by
the household economy module in 1993). In this way, I can explore the selection of
adults who are used to calculate the employment measures in the IFLS on observed
characteristics.
4.3.3 Difference in Concept of Working and in Questions about
Working
In terms of concept and definition of working, the Sakernas and the IFLS appear
to be similar. The 1993 IFLS interviewer manual (Dem (1993)) states that “those
who work are those who, one week before the interview, did some work with the
intention to obtain or help obtain an income or profit during at least one hour last
week. Working for one hour must be done continuously and must not be interrupted.
The income and profit include the wage/salary comprising all allowances, bonuses
and the returns of the enterprise in the form of rent, interest and profit, be it in
the form of money or goods.” The 1996 Sakernas interviewer manual (Ind (1996))
states that “Working is an activity to seek earnings/help seek earnings in order to
obtain or help to obtain earnings or profit minimum for an hour during the past
week. Working for an hour has to be done continuously. The earnings or profit
covers salary/wages including all benefits and bonus for workers/ entrepreneurs
and the income from lease, interest or profit, in cash or in-goods for the worker.”
Both the 1993 IFLS manual and the 1996 Sakernas manual also provide examples
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of individuals who work. The examples, listed in Appendix I, are also very similar.
The only difference is that the Sakernas states that a person who uses his own
profession for their own household needs is considered as working, and a field
laborer and loose laborer who is waiting for a job is considered as not working.
These two examples are not written in the IFLS manual. Since these two categories
of individuals are hard to identify in the Sakernas and the IFLS data, it is difficult
to know if this difference causes any discrepancy in employment measures between
the two surveys.
Unfortunately, I cannot find the interviewer manuals for the rest of survey years
for the Sakernas and the IFLS. If the interviewer manual stayed the same for all
survey years compared in this chapter (1993, 1997, 2000, 2007), then the difference
in concept and definition of working should not be a cause of discrepancy between
the two surveys.4
Similar questions deciding whether an individual is working are administered
to most adults in the IFLS and to all adults in the Sakernas (See Appendix J for the
questions). We can see that between 1993 and 2007 the IFLS questionnaire did not
change, but the Sakernas questionnaire changed in 1997 and then changed again in
2001. Both the IFLS and the Sakernas have several questions determining whether
a person is working. From 1986 to 2000, the only difference between the IFLS
and the Sakernas is that in the IFLS one additional follow-up question is asked.
This question is “did you work at a family-owned business during the past week”.
Starting from 2001, the questionnaire for the Sakernas changed significantly, and
the question “were you employed for at least 1 hour during the past week?” is no
longer included in the working status questions. The difference in the questions
4As mentioned in Section 2, Dhanani et al. (2009) states that 2001 Sakernas redefines working
so that only those whose main activity is working in the last week are considered to be working.
I cannot verify, however, that this change of concept and definition is written in the Sakernas
interviewer manual after 2001. According to the User’s Guide on Sakernas provided by the
Australian National University (Aus (2001-2007)), the concept of working in years 2001-2007 is
“an activity done by a person who worked for a pay or assisted others in obtaining pay or profit for
the duration of at least one hour during the survey week”. This guide indicates that the concept of
working in the Sakernas is the same from 1996 to 2007.
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determining whether an individual works may be a cause of the discrepancy in
employment measures between the two surveys. I will test if this is true in Section
4.4.
With respect to the sector in which a working individual is employed, in both
the IFLS and the Sakernas an individual can choose between several employment
sectors if he/she is determined to be working. In the 1993 IFLS and the 2000
IFLS, an individual can choose between: 1). self-employed (without help),
2). self-employed with help of householders/temporary workers, 3). employer
with help of regular workers, 4). government worker/employee, 5). private
worker/employee, 6). family worker. In the 1997 IFLS, all the self-employed
sectors are combined into one sector called the self-employed. In 2007, the IFLS
adds two additional sectors: 7). casual worker in agriculture and 8). casual worker
in non-agriculture.
From the 1993 Sakernas to the 1996 Sakernas, if an individual is determined
to be working, he/she can choose between five employment sectors: 1).
self-employed, 2). self-employed assisted by family worker, 3). employer with
permanent workers, 4). worker/employee, 5). family worker. From 1997 to 2000,
the employment sectors in Sakernas are: 1). self-employed, 2). self-employed
assisted by workers/temporary workers/unpaid workers, 3). self-employed assisted
by workers/permanent employees, 4). worker/employee/paid worker and 5). unpaid
worker. We can see that although the sectors remain the same, the wording changed
in 1997. In 2001, the sectors are the same as in 2000 but two new sectors are
introduced: 6). casual employee in agriculture, and 7). casual employee in
non-agriculture.
In this chapter, for both surveys I categorize all self-employed workers, family
workers, and unpaid workers into the non-wage sector, and categorize government
workers/employees, private workers/employees, and casual workers/employees into
the wage sector.
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Dhanani et al. (2009) comments that the introduction of the two new casual
employee sectors in the 2001 Sakernas may have caused a re-categorization of
working individuals from non-wage employment into wage employment. I do
observe a shift of workers from non-wage employment into wage employment from
the 2000 Sakernas to the 2001 Sakernas without a change in total employment. If
what Dhanani et al. (2009) speculates is true, then the change in the IFLS sectors
may also cause some shift of workers between the wage and the non-wage sectors.
Total employment, in contrast, should not be affected by the introduction of new
employment sectors. Also, we can see that after the two new sectors are introduced,
both the 2007 Sakernas and the 2007 IFLS use the same employment sectors.
Therefore, discrepancies between the 2007 IFLS and the 2007 Sakernas should not
be caused by the difference in employment sectors.
4.3.4 Non-randomness in Selection of Enumeration Areas and
Households
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the sampling procedures of the IFLS and the
Sakernas both involve randomly selecting enumeration areas (both based on census
enumeration areas) within each stratum. The IFLS randomly selects households
within each enumeration area, and the Sakernas randomly selects a segment group
within each enumeration area and interviews all households within each segment
group. Since only a small fraction of all the enumeration areas within a stratum can
be selected, especially in IFLS which has a smaller sample size, the randomness
of the enumeration area selection is crucial for the representativeness of the survey
within strata. Also, as IFLS randomly selects a small percentage of households
within each enumeration area, whether the selection of households is random is
also very important. In comparison, the procedure in the Sakernas that interviews
all households in the segment group is not prone to the problem of non-randomness
of selection of households within segment groups.
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As a result, one possible cause of the discrepancy between the IFLS and the
Sakernas may be that the selection of enumeration areas in either or both surveys or
the selection of households within enumeration areas in the IFLS is not random.
This potential factor, however, is hard to verify and not pursued further in this
chapter.
4.3.5 Difference in Interviewer Training and Interviewer Effort
Even if the definition of and questionnaire on employment are the same between
the two surveys, the interpretation of the concept of working are subject to
the interviewer’s training, experience, ability and effort. These factors can also
influence the extent of errors in the responses reported. Systematic differences
between the Sakernas and the IFLS in terms of the experience, training, ability and
effort of the interviewers could, therefore, affect the comparability of employment
measures obtained from the two surveys.
The Sakernas interviewers are all local Bureau of Statistics officials. The IFLS
interviewers are local people recruited and trained by the Population Institute (LD)
at the University of Indonesia, an organization collaborating with RAND to conduct
the IFLS. Depending on the education, experience and training of the interviewers
in both surveys, there may be some systematic difference in terms of interpretation
of concepts and accuracy of reports. This factor is also hard to verify and not
investigated further in this chapter.
4.3.6 Questionnaire Length and Time of Year in Which
Fieldwork was Conducted
A major difference between the IFLS questionnaire and the Sakernas questionnaire
is length. The IFLS covers a broad range of information and has a much
longer questionnaire containing multiple question books. As a result, the
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IFLS questionnaire may require several interviews to complete. The Sakernas
questionnaire is short and can usually be completed in one interview session. The
difference in questionnaire length may affect interviewer’s effort and respondent’s
patience and, as a result, influence the accuracy of the information collected.
Another difference between the IFLS and the Sakernas is the time of the year in
which the fieldwork was carried out. According to the 1996 manual, the Sakernas
fieldwork is completed in August every year. The IFLS fieldwork takes much longer
to complete and usually stretches from June/July to December or January of next
year. If there is seasonality in employment in Indonesia, the difference in the timing
of fieldwork could cause a difference in employment measures. This factor is also
not investigated further in this chapter.
4.4 Test of Potential Factors Causing Discrepancy
In this section, I explore some of the possible factors that could cause the
discrepancies in employment measures between the IFLS and the Sakernas. To
investigate whether the difference in sampling structure, namely, stratification on
provinces and urban/rural areas, causes the inconsistencies, I construct sampling
weights that match the provincial distribution of the IFLS and the Sakernas to the
2000 Census distribution. To investigate whether tracking rule and sampling of the
IFLS and sampling of the Sakernas have created any bias in terms of coverage
of age and education groups, I compare age and education distributions within
urban/rural areas of each province with the same distributions from the census or
inter-census. To analyze whether differential age and education distribution causes
the inconsistency between the two surveys, I conduct Oaxaca decomposition to
quantify the share of the gaps between the two surveys explained by difference
in education and age distributions. To investigate whether the difference in
questionnaire on working creates difference in employment measures, I drop the
last follow-up question in IFLS and use the same set of questions to determine if an
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individual is working.
4.4.1 Using Sampling Weights
Distribution of Population across Provinces
Before constructing weights to match the regional distribution of the IFLS
and the Sakernas to the Census, I compare the provincial distribution and
urban/rural distribution by province among the IFLS, the Sakernas, and the
Census/Inter-Census. Since Sakernas only covered adult members (older than or
equal to 15), I compare the provincial distribution of adults between the IFLS
and the Sakernas. I also compare the provincial distribution among different
sub-samples within the IFLS. These subsamples are all respondents, adults and
adults with full work information (who have answered the adult information module
or are covered in 1993 by the household economy module). From Figure 4.4 we
can see that the IFLS provincial distribution differs significantly from the Sakernas
provincial distribution in all of the four survey years of the IFLS. In general the
Sakernas provincial distribution is closer to the census and inter-census. Both the
IFLS and the Sakernas under-sampled the largest provinces, namely, West Java,
Central Java and East Java, and over-sampled Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bali, West Nusa
Tenggara and South Kalimantan. The provincial distribution within the Sakernas is
stable over the four years. The provincial distribution within the IFLS is stable from
1993 to 2000, but in 2007, the percentage in North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South
Sumatra and South Sulawesi increased significantly compared with the previous
IFLS survey years.
I also checked whether the provincial distribution is similar across different
sub-samples within the IFLS (everyone, adults and adults with full work
information). It turns out this distribution is not significantly different across
different sub-samples of the IFLS.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Population across Provinces by Survey
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than or equal to 15
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Distribution across Urban/Rural Status within Provinces
The earliest census/inter-census from which I can obtain information on urban/rural
population shares by province is the 2000 census. Therefore, the Sakernas and the
IFLS distributions in 1993, 1997 and 2000 are compared with the 2000 census. As
shown in Figure 4.5, the urban/rural distribution is very different across provinces
according to the 2000 census and the 2005 Supas (inter-census). The provinces on
the Java-Bali island are more urban compared with provinces on the other islands.
Also, the IFLS urban/rural shares differ significantly from the Sakernas.
We can see from Figure 4.5 that in 1993, 1997 and 2000, the Sakernas tends
to oversample urban areas in provinces outside Java-Bali island. Especially it
oversampled Lampung, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. At the same time,
it under samples urban areas in provinces on Java-Bali for the same three years. In
2007, the Sakernas urban/rural distribution by province is more similar to the 2005
Supas compared with earlier Sakernas years, even though the differences are still
significant.
The 1993 IFLS urban/rural distribution is more similar to the 2000 census than
the 1993 Sakernas for all provinces except North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South
Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara. For Lampung, West Java, Central Java and East
Java, the 1993 IFLS distribution is very similar to the 2000 census. For Bali and
West Nusa Tenggara, the 1993 IFLS has a lower urban percentage than the 2000
census. For the rest of the provinces, the 1993 IFLS has a higher urban share than
the 2000 census. This same pattern persisted for the IFLS until 2000. In 2007, the
IFLS has a greater urban share for all provinces compared with the 2005 Supas.
The 2007 Sakernas distribution seems to be closer to the 2005 Supas distribution
than the 2007 IFLS distribution.
I also checked the urban/rural distribution by province for different sub-samples
within the IFLS, and I found that the urban/rural distribution by province is not very
different across different sub-samples within the IFLS.
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Figure 4.5: Percent Urban by Survey
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than or equal to 15
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Employment Measures after Using Sampling Weights
Figure 4.6: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Work without and
with Sampling Weights
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Figure 4.7: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Wage Work
without and with Sampling Weights
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Figure 4.8: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Non-Wage Work
without and with Sampling Weights
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As explained in Section 4.2, the 1993 IFLS stratified on province and
urban/rural status. Also, as shown above, the provincial distributions in the IFLS
and the Sakernas differ significantly from each other and also from the Census
distribution. In a country with massive regional diversity, samples with very
different provincial distributions may not be directly comparable. Therefore, for
each year (1993, 1997, 2000, 2007) of the IFLS and each year (1993, 1997,
2000, 2007) of the Sakernas, I compute sampling weights that match the provincial
distribution by urban/rural status to the 2000 census. Then I can find out whether
the difference in the provincial distribution is one of the causes of the gaps between
the IFLS and the Sakernas by recalculating the employment measures using the
sampling weights. In the IFLS, I match the distributions of everyone (all ages)
included in the survey to the census. In the Sakernas, I match the distribution of
adults (equal and over 15) to the census. The weights are shown in Appendix K.
Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.8 compare the trends without using weights with the trends
using weights. We can see that using provincial weights does not narrow the gaps
between the IFLS and the Sakernas in percent working. In fact, the trends with and
without the provincial weights are very similar.
4.4.2 Comparison of Basic Characteristics Distributions
between IFLS, Sakernas, Census, and Inter-Census
In this section, I will show that the age and education distributions differ
significantly between the IFLS and the Sakernas at the province interacted with
urban/rural status level. I also compare these distributions of the IFLS and the
Sakernas to the distributions from the Census and the Inter-Census (Supas).
Age Distribution
All years of the IFLS and the Sakernas are compared with the 2005 Supas. This is
because the 2005 Supas is the only Census/Inter-Census for which I can get the age
Chapter 4. Reconciling Inconsistencies between IFLS and Sakernas 136
distribution at the province interacted with urban/rural status level. Since 2007 is
the closest year to 2005, I compare distributions in 2007 first. Figure L.1 to Figure
L.8 in Appendix L show that in urban areas, the 2007 age distribution is similar
between the IFLS and the Sakernas. Compared with the 2007 Sakernas, the 2007
IFLS has a higher percentage in the 25-34 group and the 65+ group and a lower
percentage in the 15-24 group, the 35-44 group and the 45-54 group. Both of the
2007 Sakernas and the 2007 IFLS seem to have under-sampled the 15-24 group
compared with the 2005 Supas. There is some variation in age distribution across
provinces evident in all three surveys. The 2000 IFLS has a much higher percentage
in the 15-24 age group in urban areas compared with both the 2000 Sakernas and
the 2005 Supas. In 1993 and 1997, the IFLS age distribution and the Sakernas age
distribution are not significantly different from each other.
In rural areas, we see a bigger variation in the age distribution across provinces.
Also, there is more difference between the Sakernas and the IFLS in the age
distribution. In general, the IFLS seems to have a higher percentage in the younger
groups (15-34) and the older groups (55+) and have a lower portion in the middle
groups (35-54).
The age distributions for different sub-samples within IFLS are very similar, so
I do not show details here.
Education Distribution
All years of the IFLS and the Sakernas are compared with the 2005 Supas. This
is because the 2005 Supas is the only Census/Inter-Census for which I can get
the education distribution at the province interacted with urban/rural status level.5
Figure L.9 to Figure L.16 in Appendix L show that in 2007, urban education
distribution varies significantly across provinces for the education group “no
school” and the group “senior secondary and higher”. In 2007, the IFLS education
5Education levels are increasing over time in Indonesia, and as a result earlier rounds of the IFLS
and the Sakernas may not be comparable to the 2005 Supas in terms of education distribution.
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distribution is significantly different from the Sakernas education distribution. The
IFLS has a higher percentage in the “no school”, “elementary incomplete” and the
“senior secondary and higher” groups and a lower percentage in the “elementary”
and “junior secondary” groups. Both the 2007 Sakernas and the 2007 IFLS are
significantly different from the 2005 Supas in terms of education distribution. In
2000, the education distribution is similar between the IFLS and the Sakernas,
except that the IFLS has a higher percentage of the “elementary incomplete”
group and a lower percentage in the “elementary complete” group. The share of
the “senior secondary and higher” group is different between the IFLS and the
Sakernas, too, but which one is bigger depends on the province. In 1997, the IFLS
has higher percentages in the lower education groups (“no school”, “elementary
incomplete” and “elementary complete”) and a much lower share of the highest
education group (“senior secondary and higher”) in urban areas compared with
the 1997 Sakernas. In 1993, the IFLS has a higher percentage in the “no school”
and “elementary incomplete” groups and a lower share of the rest of the education
groups. It seems that in 1993 and 1997, the IFLS sample has lower education
compared with the Sakernas sample in urban areas, but in 2000 and 2007, we cannot
tell which survey sample has lower education any more.
In 2007, the same pattern in terms of education distribution in urban areas is
also observed in rural areas. In 2000, 1997 and 1993, IFLS has a higher percentage
in the “no school” and “elementary incomplete” groups and a lower share in the
“elementary complete” group. Therefore, it seems like in rural areas the IFLS
sample has lower education compared with the Sakernas in 1993, 1997 and 2000,
but not in 2007.
The education distribution for different sub-samples within the IFLS (adults and
adults with work information) are similar, so I do not show the details here.
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4.4.3 Oaxaca Decomposition
The distribution of basic characteristics (province, urban/rural residence, age,
education) differ significantly between the IFLS and the Sakernas for all four survey
years covered by the IFLS. Do these differences explain differences in employment
measures? To answer this question, I conduct an Oaxaca decomposition of the
gaps which gives estimates of the share explained by differences in characteristics
and the share explained by difference in coefficients. In view of differences in the
regional distributions of the two survey samples, I conduct the decomposition first
with province dummies as independent variables and then with provincial sampling
weights. Table 4.1 displays the key results from the Oaxaca decomposition for
all groups and for all outcomes using age and education and province dummies
as independent variables. Table 4.2 displays key results with age and education
as independent variables and with provincial weights. Both tables show the share
of the gap explained by difference in distribution of independent variables. The
shares under IFLS are computed using the coefficients from the IFLS estimation.
The shares under Sakernas are calculated using the coefficients from the Sakernas
estimation.
Table 4.1 reveals that in general the difference in characteristics (age, education,
province) help little with explaining the gaps between the IFLS and the Sakernas
in percent working for all years and all groups. For the share employed in the
wage sector the differences in characteristics do not explain the gaps for 1993, 1997
and 2000, but it does explain a significant share of the gaps for all four groups
in 2007. For the share employed in the non-wage sector, again the differences
in characteristics do not explain the gaps except for both urban and rural males
in 2007. For these two groups a large percentage of the gap is explained by the
difference in characteristics in 2007.
By comparing Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 we can see that only including age
and education as independent variables does not change the results much. This
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Table 4.1: Oaxaca Decomposition Results, Share of Gap Explained by
Difference in Province, Age, Education, in %
Urban Male Urban Female Rural Male Rural Female
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Share of gap in total employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 25.81 4.93 15.24 -2.16 -21.54 1.52 -71.69 -17.41
1997 37.81 -26.74 -30.74 -27.54 -6.59 2.74 -10.41 -12.86
2000 5.35 -2.21 -3.56 -2.08 8.61 -12.06 -0.62 0.75
2007 12.72 -5.17 15.16 4.97 -12.68 -25.7 1.14 -6.41
Share of gap in wage employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 -4.26 -20 3.69 -15.85 -33.01 -34.95 -33.15 -33.29
1997 -7.87 -23.46 -28.7 -37.36 -31.88 -38.7 -11.81 -25.03
2000 2.13 -4.69 -5.02 -7.45 -1.38 -2.24 -5.06 2.75
2007 12.45 8.02 18.59 13.24 17.17 22.57 29.63 21.09
Share of gap in non-wage employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 -21.3 -31.99 56.71 38.94 -26.64 -16.64 -48.72 -26.05
1997 -5.32 -24.82 -19.5 -43.59 -20.16 -19.1 -11.05 -16.05
2000 -2.64 -8.38 0.92 7.15 -3.58 -2.42 -7.52 2.37
2007 12.11 26.17 -3.71 -39.32 39.18 58.11 -92.66 -92.48
Notes: Decomposition (1) use estimated coefficients from the IFLS sample to compute the share
contributed by difference in characteristics. Decomposition (2) use estimated coefficients from the
Sakernas sample to compute the share contributed by difference in characteristics.
Table 4.2: Oaxaca Decomposition Results, Share of Gap Explained by
Difference in Education and Age, with Provincial Weights, in %
Urban Male Urban Female Rural Male Rural Female
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Share of gap in total employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 46.29 24.51 14.71 13.41 -30.21 -1.6 -16.35 5.6
1997 90.78 88.44 -3.4 -0.81 -0.45 -4.92 -10.41 -12.86
2000 9.01 2.69 -0.7 3.92 11.84 -34.73 11.64 -13.66
2007 11.6 -6.46 7.59 0.37 -2.04 -26.59 -1.04 -13.54
Share of gap in wage employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 -9.01 -19.99 -11.43 -21.48 -4.19 -8.14 4.61 -4.8
1997 -8.77 -13.1 -31.31 -28.84 -14 -17.47 10.45 -9.89
2000 2.29 -0.23 -6.76 -4.7 0.05 0.58 9.87 7.57
2007 10.21 5.46 12.76 7.97 12.1 4.77 13.08 7.62
Share of gap in non-wage employment explained by education and age distribution
1993 -31.2 -37.8 134.85 166.17 -14.05 -5.58 -4.9 -0.62
1997 -12.9 -20.76 -131.74 -167.24 -13.58 -7.9 2.34 -6.26
2000 -4.66 -3.9 9.36 19.19 -2.09 5.71 5.19 41.92
2007 8.32 21.85 -35.46 -62.01 26.85 39.04 -361.81 -232.71
Notes: Decomposition (1) use estimated coefficients from the IFLS sample to compute the share
contributed by difference in characteristics. Decomposition (2) use estimated coefficients from the
Sakernas sample to compute the share contributed by difference in characteristics.
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result again confirms that the difference in provincial distribution does not explain
the gaps, but the difference in education and age distribution may explain part of
the gaps for certain outcomes/groups in certain years. In general, however, the
difference in observable characteristics helps little with explaining the gaps between
the IFLS and the Sakernas.
4.4.4 Using Same Questions Deciding whether Working
As shown in Section 4.3, the questions used to decide if a person is working differ
between the IFLS and the Sakernas and differ from year to year within the Sakernas.
This section tries to use the Sakernas questions to re-determine whether individuals
are working in the IFLS sample. Then I can find out whether the difference in
questionnaire explains part of the gaps in employment measures between the two
surveys.
As shown in Appendix J, the main difference between the IFLS and the Sakernas
when deciding if an individual is working is that the IFLS has one more follow-up
question. This question is “Did you work in a family business in the last week?”
Therefore, I re-determine whether a person is working in the IFLS sample without
using the last follow-up question. If a person is re-determined to be not working,
she/he is also not employed in the wage or the non-wage sector. As explained in
Section 4.3, in 1993, about 40% of adults are not interviewed individually and,
as a result, do not answer the questions in the individual information modules
on working. Therefore, for this section I do not re-determine working status for
1993 individuals in the IFLS sample. We will only see if using the same questions
narrows the gaps between the IFLS and the Sakernas in 1997, 2000, and 2007.
Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.11 show the comparison between trends without using the
same questions and with using the same questions. I use the provincial sampling
weights to compute all trends.
We can see that using same questions does seem to close the gaps in the percent
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working by a small amount, especially in rural areas in 2000 and 2007. In terms
of the percent doing wage work, using the same questions does not seem to help
with closing the gaps. This is not surprising as the extra follow-up question in
the IFLS is about work in family businesses, which is categorized as non-wage
work in my analysis. In terms of the percent doing non-wage work, we can see
that using same questions widens the gaps between the IFLS and the Sakernas but
lowers the levels for IFLS. The IFLS has a higher percentage doing wage work
than the Sakernas and has a lower percentage doing non-wage work. When we
use same questions, lowering the IFLS percentage doing non-wage work brings the
total percent working in the IFLS closer to that in the Sakernas.
There is also inconsistency in employment questions within the Sakernas over
years, as explained in detail in Appendix J. In particular, there is a significant
change in questionnaire starting from 2001. Although the questionnaire has
changed, I find using the 2001 Sakernas questionnaire on the 2000 Sakernas sample
does not change who is working at all. Therefore, the change of questionnaire since
2001 in the Sakernas should not have any effect on total employment rate. This
is in contrary to what is claimed in Dhanani et al. (2009). The introduction of two
casual employment sectors, however, does seem to cause a shift of workers from the
non-wage sector into the wage sector from the 2000 Sakernas to the 2001 Sakernas.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 4.4, since both the 2007 IFLS and the 2007
Sakernas have the two new sectors, this should not be a cause of the discrepancy
between the IFLS and the Sakernas.
Chapter 4. Reconciling Inconsistencies between IFLS and Sakernas 142
Figure 4.9: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Work without and
with Same Questions
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Figure 4.10: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Wage Work
without and with Same Questions
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Figure 4.11: Percent of Adults (older than 15) who Do Non-Wage
Work without and with Same Questions
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4.5 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter has compared two widely used large-scale household surveys from
Indonesia, the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) and the Indonesian
Family Life Survey (IFLS), and tries to reconcile the significant discrepancy
between these two surveys in terms of employment measures (total employment
rate, wage employment rate, and non-wage employment rate). I discussed the
potential factors that may cause the discrepancy, including sampling structure,
the panel nature of IFLS, questionnaire design, selection of enumeration areas
and households, interviewer training, questionnaire length, and fieldwork timing.
Then I test how well some of the factors can explain the discrepancy. I find
that using sampling weights (correcting for the stratification on provinces in both
surveys) so that the two surveys have the same regional distribution does not help
with narrowing the gaps. I also find that although the two surveys have different
age and education distributions, this difference does not explain the gaps between
the two surveys. The only factor that seems to help with explaining the gaps is
the difference in questions on working status. Using the Sakernas questions to
re-determine whether a person is working in the IFLS sample does narrow the gap
in total employment in rural areas. By large, however, much of the discrepancy
between the two surveys in employment measures remains unexplained.
The fact that the IFLS and the Sakernas have different age and education
distributions even at the provincial level implies possible differences in the selection
of enumeration areas and/or households within strata. Also, the fact that both
the IFLS and the Sakernas age and education distributions differ significantly
from the Census distribution provides some evidence of non-random selection of
enumeration areas and/or households within strata in the surveys. Although I find
that the difference in education and age distribution in general does not explain
the discrepancies, selection of enumeration areas and/or households on unobserved
characteristics may exist. For example, one survey may have over-looked poorer
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enumeration areas or slums in a particular sampling stratum. Other unverifiable
factors, such as differences in interviewer quality, in questionnaire length, and in
fieldwork timing of the year may also contribute to the discrepancy in employment
measures.
Dropping the question “did you work in a family business last week?” in the
IFLS helps with narrowing the gap in total employment in rural areas. This result
indicates that measuring unpaid family work, especially in rural areas, is hard and
highly depends on the formation of questions in the interview. This confirms the
argument in many other labor studies in Indonesia such as Dhanani et al. (2009)
and Korns (1987) that the measurement of unpaid family work is important for
the accuracy of employment measures in Indonesia. Surveys that aim to measure
employment in developing countries, especially informal employment that includes
unpaid family work, should pay particular attention to the measurement of unpaid
family work. Asking explicitly “whether you worked in a family business” may
help with getting more accurate information about family work in low-income
countries.
As to which survey researchers should use to analyze labor issues in
Indonesia, this chapter does not provide a clear conclusion. Nonetheless, I have
compared systematically the differences between the two surveys pertaining to the
measurement of labor market outcomes. I have also shown that the distribution
of basic characteristics (provincial, urban/rural, age, education) of both surveys
differ from the Census. Furthermore, I have shown that using sampling weights that
correct for differential regional coverage does not explain the gap in employment
measures, nor does accounting for the differences in age and education distributions.
The descriptions and findings in this chapter can be used as important caveats when
using either survey to analyze labor issues in Indonesia. I have shown that the
measurement of unpaid family work depends on the questionnaire and that the
IFLS seems to measure unpaid family work better due to more explicit question
on family work. Therefore, researchers may benefit more from using the IFLS than
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from using the Sakernas if their focus is on informal work, especially unpaid family
work in household businesses.
Another lesson learnt from this chapter is that many surveys from Indonesia
such as the Census, the Inter-Census, the Sakernas and the IFLS may not be directly
comparable. Particular attention should be paid to the difference in sampling
structure, distribution of basic characteristics, questionnaire design, etc. between
surveys when one uses two or more surveys at the same time. Also, what is
claimed about the representativeness of the sample, the consistency of definition
and questionnaire, the quality of the interviewers, etc. should be checked and
documented before using the data.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has analyzed labor market issues in Indonesia. The first chapter analyzes
the insurance role of self-employment during the Asian financial crisis. Difference
in difference estimation is used to estimate the effect of having self-employed
business before the crisis on household consumption and labor supply during
the crisis. I find that households with self-employed business before the crisis
could increase labor supply by a much lesser amount to maintain the same level
of consumption compared to households without self-employed business before
the crisis. The second chapter looks at the effect of women’s work hours on
their intra-household bargaining power. I utilize direct information on household
decision-making from the Indonesian Family Life Survey to construct direct
measures of women’s intra-household bargaining power. I also utilize the price
increase during the Asian Financial Crisis as an instrumental variable that positively
affects women’s work hours but does not affect women’s bargaining power directly.
I find evidence of a positive relationship between women’s work hours and their
intra-household bargaining power. The third chapter compares the Indonesian
Family Life Survey and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey and tries to reconcile
the inconsistency between the two surveys in terms of employment measures. After
documenting and testing potential causes of the inconsistencies, I find that the
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inconsistencies are by large not reconcilable. The design of questions on working
status in the survey and the treatment of unpaid family work, however, does seem
to be a factor causing inconsistencies between the two surveys.
This thesis will add to our knowledge of labor market in developing countries.
In particular, it adds to our understanding of the informal sector in developing
countries. In a country where there are frequent shocks to the formal economy
and where there is little formal insurance institutions, the informal sector functions
as a safety net for individuals to fall back into during shocks to the formal economy.
Also, having self-employed business in the informal sector may serve as a form of
insurance for households against shocks in the formal sector.
This thesis also adds to our understanding of intra-household decision-making
by describing decision-making patterns using unique data in the Indonesian Family
Life Survey. It also contributes to the literature on intra-household decision making
by testing the effect of economic factors such as women’s working status and
wage on direct measures of their decision-making power. My analysis shows that
household members may have different influence on different aspects of household
decisions. Also, it shows that in addition to wage, how much a woman works may
also affect their intra-household bargaining power.
This thesis will also add to our understanding of two important surveys from
Indonesia, the Indonesian Family Life Survey and the Indonesian Labor Force
Survey, and provide important implications for the design of labor force surveys in
developing countries. The findings in this thesis indicate that researchers should
pay special attention to differences in sampling structure, distribution of basic
characteristics, questionnaire design, etc. between surveys when they use two or
more surveys at the same time. Also, my analysis shows that accurate measure
of unpaid family work is crucial in obtaining accurate measures of employment in
developing countries.
Appendices
152
Appendix A
Re-contact and Interview Procedure
of IFLS
A.1 IFLS1
In 1993, IFLS1 was conducted. IFLS1 stratified on provinces and urban/rural
residence, and households were randomly sampled within these strata. 7730
households were sampled and among them 7224 households were interviewed. In
the households that were interviewed, detailed individual interview that contains
the working questions (the adult information module) was only conducted on the
following of these households:
• The household head and spouse
• Two randomly selected children of the head and spouse aged between 0 and
14 (interviewed by proxy)
• An individual aged 50 and above and his/her spouse, randomly selected from
remaining members
• For a randomly selected 25% of households, an individual aged between 15
and 49 and his/her spouse, randomly selected from remaining members.
The maximum number of members interviewed with detailed questions in each
household was limited to 4. As a result, for 1% of households, some members that
fit the criteria above had to be dropped.
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A.2 IFLS2
The goal of IFLS2 was to relocate and re-interview IFLS1 households. Field work
for IFLS2 was conducted mostly between August, 1997 and December, 1997, with
5% of households interviewed in January, 1998. If an IFLS1 household was found
intact in 1997, it would be treated as an original household. If the household had
split up between 1993 and 1997, then when the first respondent from that household
was re-contacted in IFLS2, that respondent’s household was designated as the
original household. Among people that have moved out of the original households,
two kinds of people are tracked: 1. Individuals who answered detailed individual
questions in 1993, 2. IFLS1 household members who were 26 or older in 1993.
These people are called the target respondents, and the households they resided
in 1997 are called split off households. Individual level interviews which include
the adult information module are conducted on selected people according to the
following two rules:
• In original households, everyone in the household was interviewed
individually
• In split-off households, only the target respondents, their spouses, and their
children were interviewed individually.
Note that the rule for conducting conducting individual interviews in original
households has changed from 1993 to 1997. In 1993, mostly it was only the
household heads and their spouses that were interviewed individually. In 1997,
everyone in the original households was interviewed. This has changed the
demographic distribution of people who are interviewed individually from 1993
to 1997.
A.3 IFLS2+
IFLS2+ was a survey round that was specifically aimed at capturing the effect of the
Asian Financial Crisis. In this round, only a sub-sample of the IFLS1 households
from 7 out of the 13 original provinces were tracked and interviewed. For the 25%
sub-sample, tracking rules were similar to IFLS2. Namely, if an individual had
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moved out of his her original household, he/she was tracked if he/she was a target
respondent. In original households, everyone was interviewed individually. In split
off households, everyone was interviewed individually as well. Since I do not have
access to IFLS2+ data, I cannot find out detailed sampling procedure of IFLS2+.
A.4 IFLS3
IFLS3 was conducted in 2000. Households that have moved from 1997 were
tracked. The following individuals who moved out of original households were
followed:
• 1993 main respondents ( the respondents that answered the individual level
questions)
• 1993 household members born before 1968
• Individuals born since 1993 in original 1993 households
• Individuals born after 1988 if they were residents in an original household in
1993.
• 1993 household members who were born between 1968 and 1988 if they were
interviewed in 1997
• 20% random sample of 1993 household members who were born between
1968 and 1988 if they were not interviewed in 1997
The households that these individuals resided in 2000 were the split-off
households in 2000. In original households in 2000, everyone who could be was
interviewed or had a proxy interview, even if they were not IFLS1 members. In
split-off households, all IFLS1 members, their spouses and biological children were
interviewed, but not others.
A.5 IFLS4
IFLS4 was conducted in 2007. The target households were original IFLS1
households, minus all of those households whose member had died by 2000, plus
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split-off households from 1997, 1998 and 2000. Field work was conducted between
November, 2007 and May, 2008. In IFLS4, 6596 original IFLS1 households
were re-contacted, 3366 old split-off households were re-contacted, and 4033 new
split-off households were contacted.
Rules for tracking individuals who had moved are the following, which are
similar to 2000:
• 1993 main respondents
• 1993 household members born before 1968
• Individuals born since 1993 in original 1993 households, also in split-off
households if they were children of 1993 IFLS household members
• Individuals born after 1988 if they were residents in an original household in
1993
• 1993 household members who were born between 1968 and 1988 if they were
interviewed in 2000
• 20% random sample of 1993 household members who were born between
1968 and 1988 if they were not interviewed in 2000.
The households that the target respondents above resided in were designated as
split-off households. In original households, everyone that could be interviewed
was interviewed individually. In split-off households, only the target respondent,
their spouses, and biological children were interviewed.
Appendix B
OLS Regression Results, Chapter 2
B: OLS regression results
As shown in table B.1 and B.2, if we assume that self-employment status is not
endogenous and estimate equation 2.18 and 2.19 using ordinary least squares, we
will get that having self-employment in 1997 increases per capita consumption by
around 7%. In terms of work, we can see that having self-employment in 1997
also increases the percentage of adult members who work by around 10 percentage
points. If we look at hours, we can see that having prior self-employment also
increases hours by various measures. Therefore from the OLS regressions, having
prior self-employment has no insurance value during the crisis in terms of work,
and it seems like having prior self-employment has some insurance value during
the crisis in terms of consumption.
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Appendix C
Sample Size and Attrition at the
Household Level IFLS
Table C.1: Sample Size and Attrition of IFLS 1993, 1997, 1998 and 2000
Household Type
Original 1997 Splits 1998 Splits 2000 Splits
1993 households 7224
1997 households 6742 878
1993-1997 recontact rate 93%
1997 HHs to be tracked in 1998 1911 264
1993 HHs to be tracked in 1998 2063
1998 households 1990 344
1993-1998 recontact rate 96%
1997 households that are also in 1998 1893 241
1997-1998 recontact rate 99% 91%
2000 households 6758 2646
1993-2000 recontact rate 94%
1997 households that are also in 2000 6564 751
1997-2000 recontact rates 97% 86%
1998 households that are also in 2000 1935 220 279
1998-2000 recontact rates 97% 91% 81%
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Appendix D
Household Decision Making Module
from IFLS
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Appendix E
Summary Characteristics of OLS
Regressions, Chapter 3
165
166
Table E.1: Summary of Characteristics 2000, 7 Categories of Decisions
Sample All Couples With Working Wife
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Obs. 4349 2264
Index 1 Percent Sole 0.2824 0.2272 0.2901 0.2285
Index 2 Average Decision Weight 0.5371 0.1687 0.5494 0.1659
Hours Wife 23.9496 29.5053 46.0057 25.6418
Hours Husband 48.5777 24.6861 49.3929 25.0140
Age Wife 37.3233 11.6695 39.0031 10.2021
Age Husband 42.6420 12.9283 44.2566 11.8453
Years of Sch. Wife 6.4077 4.3297 6.3220 4.6119
Years of Sch. Husband 7.3102 4.5147 7.0769 4.6711
Hourly Wage Wife 1900 5566 1900 5566
Hourly Wage Husband 2543 12201 2023 3276
Husband Not Working 0.0607 0.2388 0.0565 0.2310
Non-labor income Wife 99365 647332 104522 525493
Non-labor income Husband 292948 1656376 222186 1528711
Non-business asset Wife 10883691 31159719 11326320 28780893
Non-business asset Husband 14137155 36093618 13952889 31907547
Business Asset Wife 2162454 13621599 2881753 14817303
Business Asset Husband 7935037 41739273 8150524 35295912
Number of Adults in HH 3.2212 1.3942 3.1793 1.3307
Number over 65 in HH 0.1692 0.4336 0.1617 0.4198
Urban 0.4838 0.4998 0.4554 0.4981
Javanese 0.4353 0.4958 0.4916 0.5000
Sundanese 0.1347 0.3415 0.1082 0.3107
Balinese 0.0644 0.2455 0.0707 0.2563
Sasak 0.0391 0.1938 0.0402 0.1965
Minang 0.0350 0.1837 0.0371 0.1891
Batak 0.0299 0.1703 0.0371 0.1891
Bugis 0.0416 0.1997 0.0283 0.1658
Banjar 0.0322 0.1765 0.0300 0.1707
Betawi 0.0352 0.1843 0.0252 0.1567
South Sumatran 0.0246 0.1549 0.0212 0.1441
Madura 0.0260 0.1591 0.0278 0.1645
Cirebon 0.0225 0.1484 0.0239 0.1526
Bima 0.0166 0.1276 0.0124 0.1105
Makasar 0.0147 0.1204 0.0066 0.0811
Other Ethnicity 0.0538 0.2257 0.0451 0.2075
Javanese in North Smtr. 0.0267 0.1611 0.0234 0.1512
Javanese in South Smtr. 0.0108 0.1034 0.0119 0.1086
Javanese in Lampung 0.0193 0.1376 0.0239 0.1526
Javanese in Jakarta 0.0237 0.1521 0.0225 0.1484
Javanese in West Java 0.0333 0.1795 0.0225 0.1484
Javanese in Yogyakarta 0.0556 0.2293 0.0773 0.2671
Javanese in Central Java 0.1262 0.3322 0.1595 0.3662
Javanese in East Java 0.1258 0.3316 0.1391 0.3462
Javanese in South Kalimtn. 0.0069 0.0828 0.0066 0.0811
Sundanese in Lampung 0.0090 0.0943 0.0093 0.0959
Sundanese in Jakarta 0.0133 0.1147 0.0115 0.1066
Sundanese in West Java 0.1074 0.3096 0.0830 0.2760
Betawi in Jakarta 0.0228 0.1492 0.0168 0.1285
Betawi in West Java 0.0124 0.1107 0.0084 0.0912
Couple Ethn. Differ 0.1223 0.3277 0.1078 0.3102
167
Table E.2: Summary of Characteristics 2000, 11 Categories of
Decisions, Households with Children between 0 and 15
Sample All Couple With Wife Working
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Obs. 2857 1530
Index 1 Percent Sole 0.2933 0.2269 0.2948 0.2265
Index 2 Average Decision Weight 0.5431 0.1667 0.5528 0.1617
Work Hours Wife 24.7825 29.7520 46.2768 25.6530
Work Hours Husband 50.3078 23.8865 50.8631 24.5140
Age Wife 36.1176 9.4980 37.5752 8.7307
Age Husband 41.3668 10.7959 42.7235 10.3008
Years of Sch. Wife 6.5506 4.2467 6.5150 4.5199
Years of Sch. Husband 7.4158 4.5065 7.1922 4.6426
Hourly Wage Wife 1911 4794 1911 4794
Hourly Wage Husband 2687 12649 2077 3117
Husband Not Working 0.0427 0.2022 0.0464 0.2104
Non-labor income Wife 85375 497928 114314 597843
Non-labor income Husband 219352 1447964 160070 1395234
Non-business asset Wife 10954890 27882225 11553372 30546909
Non-business asset Husband 13977216 32672394 13614831 29705121
Business Asset Wife 1999688 10505754 2588335 12268476
Business Asset Husband 8322005 46508751 8524550 38081772
Number of Adults in HH 3.1943 1.3803 3.1889 1.3427
Number over 65 in HH 0.1456 0.4002 0.1444 0.4004
Urban 0.4795 0.4997 0.4314 0.4954
Javanese 0.4382 0.4963 0.4902 0.5001
Sundanese 0.1369 0.3438 0.1026 0.3036
Balinese 0.0602 0.2379 0.0667 0.2495
Sasak 0.0294 0.1690 0.0327 0.1779
Minang 0.0371 0.1890 0.0386 0.1926
Batak 0.0333 0.1793 0.0425 0.2018
Bugis 0.0385 0.1924 0.0301 0.1708
Banjar 0.0343 0.1820 0.0340 0.1813
Betawi 0.0336 0.1802 0.0222 0.1475
South Sumatran 0.0294 0.1690 0.0261 0.1596
Madura 0.0259 0.1589 0.0268 0.1615
Cirebon 0.0238 0.1525 0.0248 0.1557
Bima 0.0168 0.1285 0.0137 0.1164
Makasar 0.0140 0.1175 0.0065 0.0806
Other Ethnicity 0.0557 0.2293 0.0503 0.2187
Javanese in North Smtr. 0.0312 0.1738 0.0248 0.1557
Javanese in South Smtr. 0.0116 0.1069 0.0131 0.1136
Javanese in Lampung 0.0210 0.1434 0.0261 0.1596
Javanese in Jakarta 0.0207 0.1422 0.0203 0.1409
Javanese in West Java 0.0347 0.1829 0.0242 0.1537
Javanese in Yogyakarta 0.0473 0.2122 0.0608 0.2390
Javanese in Central Java 0.1309 0.3374 0.1686 0.3745
Javanese in East Java 0.1250 0.3307 0.1412 0.3483
Javanese in South Kalimtn. 0.0084 0.0913 0.0072 0.0845
Sundanese in Lampung 0.0116 0.1069 0.0111 0.1049
Sundanese in Jakarta 0.0137 0.1161 0.0092 0.0952
Sundanese in West Java 0.1054 0.3071 0.0771 0.2669
Betawi in Jakarta 0.0214 0.1446 0.0144 0.1191
Betawi in West Java 0.0123 0.1100 0.0078 0.0882
Couple Ethn. Differ 0.1257 0.3315 0.1105 0.3136
Appendix F
Estimation of Selection Equation,
Chapter 3
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Table F.1: Selection Equation
7 Categories 11 Categories
Urban -.16112*** -.28559***
(-3.59) (-5.15)
Age wife .01925*** .02483***
(8.71) (7.65)
Years of school wife .02807*** .03632***
(3.57) (3.67)
Household Total Non-Labor Income (in 1000 US$) -.43856*** -.37233***
(-4.22) (-2.58)
Household Total Assets (in 1000 US$) -.00642** -.00844**
(-2.33) (-2.33)
Number of Pre-School Children (0-6) -.19791*** -.20528***
(-6.18) (-5.20)
Number 7-15 .11705*** .06281***
(4.78) (2.00)
Number older than 65 -.26092*** -.22418***
(-5.00) (-3.35)
Number Female .05833** .05876**
(2.24) (2.01)
Work age members no school .02488 .04211
(0.52) (0.69)
Work age members elem. sch. .00397 .02504
(0.15) (0.79)
Work age members jr. sec. -.11529*** -.12182***
(-3.96) (-3.42)
Work age members sr. sec. -.10118*** -.10393***
(-3.68) (-2.99)
Work age members post sec. .15157*** .18963***
(3.26) (3.04)
Constant -.93928*** -1.1196***
(-7.31) (-6.71)
Observations 4349 2857
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Coefficients on province dummies not reported here, many of these coefficients are significant
Work age members are members between 15 and 65 years old
Appendix G
Attrition of IFLS at the Individual
Level
Table G.1: Number of Respondents Each Year by the Year in Which
the Respondent First Appeared in IFLS
1993 1997 1998 2000 2007
1993 Original Respondents 33081 27236 7975 27530 23902
1997 New Respondents 6694 1725 5112 4190
1998 New Respondents 1458 1099 768
2000 New Respondents 9908 6191
2007 New Respondents 15531
Total 33081 33930 11158 43649 50582
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Appendix H
Sakernas Sample Size
Table H.1: Sample Size (Number of Individuals) Sakernas 1993-2007
Year Total Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1993 279784 72396 68489 69865 69034
1994 245206
1995 948380
1996 247199
1997 219439
1998 163517
1999 155572
2000 98952
2001 119935
2002 275353
2003 232466
2004 237290
2005 202633
2006 193696
2007 910277
Notes: Q1 means Quarter 1. In 1993 only Q3 sample is used for analysis in this
paper, so that Sakernas field work is conducted in August for all years
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Appendix I
Examples of Those who Work in
Sakernas and IFLS Interviewer
Manual
I.1 1993 IFLS Interviewer Manual
• Those who engage in activities producing rice and/or secondary crops that are
consumed by oneself and those engaged in activities yielding something (no
rice or secondary crops) which are consumed by oneself like sewing clothes,
cooking for the family, angling (fishing) for pleasure is not included in work.
• The household members who help the other household heads/household
members in the wet rice fields, dry rice fields, shops, etc. are taken to be
working even if they do not receive wages/salaries.
• Somebody who leases machines/farming tools, industry machines, feast
equipment, means of transportation etc. is categorized as working.
• Domestic assistants are in the category of working people, both as household
members of their employers and non-household members of their employers.
• Criminals who engage in activities like working the soil, making furniture,
etc., are not groups as workers
• Somebody who leases farming land to others on a production-sharing basis,
is categorized as worker if he takes the risks or joins the management of this
farming.
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I.2 1996 Sakernas Interviewer Manual
• Conducting work as in the concept of working to earn wages/help seek
earnings is an economic activity that produces goods or services.
• A person who conducts activities of planting cultivation where the production
is for self consumption is not considered as working except the plant
cultivation are main food such as rice, corn, sago and or secondary crop
(cassava, sweet potato, potato).
• Household members that help the work of head of the household or other
household members, for example, in the rice field, stall/shop etc., are
considered as working although they do not receive salary/wages (unpaid
worker).
• A person that uses his profession for their own household needs is considered
as working, example a doctor who heals his household members, a brick layer
that fixes his own house, and tailors who sew their own clothes.
• A person that hires machines/farm machinery, industrial machines, party
instruments, transportation and others is categorized as working.
• Domestic help are categorized as working, also as household members of
their employer or as non-household members.
• A prisoner that works as a gardener, makes furniture etc. is not categorized
as working.
• A person that rents his farm to another person and share production is
categorized as working if he/she is responsible or is managing the farm.
• A field laborer and loose laborer who is waiting for a job is considered as not
working.
Appendix J
Questions Determining Whether
Working in IFLS and Sakernas
J.1 IFLS
1. What was your primary activity during the past week?
(a) Working/trying to work/helping to earn income – If yes, working; if not,
next question
(b) Job searching
(c) Attending school
(d) Housekeeping
(e) Retired
(f) Other, specify
2. Did you work for at least 1 hour during the past week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No – next question
3. Do you have a job/business, but were temporarily not working during the past
week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No – next question
4. Did you work at a family-owned (farm or non-farm) business during the past
week?
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(a) Yes – working
(b) No
J.2 Sakernas
J.2.1 1986 - 1996
1. What was your primary activity during the past week?
(a) Employed – If yes, working; if not, next question
(b) Schooling
(c) Housekeeping
(d) Not capable to have any activities
(e) Other
2. Did you work for at least 1 hour during the past week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No – next question
3. Do you have a job/business, but were temporarily not working during the past
week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No
J.2.2 1997- 2000
1. Did you engage in any of the following activities during the previous week?
(a) Earned a living/helped to earn a living 1
1. Yes 2. No
(b) Attended school
1. Yes 2. No
(c) Housekeeping
1. Yes 2. No
1This particular choice was “worked” in 1998, and in the 1998 questionnaire it is written that the
definition of work is to engage in an activity for at least one continuous hour in order to earn/help
earn an income
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(d) Looked for a job
1. Yes 2. No
(e) Other
1. Yes 2. No
If you answered “Yes” to any of the choices above, what was your primary
activity during the previous week?
1 – working 2 2 3 4
2. Were you employed for at least 1 hour during the past week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No – next question
3. Do you have a job/business, but were temporarily not working during the past
week?
(a) Yes – working
(b) No
J.2.3 2001 - 2011
1. Did you engage in any of the following activities during the previous week?
(a) Work3
1. Yes – working 2. No
(b) Attended school
1. Yes 2. No
(c) Housekeeping
1. Yes 2. No
(d) Other
1. Yes 2. No
If you answered “Yes” to any of the choices above, what was your primary
activity during the previous week?
1 2 3 4
2. Did you have a job but were temporarily not working during the previous
week?
2If the individual answered “yes” to 1.(a) but did not choose 1 here, then she will answer “yes”
to Question 2.
3According to 2001 Sakernas User’s Guide by Australian National University, the definition of
working in this questionnaire is “an activity done by a person who worked for a pay or assisted
others in obtaining pay or profit for the duration at least on hour during the survey week
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(a) Yes – working
(b) No
Appendix K
Sampling Weights (provincial
weights), Chapter 4
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Appendix L
Age and Education Distribution of
IFLS, Sakernas, Census and
Inter-Census
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Figure L.1: Age Distribution by Survey Urban 2007
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.2: Age Distribution by Survey Urban 2000
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.3: Age Distribution by Survey Urban 1997
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.4: Age Distribution by Survey Urban 1993
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.5: Age Distribution by Survey Rural 2007
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.6: Age Distribution by Survey Rural 2000
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.7: Age Distribution by Survey Rural 1997
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.8: Age Distribution by Survey Rural 1993
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.9: Education Distribution by Survey Urban 2007
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.10: Education Distribution by Survey Urban 2000
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.11: Education Distribution by Survey Urban 1997
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
215
Figure L.12: Education Distribution by Survey Urban 1993
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.13: Education Distribution by Survey Rural 2007
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.14: Education Distribution by Survey Rural 2000
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than or
equal to 15
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Figure L.15: Education Distribution by Survey Rural 1997
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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Figure L.16: Education Distribution by Survey Rural 1993
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Notes: All means all individuals of all ages. Adults means individuals older than
or equal to 15
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